Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
WITH ABSTRACTS
AND ANNOTATIONS



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A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS

Prepared by the
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PREFACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyrillic alphabet are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged and unclassified materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

Matters of fact and opinion presented in *Arms Control & Disarmament* are solely the responsibility of the authors of the items abstracted, and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement by either the Library of Congress or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Information about the periodicals cited can in most instances be obtained readily from standard reference works.

The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,700 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate are, with the permission of their copyright owners, sometimes used verbatim or in modified form and are designated as "abstract supplied" or "abstract supplied, modified."

Library of Congress Location Symbols

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Sci RR	Science Reading Room
Slav Rm	Slavic Room

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I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A. BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

894
Atkinson, James D. THE POLITICS OF STRUGGLE: THE COMMUNIST FRONT AND POLITICAL WARFARE. Chicago, H. Regnery Co. [1966] 192 p.
HX518. S8A8

Contents. --pt. 1. Political warfare; its strategy and tactics: Origins of non-traditional warfare. Soviet diplomacy and non-traditional warfare. The fronts emerge. History intervenes. --pt. 2. Non-traditional warfare; a case history. The parent front, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The World Federation of Teachers' Unions (FISE: Fédération Internationale Syndicale de l'Enseignement) takes shape. The FISE in action. The FISE, other fronts, and Soviet foreign policy. --pt. 3. Outlook for Communist front organizations. The exploitation of nationalism in the developing nations. Emphasis on Africa and Latin America. The fronts: agencies of Communist espionage and subversion? The fronts and the Chinese Communist-Soviet dispute. Fronts as proxy forces in the cold war. --Index.

Analyzes the philosophy and tactics of communism's political and propaganda warfare. While democracies find it difficult to mobilize their defense resources until they are confronted with an overt act of war, the Communists wage a daily political war under the guise of "peace." Although the Soviet Union originated this psycho-political strategy, other Communist countries--particularly Communist China--are following the Russian pattern.

895
Brams, Steven J. RESEARCH COMMUNICATION: A NOTE ON THE COSMOPOLITANISM OF WORLD REGIONS. Journal of peace research, no. 1, 1968: 87-95. AS9. J6, 1968

"Slightly revised version of a paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Purdue University, April 27-29, 1967."

Comparative analysis of the cosmopolitanism of world regions. Cosmopolitanism is defined as "the proportion of ties nations in one region have with nations in all other regions, in contrast to the proportion of ties they have with nations in their own region." Brams constructs indices of these ties that permit quantitative comparisons between regions.

896
Cherniak, N. [THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ARMED DEFENSE OF SOCIALISM] Mezhdunarodnoe znachenie vooruzhennoi zashchity sotsializma. Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, v. 48, Jan. 1968: 15-21. U717. R9A27, v. 48

Wars in defense of the Socialist achievements of the workers are wars of liberation and different from those between nations of the exploiting classes. The basic war aims of a Socialist state are protection of socialism and the workers' freedom and independence and aid to other countries in their struggle for liberty against imperialism and reaction. These wars are revolutionary, often a combination of internal civil war and armed struggle against imperialist aggressors; they are essentially national wars with the broad masses as active participants. The Marxist-Leninist Party is the leading inspiring and organizing force in guarding the workers' gains; it is capable of uniting and mobilizing material and human resources for crushing the aggressor. International Socialist solidarity has resulted in Soviet aid to China in the 1920's and from 1937 to 1940, the liberation of Southern and Southeastern Europe and China during World War II, and assistance to Korea from 1950 to 1953. The U.S.S.R. today is providing the Vietnamese with military and economic aid; the party has declared that "upon the request of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Soviet volunteers will take part in battles against the American aggressors."

897
Cleveland, Harold van B. THE ATLANTIC IDEA AND ITS EUROPEAN RIVALS. New York, Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill [1966] xxxi, 186 p. (The Atlantic policy studies)
D843. C5766
Bibliographical references included in footnotes.

Partial contents. --The Atlantic alliance in a nuclear age. --Control of the deterrent. --Control of international money. --Trade policy. --The European idea: theme and variation. --The Atlantic idea. --Index.

Analysis of the dynamics of European and Atlantic politics. Relations between the Atlantic nations are no longer characterized by the territorial or ethnic disputes that dominated the pre-World War II scene; instead they are concerned with the control of the systems for military and economic cooperation that have developed in the past two decades. In seeking to identify the forces that work for and against Atlantic unity, Cleveland describes the framework of functional interdependence within the Atlantic region and explores the conflicting views regarding the distribution of authority within the framework. Although the struggle continues between the advocates of a European approach and the advocates of an Atlantic approach to regional unity, Cleveland urges proponents of greater cohesion in the area not to despair, for already "the peace has been preserved, economic growth has exceeded all expectations and in the Atlantic area political stability has been achieved."

898
Clotfelter, James. THE AFRICAN MILITARY FORCES. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, May 1968: 23-31. illus. Z6723. U35, v. 48

African military forces are multifunctional: they maintain internal order, participate in national develop-

ment programs, counter external threats, and take part in domestic politics. Most African nations have undergone military rule because few civilian governments have successfully withstood military intervention. However, some civilian leaders have sought both to make military intervention unprofitable and to resist it forcibly by distributing higher wages, encouraging interservice rivalries, using security forces, and arming youth groups or other nonmilitary groups. But establishment of military regimes is firmly entrenched, primarily to discourage the civilians from dividing the armies by competitive appeals to tribe, region, and political ideology.

899
Daw, E. D. TRENDS IN JAPANESE NATIONALISM. Australian Army journal, no. 223, Dec. 1967: 13-21.
U1.A92, 1967

Traces the development of modern Japanese nationalism from the mid-19th century to 1945 and speculates on the reemergence of a Japanese nationalism reminiscent of that of previous times. Modern nationalism in Japan is a direct result of the impact of European power, but geographical separateness and a common government, religion, racial descent, and language were also factors. The year 1931 marked a turning point in modern Japanese nationalism. Japanese nationalism became "external" in character when Japan adopted an expansion policy. Postwar nationalism was virtually nonexistent; militarism was abandoned, nonpolitical symbols were used, and the nationalism that did exist was inward or for "home consumption." The Japan of today, with its budding nationalism, shows elements present in the 1920's and 1930's. By 1970, when the present treaty with the United States comes up for negotiation, "there will undoubtedly be a change in the status quo of Japan's internal and external political life."

900
Domes, Jürgen. [STUDIES ON CHINESE COMMUNISM] Studien zum chinesischen Kommunismus. Moderne Welt, v. 9, no. 1, 1968: 78-93.
D839.M58, v. 9

Political bibliography on China covering the last several years. Domes comments on some of the listed works and articles.

901
Druckman, Daniel. ETHNOCENTRISM IN THE INTERNATION SIMULATION. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 12, Mar. 1968: 45-68.
JX1901.J6, v. 12

Hypotheses from the literature on ethnocentrism in intergroup relations were tested in eleven runs of an Inter-Nation Simulation, each one week in duration. A disguised measure of ethnocentric bias was used. Naval recruits, playing roles of decision-makers in "nations," acted as judges in assessing the degree to which certain personality traits characterized each of the participants. Strong support for the proposition of "universal" ethnocentrism was obtained. Biasing tendencies, evidenced in stronger adulation of own nation members than of allies, and in derogation of enemies, were present in each run and for all types of traits. When alliances shifted, the bias shifted accordingly. Renegades received more intense negative sentiment than continuing enemies, while converts to the alliance received more intense positive sentiment than continuing allies. Other findings included support for the selective bias hypothesis, and the fact that the role with the most equal-status international contacts was least ethnocentric while a lower status role (most concerned with status mobility) was most ethnocentric. (Abstract supplied)

902
Fedder, Edwin H. THE CONCEPT OF ALLIANCE. International studies quarterly, v. 12, Mar. 1968: 65-86.
D839.B2, v. 12

An alliance is a military compact and is distinguished from an international organization or agency which performs economic, political, social, and cultural tasks. The alliance is different from a collective security arrangement because the latter abandons the exclusive concern for national interests and accepts instead sweeping commitments to the interests of the world community. Textbook definitions of alliances are generalized, and the formulation of definitive constructs that might give rise to theories are absent. The result is great confusion in the literature regarding the most fundamental variables in alliances. Alliances are not particularly viable and work best in bilateral, rather than multilateral, systems. The significance of an alliance "rests principally upon its place in the operational and psychological environments of the national decision processes of the members." It is not an instrument of national policy. The study of alliances facilitates interpretation of nation-state behavior and fuller understanding of the transformation of national values that takes place in alliances.

903
Genevey, Pierre. [DÉTENTE IN EUROPE] Détente en Europe. Politique étrangère, v. 32, no. 6, 1967: 507-517.
JX3.P6, v. 32

Although the political situation in Europe has hardly changed since the early 1950's, the extreme tension that prevailed between the two political blocs has weakened; détente in Europe is now a reality. Among the reasons for this shift in attitude is that the antagonism between Eastern and Western Europe was artificial since it was based on the rivalry of the superpowers. In addition nuclear deterrence made it highly unlikely that there would be a confrontation between the United States and Russia. For Europeans nuclear parity meant that general war was improbable, and deterrence has stabilized the European situation without actually resolving the political and geographical chasm between socialism and capitalism. The East and West alike have gained new freedom and greater stability, and both blocs have profited from the recent economic, cultural, and social exchanges. The path to future European cooperation lies in these exchanges and the recognition by both sides that they can benefit from cooperation and a "community spirit."

904
Harkabi, Y. BASIC FACTORS IN THE ARAB COLLAPSE DURING THE SIX-DAY WAR. Orbis, v. 11, fall 1967: 677-691.
D839.O68, v. 11

The Arab defeat in the June war was a result not only of military failures but of "flaws of national character, weaknesses in the national fabric and spirit, and errors in basic approaches and conceptions." The high degree of distrust and hostility in Arab society precludes dis-

ciplined and abiding unity. Whereas the Israeli soldier is confident, proud, courageous, and reliable, his Arab counterpart is unreliable and individualistic. He mistrusts his officers, who in turn reveal little concern for him. In addition the Arab ethos and ideology induce the Arab soldier to close his eyes to the truth. His frequent falsehoods, inability to distinguish between truth and reality, and self-glorification contributed to the Arab defeat. There is little hope for a nation or army that deludes itself into thinking that it is invincible; while the Egyptian Army was reporting successes in the battlefield, Israel was on the verge of one of the greatest victories of all time. These defects in Arab society could be one of the greatest obstacles in initiation of a positive change for the Arab nations--all the more so when they have been pointed up by a humiliating defeat.

905
Kára, Karel. ON THE MARXIST THEORY OF WAR AND PEACE: A STUDY. Journal of peace research, no. 1, 1968: 1-27. AS9.J6, 1968

Bibliographical references included in "Notes and References." p. 22-26.

This study strives to elucidate some functional problems of war and peace from the Marxist viewpoint. War and peace are understood exclusively as social phenomena, not manifestations of any super-natural power outside human society. The study emphasizes the explication of concepts used and points out confusions on some terms in Marxist literature. The author examines the problems of war and peace, both in terms of relations among states and of national liberation and civil wars. Here he attempts to elucidate the relationship of war and revolution, notably the Marxist attitude to the so-called 'export of revolution' and the Marxist conception of peaceful and non-violent forms of revolution. He further deals with the avoidability and unavoidability of wars in our times and the problems relating to peaceful coexistence. The author points out that the tremendous changes in today's world make impossible any solution of these problems in terms of timeworn attitudes. The study also emphasizes the role of thermonuclear weapons in the structure of social phenomena. The emergence of nuclear missile war techniques has changed the social function of wars. Only non-nuclear wars have in essence retained their original social function; but even these involve new elements and can easily grow into nuclear missile wars. The author concludes that peace and peaceful coexistence among states are not only possible, but a historical necessity. He outlines the views held by various groups in the international Communist movement on some basic issues and also confronts the Marxist conception of war and peace with the views of some non-Marxist scholars. (Abstract supplied, modified)

906
Kenworthy, Eldon. BLACK-WHITE AT HOME, NORTH-SOUTH ABROAD. Yale review, v. 57, winter 1968: 161-181. AP2.Y2, v. 57

Increasingly the conflict between north and south, i.e., between haves and have-nots predominates over that between East and West. The new prominence of this old cleavage is attributable to the rise of native southern leaders able to articulate the growing aspirations of their peoples, and the differential in possession of wealth and power between the two areas is made worse each day by the inequitable working of the present international system. At the moment, only the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons offers the southern states access to a kind of equality. The north must accept changes in the international system beneficial to the south and must realize that change within southern states is equally necessary and not likely to be peaceful. The ideology of southern revolutionaries will be leftist if not Communist. In the past, U.S. policymakers have toyed with the idea of promoting a nationalistic revolutionary ideology to counter Marxism but now take the position that revolution in backward states is unnecessary. These officials fail to realize that a New Deal solution to social ills is possible only when power is widely shared and institutions neutral. In the south a political revolution must precede the economic and social one, and to blame instability in have-not states on agitators simply ignores the root causes of violence. The north-south conflict has its domestic analogy in the struggle between Black and White in the United States. We might better understand the coming international struggle if we studied more closely the history of this domestic one.

907
Marwell, Gerald, and David R. Schmitt. ARE "TRIVIAL" GAMES THE MOST INTERESTING PSYCHOLOGICALLY? Behavioral science, v. 13, Mar. 1968: 125-128. BF1.B4, v. 13

In recent discussions of the variety of 2 X 2 games, those in which the same outcome is preferred by both players, so that there is no conflict of interest, have been defined as "trivial" and of lesser "psychological interest" than those nonzero-sum games in which there remains some conflict of interest. An example of the latter type of game is the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma. The opposite position, that trivial games are the most interesting psychologically, is advanced here. The results of research with nontrivial games are much more difficult to interpret unambiguously. Examples are given to indicate how trivial games may be used to demonstrate the importance of motives, such as a desire to maximize differences, a desire to reduce inequity of payoffs, and a desire to be altruistic. (Abstract supplied)

908
Nemo, Général. [RUSSIANS AND AMERICANS FACE CHINA] Russes et Américains face à la Chine. Revue de défense nationale, v. 24, Apr. 1968: 678-688. D410.R45, v. 24

In the coming years the United States and Russia will consider Communist China their foremost adversary. Although they must cope with a common threat, their attitudes toward China are not the same. Americans have long been disconcerted over the contradictions in China's foreign policy; the Chinese preach violent revolution but prefer flexible solutions in international relations or compromises that often result in ambiguous situations. On the other hand the Russians have understood what Americans are just beginning to learn, that China's foreign policy is guided less by territorial expansionism and irredentism than by the desire for internal consolidation and unity.

909
Netzer, Hans-Joachim, ed. [SO THEY SEE THEMSELVES (THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION,

CHINA, FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, GERMANY). CONTRIBUTIONS BY ERWIN BEHRENS ET AL.] So sehen sie sich (USA, Sowjetunion, China, Frankreich, Grossbritannien, Deutschland). Beiträge von Erwin Behrens [et al.] Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik [1967] 143 p. D843. N44

Contents.--Preface: The "world image," by Hans-Joachim Netzer.--The United States, a reluctant world power, by Joachim Schwelien.--The Soviet Union, a bent toward the absolute, by Erwin Behrens.--China, the self-assurance of the middle, by Fritz van Briessen.--France, greatness without power, by Lothar Ruehl.--Great Britain, the need for and virtue of insular existence, by Peter de Mendelssohn.--The political self-understanding of the Germans.

Attempts to define the political genius of each nation and its potential influence on world peace and security.

910
[THE NEW PEACE MESSAGE BY THE POPE AND A CRITIQUE] Die neue Friedensbotschaft des Papstes und ihre Kritik. Junge Kirche, v. 29, Jan. 10, 1968: 38-45. BX8001. J8, v. 29

For a notation of the English version of the message see item no. 1224 in this bibliography.

Text in German of the Pope's December 8, 1967 message, proclaiming an International Day of Peace, and comments by the presiding committee of the German branch of the international peace movement, Pax Christi; the Ecumenical Council of Churches; and Dr. Joachim Beckmann, president of the Evangelical Church of the Rhineland. Beckmann questions the Pope's statement that "peace is not pacifism."

911
Newbury, Colin W. MILITARY INTERVENTION AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN WEST AFRICA. Africa quarterly, v. 7, Oct./Dec. 1967: 215-221. DT1. A216, v. 7

"The army retains certain advantages in an African state where political instability threatens to wreck the limited economic security built up since independence." The deterioration of the civilian government appears to be characteristic of nations with immature political traditions and institutions. Thus the military, with its special skills, popular appeal, and professional cohesion, has succeeded in displacing civilian regimes in 10 emerging African countries. Although the leaders of the military coups in Ghana and Sierra Leone proclaimed that once order and efficiency were restored to the government it would be again turned over to civilian control, they have not yet shown signs of "returning to the barracks." The Nigerian military leaders came into power primarily because of dissension between the three main regions in the federation and are not likely to voluntarily resign. Whatever their original intentions, the military regimes in West Africa have assumed increasingly greater authority and probably have set a "precedent for a long series of military regimes in this and other areas of Africa."

912
Niu, Sien-chong. WORLD REVOLUTION AND PEOPLE'S WAR. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Mar. 1968: 83-88. illus. Z6723. U35, v. 48

War and revolutionary violence are at the core of Maoist thinking on international politics. Mao's current theory of world revolution divides the globe into the U.S.-Soviet and the intermediate zone. The intermediate zone is the locus of the world revolutionary struggle of Asia, Africa, and Latin America against the hegemony of the superpowers. Maoist China is the leader of this struggle. Strategy is based on the mainland experience of the Communist Party, where the superiority of Mao's strategic thought was proved. Against the United States, Maoist tactics--the essence of which is unification of time and space--combine the "indirect approach" and the "piecemeal method," both of which require the use of non-Chinese forces of the intermediate zone against the adversary. China's own contribution to the struggle, along with its leadership, is people's war used as both a defensive and offensive deterrent; used, that is, both to prevent an attack on the mainland and to discourage opposition to Chinese moves in the intermediate zone. The capacity of the rigidly disciplined Chinese nation to pursue its goals effectively should not be underestimated. At the same time, verbal bellicosity must not be permitted to hide the regime's essential caution. For the long run, full account must be taken of China's global aims, but, for the moment, we have little to fear from the people's war.

913
Pokstefl, Josef. LIMITS ON THE USE OF FORCE IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Political translations on Eastern Europe. no. 316; Jan. 19, 1968. Washington. (Its JPRS 44,089) p. 1-15. AS36. U57, no. 44,089

Translated from the Czech-language quarterly, Mezinárodní vztahy, v. 2, Sept. 1967, p. 12-21. D839. M49, v. 2

Explains the factors that now limit the use of force in international relations. The tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons makes the initiation of a global war national suicide and restricts the application of force in local conflicts. Nations will hesitate to implement their national political goals by force as long as the strategic balance is maintained between the leaders of the two camps, the Soviet Union and the United States. Pokstefl contends that the means to upset this balance lies "beyond the limits of economic possibilities of contemporary society." Since the military status quo appears to be of a relatively permanent nature, the continuation of the arms race and proliferation of nuclear weapons seem rather senseless. Pokstefl concludes that both Socialist and capitalist countries will be forced to follow policies of peaceful coexistence even though it may mean compromising certain national goals.

914
Prewett, Virginia. WORLD POPULATION AND FOOD PROBLEMS. Vital speeches of the day, v. 34, Apr. 15, 1968: 404-407. PN6121. V52, v. 34

"Delivered to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Luncheon, Washington, D.C., February 29, 1968."

America should "face frankly the possibility that the U.S. will indeed decrease its world role" and set up priorities in international matters without forsaking the task of furthering world peace and plenty. One of these priority areas should be Latin America, which is favored as such by two programs: the Alliance for Progress and the Organization of American States.

The first, involving economic, political, and cultural development, is the sole institution within the framework of U.S. foreign policy that can be utilized to boost a regional overseas effort. The second program offers an international mechanism for hemispheric cooperation should America fall back to its own shores. In this area the U.S. Chamber of Commerce can take action by helping to contain the protectionist moves in Congress and by looking into such matters as the provision tacked to the Alliance for Progress aid bill that reduces assistance to any Latin American country by the amount the country spends on new weapons. This has caused a great deal of resentment south of the border where, until recently, the United States aided Latin American armies against pro-Castro and Communist guerrilla threats. Yet there is another threat that America should be made aware of--the possibility of a "collision between world population out of control and a lagging food production." Over the past decades two pictures of the future loomed over the horizon: that of life destroyed by nuclear holocaust or that of life as depicted in national magazines. But there is also a third picture, projected by a Peruvian Marxist, in which "the so-called underdeveloped world, by sheer weight of numbers, would eventually combine," keeping the United States "as a kind of ant society, producing for the world's needs." This seemingly far fetched picture may be the logical outcome in a world in which one country "has a fabulously advanced technology and most of the rest of the earth suffers from procreation out of control." America should wake up to world realities now. And it is up to the experts to make organizations, lawmakers, and those shaping public opinion aware of the problems to come.

915
Price, James R. SOLID-STATE POLITICS: THE NEED FOR INNOVATION. World affairs, v. 130, Oct./Dec. 1967: 155-158. JX1901.W7, v. 130

Advancements in science and technology have caused the deterioration of statehood by breaking down the traditional barriers between "hard-shell" nation-states. The classic international system of nation-states vying for advantage in a "world economy of scarcity" has been replaced by a bipolar system in which the equal superpowers determine the fate of less equal states. The system of great and small nations living in mutual recognition of "equal" sovereignty has vanished as a political practicality, yet it continues to exist in the form of the United Nations. As a manifestation of an international system of equal partners together in a nation-state system the United Nations is a sham. The organization is a puppet of the superpowers, who decide when and how it will act. However modified or refined it may become, the function of the national state should be preserved. It should be systematized and modernized "in an institutional framework compatible with the technology of our times." If the nation-state system is allowed to degenerate, the return of total international anarchy is only a matter of time.

916
Reese, Howard C. THE SEARCH FOR EQUILIBRIUM IN THE MIDDLE EAST. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Apr. 1968: 29-40.
Z6723.U35, v. 48

Postwar attempts by the United States to exclude Russian influence from the Middle East have failed conspicuously. The Russians have outflanked U.S. blocking positions with foreign aid programs and a powerful Mediterranean fleet. Now, however, as a result of the 1967 Israeli victory over the Arabs, the United States and the Soviet Union are faced with a changed strategic environment in the Middle East, and both states must decide whether to continue pursuing their separate and opposing interests or to shift to a policy aimed at promoting equilibrum in the area. Much, of course, depends on Israel and the Arabs. Israel can afford to be generous in negotiating a settlement, even though its vital security interests are involved, but negotiations are likely to be delayed by Arab disunity. A settlement would be in the interest of both superpowers, and they should take the lead in finding a solution if the belligerents cannot settle the matter themselves. The question though is whether the Soviet Union is ready to accept the kind of stable balance it has agreed to in Europe. If so, limited economic cooperation might lay the groundwork for progress in more important matters such as arms control. This in turn would contribute significantly to the worldwide detente that both powers say they want.

917
Robertson, Roland. STRATEGIC RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL SOCIETIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 12, Mar. 1968: 16-33.
JX1901.J6, v. 12

This paper seeks to illuminate the relationships prevailing between national units in the contemporary global system. The problem is tackled primarily in terms of a confrontation between game-theoretic and more inclusive conceptions of strategic interaction. This involves treating strategy both as a sociocultural phenomenon and as a sociological concept. Relations between national societies are analyzed in terms of the intersection of internal-unit properties and unit-to-unit properties, an exercise which necessitates a reconceptualization of the political attributes of national units. In discussing unit-to-unit themes, four major dimensions of interaction are utilized. Finally, a distinction is made between the applications of the notion of strategy to "North-South" and to "East-West" international relationships. The empirical mixture of these two types of relationship is briefly explored. (Abstract supplied)

918
Schilling, Joachim. RAPPROCHEMENT WITH MOSCOW? THE VATICAN LOOKS EAST. Atlas, v. 15, Mar. 1968: 33-36.
AP1.A83, v. 15
Translated from Christ und Welt (Stuttgart).
BR4.C37

If the Catholic Church is to act as the world's foremost moral power and assume its role as a "force for peace and progress in the Third World," Rome must find a modus vivendi with Moscow. The East European regimes have realized at last that religious impulse cannot be destroyed and that tolerance of religious communities is both necessary and feasible. At the same time, the Kremlin has come to the conclusion that its ideology cannot succeed in Asia, Africa, or Latin America if it openly opposes the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church is not bound to any single civilization and stands above the world's contending parties. With 60 million Catholics in Eastern Europe, the Vatican is exploring all possibilities for a detente. Yet the most that can be achieved today in terms of

Church and Communist-state coexistence is an arrangement similar to the 1965 treaty between the Holy See and Yugoslavia, under which Yugoslavia's Catholic bishops swore loyalty to its Communist constitution.

919
Shanor, Donald R. EXIT IN BUDAPEST. New leader, v. 51, Mar. 11, 1968: 15-17.
HX1. N37, v. 51

The Rumanian walkout at the February 29 meeting of 67 Communist parties in Budapest was sparked by the Syrian delegate's attack on Rumania "for its support of Israel and its iconoclastic attitude toward the Communist summit" slated for late 1968; it culminated in a shattering of the odd sort of togetherness the Soviet Union had attempted to enforce within the Socialist bloc. While both sides claimed victory, in reality each suffered a defeat: the collapse of the family of 90 Communist parties, however, indicates that the Soviet defeat was the worse. Eight years ago 81 parties attended the Moscow meeting while only 67 showed up in Budapest. Among these only 14 are in power--and Rumania's exit left them divided evenly: China, Albania, Cuba, Korea, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia constitute the "outs," along with Rumania, and Poland, Bulgaria, East Germany, Outer Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary the "ins" with Russia. The Budapest meeting pointed out that the harder the Russians push the greater their risk of "losing the support of the parties that count"--those of France and Italy, which have to fight for votes in free elections, or those of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the "hesitant travelers on the path taken by Yugoslavia and Rumania."

920
Shizuo, Maruyama. ASIAN REGIONALISM. Japan quarterly, v. 15, Jan./Mar. 1968: 53-61.
DS801. J274, v. 15

Asian regionalism, in striving to bring about development through cooperation between countries with similar regional characteristics, has passed through two postwar periods: the first was initiated by the formation of the U. N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, and the second was launched by President Johnson's proposal for a Program for Southeast Asia at the Johns Hopkins University in April 1965. The two periods have a common denominator: the self-determination and independence of Asian countries upheld by "the spirit of Asia." In back of this spirit lies the Asian awareness of its solidarity, which will eventually produce "the concept of a United States of Asia." If America expects the strong support of Asian nations it must learn to understand the real nature of Asian regionalism; it will not "replace nationalism" as claimed by Special Presidential Assistant Walt W. Rostow. Regionalism is "a broadening of nationalism," a strengthening of cooperation with neighbors, as well as achievement of self-determination and independence. Where it is headed is still unclear. But one thing is certain: it will never permit itself to be turned into a "mere instrument of the world strategy or world policies of any specific country."

921
Stucki, Lorenz. [FOCAL POINT EAST ASIA. FROM VIETNAM TO JAPAN--A WORLD IN MOVEMENT] Brennpunkt Ostasien. Von Vietnam bis Japan--eine Welt in Bewegung. Bern, Scherz [1967] 150 p. map.
DS511. S78

Partial contents. --America's South Vietnam tragedy. --Malaysia a surprising instance to the contrary. --Where does the "Third China" stand?--Endangered Singapore. --The Philippines, a hotbed of future crises. --Red China's fanatics attack. --Formosa, or the "other" China. --New confidence in South Korea. --Where the "Curtain" is thickest. --Japan's fear of politics. --East Asian prospects.

Contends that Eastern Asia does not have to make a choice between East and West. The American presence in the area protects it from Red China, and with its security thus assured it now has the rare opportunity for socioeconomic and political development that will remain Asian in spirit. But if it fails to progress it will be ripe for Communist conquest.

922
Stucki, Lorenz. [SOUTHEAST ASIA BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES (CONCLUSION): CHINA] Südostasien zwischen China und America (Schluss): China. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, Sept./Oct. 1967: 399-405.
P&GP RR

Second of a two-part series. Pt. one, dealing with South Vietnam, was abstracted as item 61 in v. 4, no. 1 of this bibliography.

Red China's abortive Great Leap Forward in 1958-59 marked Peking's determination to overtake the Soviet Union on the road to communism and to become the leader of the world Communist movement. This essentially was the reason for the open ideological split between the two nations. The recent Cultural Revolution, a new, irrational effort to accelerate the country's transformation into a textbook Communist society, has caused massive economic regression and abased the international position of China. But this has been of secondary importance to Chinese leaders, who believe that the nation's foreign policy should be primarily an extension of its domestic Communist revolutionary process. Like most of their predecessors over the past millennia they live in a self-contained civilization ignorant of the outside world. This kind of isolationism, coupled with economic primitivism, makes China unready as yet to play rational and realistic power politics, not that it lacks a power-politics ideology. The American presence in Southeast Asia has checked both expansion of Red Chinese political power and the threat to Red China from without. Japan, defeated in World War II, has lost its imperialist ambitions and become unrealistically isolationist in its attitude to Southeast Asia's fate and security. It is, however, awakening to the increased international responsibility commensurate with its economic might. Once this happens it will play a dominant role in Southeast Asia. Red China, the United States, and Japan, "the three and only potential imperialists in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific, are constitutionally incapable of being genuine imperialists." This reduces chances of an outbreak of war there to areas of ideological vacuum, to nations marked by socioeconomic stagnation and popular apathy.

923
Symmons-Symonolewicz, Konstantin. MODERN NATIONALISM: TOWARDS A CONSENSUS IN THEORY. New York, Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, 1968. 66 p. JC311. S92

Partial contents. --Nationalism and its meanings. --Toward a definition of nationalism. --Modern national-

ism and its antecedents. --Nationalism considered as a social movement. --A typology of nationalist movements.

Sees the various forms of nationalism as sentiments, ideas, or attitudes that might be fused with other elements of ideology, but whose common quality is the striving for self-determination.

924
Toynbee, Arnold J. RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS: THE CASE FOR SECOND THOUGHTS. Journal of international affairs, v. 22, no. 1, 1968: 1-4.
JX1. C6, v. 22

The world has relapsed into new forms of religious fanaticism--unfortunately in the same era nuclear weapons were invented. The new religions are capitalism, communism, and nationalism, and their votaries in the United States and the Soviet Union have led the world into cold war. Both these states have long been deceived by the Leninist myth of proletarian internationalism, an illusion of which the Soviet Union has recently been disabused but which still haunts U.S. foreign policymakers in the form of monolithic communism. In addition the United States nurses the illusion that the capitalist world is the free world. At the end of World War II the United States and the Soviet Union had the power between them to reform the world; but hostility prevented their collaboration, and since then the struggle between the two has undermined their control of other states. Yugoslavia and China have broken with the Soviet Union, and De Gaulle and the heroic Vietnamese and Viet Cong have defied the United States. But the superpowers have one more chance to cooperate. The objective of that cooperation should be to divert the wealth of the affluent minority--now being spent on armaments--into programs to improve the lot of the indigent majority. This reform is demanded by common sense and humanity; and without it the future looks dark.

925
Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CONFLICT BEHAVIOR OF NATIONS. Journal of peace research, v. 5, no. 1, 1968: 56-69. tables.
AS9. J6, v. 5

Bibliographical references included in "Notes and References": p. 68-69.

This study is concerned with the relationship between the domestic and foreign conflict behavior of nations. Specifically, it is postulated that two key variables, type of nation and nature of conflict, determine the nature of this relationship. A population of 74 nations are divided into three groups, personalist, centrist, and polyarchic. A correlation analysis is then performed on these groups for all possible pairs of domestic conflict behavior dimensions--'turmoil,' 'revolutionary,' 'subversive'--and foreign conflict behavior dimensions--'war,' 'diplomatic,' 'belligerency.' Stage 2 of the analysis, using raw data and covering a period from 1955 to 1960, facilitates the investigation of time lags as a possible additional factor. The results of the study indicate that the postulated relationships do exist, with type of nation constituting perhaps the key element in the nature of this relationship. (Abstract supplied, modified)

926
Wright, Harrison M. "IMPERIALISM": THE WORD AND ITS MEANING. Social research, v. 34, winter 1967: 660-674. A1. S53, v. 34

A definition. The lack of consensus among scholars on the meaning of imperialism has led to semantic near chaos. Wright attempts a synthesis of existing definitions and concludes that imperialism is "the deliberate act or advocacy of extending or maintaining, for the primary purpose of aggrandizement, a state's direct or indirect political control over any other inhabited territory which involves treating the inhabitants inequitably in comparison with the norm for its own citizens."

B. FOREIGN POLICIES

927
Anthem, Thomas. RUSSIA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. Contemporary review, v. 212, Mar. 1968: 132-137.
AP4. C7, v. 212

Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean began after World War II when naval bases were acquired in Albania. Since then the loss to China of influence over that nation has been offset by acquisition of new naval facilities in Egypt and the growing strength of the Soviet fleet itself. Although Britain, France, and Italy still have a role to play in the area, the principal responsibility for countering Soviet influence has fallen to the United States. The Soviet Union does not want war; the real threat to peace is China. Nevertheless, the Russians would like to further strengthen their political position in the Mediterranean, and very likely they will succeed. As Marshal Zakharov said in February: "The time when Russia could be kept out of the world's oceans has gone . . . We will sail all the world's seas; no force on earth can prevent us."

928
Ball, W. Macmahon. JAPAN IN ASIA'S FUTURE. Nation, v. 206, Jan. 15, 1968: 82-84.
AP2. N2, v. 206

There is no doubt that Japan has all the attributes of a leader in East Asia. Its postwar recovery was one of the most spectacular in the annals of world economic achievements, so the Japanese Government and people quite rightly feel their country can assume "a key role in the future of Asia." Whether this role will be played to U.S. liking is, however, another question. There is a striking contrast between Japan's willingness to make daring international economic commitments and its qualms about international political and military commitments. To the Americans it may look as if Tokyo was trying to have its cake and eat it, too: sitting pretty under the U.S. nuclear umbrella yet reluctant to spend adequately on its own defense, and all along making excellent profits from the Vietnam War by filling many of America's defense needs. Many Japanese see this war as a struggle between white men with modern weapons and rice-paddy underdogs "with Mongolian features"--and they naturally identify with fellow Asians. They may be aware of their country's dependency on U.S. friendship, but their leaders make it clear that Japan's "economic, political and military policies must be formulated in Tokyo, not in Washington." The Japanese feel that the present threats in Asia "cannot be effectively met by military measures." Peace between Asia and the Western World is their country's foremost interest, but the West should "respect Japan's judgment" as to how it can help reach this goal.

929
Balta, Paul. [TEN YEARS OF FOREIGN POLICY: 1958-1968] Dix ans de politique étrangère: 1958-1968. Revue de défense nationale, v. 24, May 1968: 813-835.
D410.R45, v. 24

Discusses the principles of French foreign policy. An effective foreign policy depends on a viable national defense program. In 1958 De Gaulle tried to persuade President Eisenhower to form a tripartite nuclear pact consisting of the United States, France, and Great Britain, but the proposal fell on deaf ears. This rejection, together with France's successful nuclear test explosion, prompted De Gaulle to withdraw from the Atlantic alliance. Since then France's foreign policy has been molded by its possession of an independent nuclear force.

930
Bluhm, Georg R. DETENTE AND MILITARY RELAXATION IN EUROPE: A GERMAN VIEW. London, Institute for Strategic Studies [1967] 15 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 40)
U162.A3, no. 40

Investigates various meanings of East-West détente in Europe. Bluhm considers the existing and potential modalities of West German security and foreign policies and stresses the importance of American involvement in Europe for a satisfactory solution of the German problem.

931
Brandt, Willy. GERMAN POLICY TOWARD THE EAST. Foreign affairs, v. 46, Apr. 1968: 476-486.
D410.F6, v. 46

Since an acceptable solution to the problem of a divided Germany can be found only after a reduction of East-West tensions in Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany is seeking to improve its relations with Eastern Europe, East Germany, and the Soviet Union. It hopes to enlist the support of both superpowers in the creation of a system of peaceful order in Europe. The sincerity of the Federal Republic's efforts to reach a détente cannot be doubted since by closely alining itself with Western Europe it has already demonstrated its willingness to subordinate national interests to supranational goals. Unfortunately, East Germany continues to follow obsolete cold war ideas and obstructs the Federal Republic's attempts to normalize relations with the East. Although West Germany will not give into East German demands for legal recognition, it has endeavored to open the way for East-West cooperation by making many other concessions. The Federal Republic has agreed to sign nonuse of force declarations and renounced the production of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, West Germany has expressed its willingness to discuss practical and reasonable solutions to the problems created by the special status of Berlin.

932
Brimmel, J. H. THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY. Australian outlook, v. 21, Dec. 1967: 315-331.
DU80.A947, v. 21

Events in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution are understandable if related to the thought and personality of Mao Tse-tung and the history of modern China. Mao is first and foremost a Chinese national leader, whose Marxism-Leninism is merely a rationalization of his desire to reclaim Chinese leadership of the barbarian world. In his rise to power Mao has had to suppress various factions that did not share his vision, but in the present stage he has turned against the Marxist-Leninists themselves. The dispute revolves around differing answers to the related questions of how, and how fast, socialism can be built in China. Mao wants to press forward at maximum speed. His external objective is to consolidate China's leadership of the worldwide revolution. His foreign policy aims at promoting uprisings in the non-Western world in order to isolate the West and weaken it for the final assault. It is doubtful, however, that Mao can avoid making serious compromises with his more moderate and still active domestic opposition and almost certain that he will be unable to seize the leadership of the anti-Western revolution. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution will go the way of the Great Leap Forward; terminology will be preserved but content abandoned.

933
Brown, Seyom. THE FACES OF POWER: CONSTANCY AND CHANGE IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FROM TRUMAN TO JOHNSON. New York, Columbia University Press, 1968. 397 p.
E744.B78

Partial contents.--Power wielded and power perceived.--The irreducible national interest and basic premises about world conditions.--Larger interests and the balance-of-power consideration.--The shattering expectations.--1948-1950: internal dialogue on the components of the balance of power.--The primacy of balance-of-power considerations during the Korean War.--A new look for less expensive power.--Commitments and coercion: Dulles' psychology of power.--Waging peace: the Eisenhower face.--Complicating the premises: Suez and Hungary.--Sputnik: new attention to material factors of power.--Conditioned responses to new challenges.--Perceived deficiencies in the nation's power.--Attending to the military balance.--New tools for the new arena: opportunities and obstacles.--Castro, Laos, the Congo: limits on the coercive power of the superpowers.--Berlin and Cuban missiles: defining sphere of control.--The test ban: stabilizing the balance.--The breakup of blocs: the decline of ideology and control.--Vietnam and the Dominican Republic: reassertion of the functions of military power.--Changes in the forms of relevant power.

Traces recent U.S. foreign policy. Since 1945, the United States has used its power to prevent the creation of a balance of power unfavorable to its interests. The author states that the development of a Russian ABM in effect violated the 1963 "spirit of Moscow"--the partial test ban treaty--and the 1964 fissionable materials cutback pledge.

934
Caplow, Theodore, and Kurt Finsterbusch. FRANCE AND OTHER COUNTRIES: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL INTERACTION. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 12, Mar. 1968: 1-15.
JX1901.J6, v. 12

The interaction of France and a group of closely related nations are analyzed by methods drawn from the study of primary groups. For each pair of

countries, quantitative scores are computed for relative status, amount of joint activity, mutual involvement, and the relative importance of this relationship compared to others. In addition, the choice of interaction partners is described by a sociogram. The analysis is repeated separately for four types of interaction: exchange of students, trade in viable commodities, exchange of printed mail, and of translated books. The resulting matrices are then analyzed and compared. The most significant finding is that perfect, or nearly perfect, status hierarchies appear. They are quite different for each interaction field. Activity, involvement, and sociometric choice likewise order the same countries differently. The findings suggest that it makes sense to discuss the interaction of nations in terms borrowed from microsociology, provided that the modes of interaction are carefully specified. (Abstract supplied)

935
Clabaugh, Samuel F., and Edwin J. Feulner. TRADING WITH THE COMMUNISTS. Washington, Center for Strategic Studies [1968] 254 p.
HF1456 1968. C55

Partial contents.--Part I. Developments in trading with the Communists since 1964.--Part II. Congressional viewpoints.--Part III. Summary of legislation affecting United States trade with Communist nations.--Part IV. Inventory of congressional documents.--Articles.--Periodicals.--Conferences and Symposia.--Bibliographies.

Studies the value and significance of relaxing trade and travel restrictions on Communist countries. The main reason for trading with Red China would be to help one-fourth of the world's population to raise its standard of living, the study indicates that the state of Red China's economy has little to do with the conduct of its foreign policy. However, closer credit relations between non-Communist countries and China could significantly contribute to integrating China into the international community and draw Red China closer to the United States.

936
Coulmas, Peter. [DETERMINATION OF CHINA'S PLACE] Standortbestimmung Chinas [by] P. C. Moderne Welt, v. 9, no. 1, 1968: 3-7.
D839. M58, v. 9

Defines the paradox of China: a country that expounds world revolution but conducts a cautious foreign policy; an underdeveloped nation that has developed nuclear weapons; a numerous people living in isolation but exerting strong influence on American and Soviet foreign policies. The superpowers' preoccupation with the threat of China in Asia "has afforded Europe a historical respite of 6 years," a status-quo-based relaxation of tensions since the last Berlin crisis. However, contemplated reductions of Western armed forces in Europe may cause Moscow to end that respite.

937
Dacier, Michel. [CONSTANTS IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY] Les constantes de la politique extérieure des États Unis. Écrits de Paris, no. 267, Feb. 1968: 5-10.
AP20. E355, 1968

Traces the development of U.S. foreign policy from Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine to Johnsonian policy and the Vietnam War. Until the Second World War the United States was primarily an isolationist power. After World War II, U.S. foreign policy was characterized by involvement in Europe to contain communism--the Marshall plan was an attempt to fill the political vacuum left by a defeated Germany. The Berlin airlift, Truman's aid programs, the Korean War, and the Cuban missile crisis exemplified this policy. The Vietnam War is typical of U.S. diplomatic policy in the last 20 years. Dacier believes that if the war in Vietnam is illegal, then U.S. foreign policy from the end of the Second World War must be retroactively condemned since it has remained constant over the years; it is impossible to distinguish the motivations of Washington's foreign policy in Berlin and Cuba from those of its policy in Vietnam.

938
Delmas, Claude. [THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA] Les États-Unis et l'Asie. Revue de défense nationale, v. 24, May 1968: 884-894.
D410. R45, v. 24

History of U.S. involvement in Asia. From the era of the Monroe Doctrine until the beginning of World War II the United States looked toward Asia rather than Europe. Today the United States, having deterred Communist aggression in Western Europe, once again is focusing its attention on Asia.

939
Fann, Willerd R. GERMANY AND EAST EUROPE: PROBLEMS OF DÉTENTE. Current history, v. 54, May 1968: 263-267, 305-307.
D410. C82, v. 54

Reviews a decade of West German foreign relations--from the prohibitive Hallstein doctrine of the midfifties to the present policy of détente. Invoking the doctrine the Federal Republic of Germany broke diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia for recognizing the "other" Germany. Since that time, however, West Germany has inched away from its position and its friendly overtures to East Germany seem to indicate "a significant departure in West German foreign policy." German reunification used to be the sine qua non of better relations with East European countries; the present trend points rather to détente as the first step along the long road toward a single Germany. Yet despite this change basic obstacles still exist: East Germany remains a diplomatic hostage of the U.S.S.R., and West German policy is hampered by the Oder-Neisse problem, which serves the Soviet Union as "a whip to hold over the heads of the Poles." West German efforts in Eastern Europe are said to have received "punches instead of hugs." However the new course, which is based on a policy of détente, requires patience and untiring effort.

940
Fleming, D. F. VIETNAM AND AFTER. Western political quarterly, v. 21, Mar. 1968: 141-151.
JA1. W4, v. 21

Address "delivered on July 6, 1967, at a conference in Stockholm called by the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace."

Criticizes America's foreign policy and its involvement in Vietnam. America is fighting in Vietnam not to

free a people from North Vietnamese "aggressors" but to prove that guerrilla-based wars cannot succeed. The most powerful force committed to subduing Vietnam is the military-industrial complex which profits from war contracts. Fleming concludes that the United States must stop its effort to control Vietnam, that it must be willing to negotiate with the Viet Cong, that it has no mission to enforce the Pax Americana, and that it need not suppress social discontent throughout the "free world" in order to survive.

941
Franke, Wolfgang. [CHINA AND THE THIRD WORLD] China und die Dritte Welt. Moderne Welt, v. 9, no. 1, 1968: 46-66. D839.M58, v. 9

Assesses Peking's self-imposed role of spokesman for the Third World. Franke sees a great discrepancy between Peking's public pronouncements on that role and its actual policy. The article includes historical analysis of China's position in, and its attitude to, the world. Its domestic situation compels it to first consolidate Maoist revolution at home before embarking on the full-scale endeavor of world revolution.

942
Franklin, William D. U.S. STRATEGIC POLICY AND THE EURASIAN RIMLANDS. Army, v. 18, Mar. 1968: 47-54, 56. illus. Ul.A893, v. 18

Nicholas J. Spykman's analysis of the geopolitical significance of the Eurasian rimlands--"who controls the rimlands controls Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world"--demonstrates not only the vital importance of the rimlands but has to a large extent determined U.S. foreign policy and strategy since the end of World War II. Spykman contends that war is an instrument of national policy and that although it is unpleasant it is an inherent part of state systems. To forget about war is to forget reality and court disaster. Force is the primary implement to prevent any expansion into the rimlands. He believes that "modern states can preserve their power position only if they do their strategic and political thinking in war and peace on a global scale." The United States, therefore, initiated its policy of containment, employing both force and diplomacy to maintain the integrity of the rimlands. World War II was in effect fought for the control of the Eurasian rimlands. If they had united against America, it would have faced encirclement by a superior force. However, force and diplomacy in U.S. strategy have been mutually exclusive. While China was falling into Communist hands and the French were being defeated in Indochina, America relied upon a strategy of massive retaliation, a concept that reduced war to a Kafkaesque pattern of violence and brutality, divorced diplomacy from force, and rejected the concept of war as a political instrument. Spykman's rimland strategy can be viable only in a neo-Clausewitzian context; i.e., where force and diplomacy are not treated as separate entities. U.S. strategy must treat war not as an absolute manifestation of violence but as a political act that is dependent on and embodied in a policy that uses it as a political instrument to attain serious objectives.

943
Grosser, Alfred. FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY AFTER DE GAULLE. Interplay of European/American affairs, v. 1, Apr. 1968: 9-12. illus.
P&GP RR

After President de Gaulle leaves the political scene the discontinuity of French foreign policy will be less than total because he not only is the heir of the "nationalism of the right" but he also epitomizes Jacobin patriotism. These principles have had and will continue to have an enormous appeal to most Frenchmen. De Gaulle's policy of accommodation with Russia is supported by the French because of the role Russia played in World War II and the link between the French and Communist revolution. Frenchmen back De Gaulle's anti-U.S. policy because of the inconsistencies between American ideals and American practices--the Negro problem, American policy in the underdeveloped countries, and the Vietnam War. They do not understand why the United States accepts the idea of multiform communism in Moscow, Peking, and Bucharest but rejects it in Hanoi as if in Hanoi it were more aggressive and centralized than in Stalin's time. It is the precision of his fundamental inspiration and the tactical variations that he employs in his foreign policy that sets De Gaulle apart from other politicians. As a Western country France must be completely independent from the United States. However, when there is a physical threat against the Western countries, they must unite for their common defense. De Gaulle's European policy is plagued by a contradiction: the need to create economic power is stymied by the doctrine of national sovereignty, which precludes the political power needed to control large European enterprises. Thus De Gaulle's successors may accept Great Britain into the European community and thereby reinforce "Europeanism."

944
Hinterhoff, Eugene. THE SOVIET PENETRATION INTO THE MIDDLE EAST. Contemporary review, v. 212, Feb. 1968: 61-70. AP4.C7, v. 212

Surveys Russian efforts from 1697 to the present to gain control of the Middle East. Hinterhoff views Russian policy in this area as a geopolitical constant independent of the ideological motivations of the Russian regime and on this ground predicts that the Western-Soviet confrontation there will continue despite "the idle talk about detente in Europe and a possibility of signing a non-proliferation treaty, which will have no impact upon the situation in the Middle East."

945
Imhoff, Christoff von. [GENERAL DE GAULLE'S NEW ORIENTAL POLICY] Neue Orient-Politik des Generals de Gaulle. Aussenpolitik, v. 19, Jan. 1968: 29-36. D839.A885, v. 19

Considers France's present policy in the eastern Mediterranean diametrically opposed to American interests and conducive to anti-Judaism in the Arab nations and anti-Semitism in the Soviet bloc.

946
Kaplan, Lawrence S. RECENT AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS. Homewood, Ill., Dorsey Press, 1968: 358 p. (The Dorsey series in American history)
E744.K17

Partial contents:--Isolationism in American history: nature of the tradition.--Onset of the cold war: America's responsibility?--Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan: the question of compatibility.--North

Atlantic Treaty: end of isolationism?--The fall of China: America's guilt?--The Korean conflict: the United States and the United Nations.--Diplomatic issues in the 1952 election: Dulles vs. Acheson.--Dulles and Brinkmanship: Formosa in the 1950's.--The Suez crisis of 1956: role of American statecraft.--Sputnik diplomacy: disengagement in Europe 1955-60.--The United States and colonialism: the Congo example.--The Monroe Doctrine and the good neighbor: the Cuban problem.--NATO and nuclear sharing: the MLF.--Containment in Asia: Vietnam.--America as a world power: balance sheet.

Examines the major issues in American postwar diplomacy. Kaplan emphasizes the transitional nature of this period in which the United States abandoned its traditional isolationism and adopted a containment policy in its stead. The chapters consist of a narrative and analytical section by the author followed by selections from official documents and a representative sample of commentary by policy participants and detached observers.

947
Kindermann, Gottfried-Karl. [MAOIST MARXISM IN THE LIGHT OF THE 1965-1967 CULTURAL REVOLUTION] Der Maoistische Marxismus im Lichte der Kulturrevolution der Jahre 1965-1967. Moderne Welt, v. 9, no. 1, 1968: 16-31.
D839.M58, v. 9

Discusses Mao's modification of Marxism-Leninism, Peking's political voluntarism, its military model of political and economic action, Mao's new teaching on the coming self-destruction of Socialist systems (e.g., through Soviet revisionism), his notion of the structural change in the global class struggle, and his revival of Sino-centric universalism. Kindermann ascribes to Mao's traumatic experiences a motive for creation of present-day Maoism. One such experience was the Yalta agreement between China's allies, "which left China a bill to pay for Soviet entry into the war against Japan."

948
Kintner, William R. DEBACLE ROAD. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Apr. 1968: 52-54, 57-58.
UG633.A65, v. 51

"The war in Vietnam has managed to upstage items on the American agenda which are intrinsically more important to this nation's future." Domestic social unrest and the Soviet challenge to U.S. strategic superiority are the two most crucial problems now confronting the United States. Further outbreaks of racial violence could seriously threaten internal stability, and loss of strategic superiority could compromise national security. Early termination of the Vietnam War would free funds urgently needed to cope with these problems. The revitalization of NATO and the prevention of renewed violence in the Middle East should rank next on America's list of priorities. While these two problems do not involve considerable resources, they require a more realistic appraisal of Soviet global ambitions by U.S. policymakers. America's quest for a détente should not blind it to the dangers of Soviet incursions into the Middle East and of alienating its NATO allies. Although it receives top billing at present, the Vietnam War is the least important of America's five major problems. America's Vietnam endeavors are significant because of its commitment to face the challenge posed by North Vietnam and the latter's Soviet and Chinese supporters. However, the resources allocated to the war are far out of proportion to its importance. Unless the United States launches a quick offensive to end the war so that it can support a more valid set of national priorities, it may well be headed for "Debacle Road."

949
Larson, David L., ed. THE PURITAN ETHIC IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY. Princeton, N.J., Van Nostrand [1966] 228 p. (New perspectives in political science, 12) JX1255.L3
Bibliography: p. 223-228.

Partial contents.--Objectivity, propaganda, and the Puritan ethic, by David L. Larson.--The two planes of international reality, by George F. Kennan.--The eclipse of the public philosophy, by Walter Lippmann.--A realist theory of international politics, by Hans J. Morgenthau.--The morality of nations, by Reinhold Niebuhr.--The limitations of realism, by Edward Hallett Carr.--Judaeo Christian realism: the cold war and the search for relevant norms, by Kenneth W. Thompson.--Ethics in international relations today, by Dean Acheson.--Morals and power, by John Foster Dulles.--Old myths and new realities, by J. William Fulbright.--Some fundamentals of American policy, by Dean Rusk.--A league for peace, by Woodrow Wilson.--Toward a strategy of peace, by John F. Kennedy.--The arsenal of democracy, by Franklin D. Roosevelt.--Pattern for peace in southern Asia, by Lyndon B. Johnson.

Compilation of essays "offered as a critique, a commentary, and a possible remedy for some of the psychological or intellectual weaknesses of United States foreign policy". Larson contends that the American philisophy of "right will prevail over might" cannot realistically be applied to international relations. If the United States wants to retain its leadership in world affairs, it must decrease its emphasis on inflexible ideological goals and formulate policies that are directed at meeting the needs, not changing the philosophies, of other states.

950
Lasch, Christopher. THE COLD WAR, REVISITED AND REVISIONED. New York times magazine, Jan. 14, 1968: 26-27, 44-51, 54, 59.
AP2.N6575, 1968

Revisionist historians continue their assault on the orthodox thesis that Soviet expansionism was responsible for the cold war. According to revisionist interpretations of postwar events, the true causes were an insidious interaction of mutual suspicions, and intransigent anticommunism in the West. The cold war was also the direct outcome of an American diplomacy that ever since 1898 has aimed at defense of the status quo and counter-revolution, an aim determined by the belief that the survival of capitalism depends on the acquisition and defense of worldwide markets. Two quite different conclusions can be drawn from revisionist findings: Either the United States could have chosen to act differently in the postwar world; or, more radically, the inner requirements of American capitalism have forced it into a policy of expansion that can be changed only with a change in the social system. So far, hostile critics of revisionism have failed to come up with convincing counter-arguments. The revisionists have raised crucial questions concerning the relationship of the United

States to the outside world and of American policy to its socioeconomic base--questions that, because of their political implications, cannot be answered by historians alone.

951
Lee, Luke T. TREATY RELATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: A STUDY OF COMPLIANCE. University of Pennsylvania law review, v. 116, Dec. 1967: 244-314. LL

Scrutinizes China's treaty practice, assuming that there is a "correlation between a country's past record of treaty compliance and its future conduct." The major part of the research for this treatise was carried out in Japan; it includes a review of the concept of treaties in traditional China, the People's Republic of China's practice in regard to boundary treaties, ambassadorial talks carried on despite nonrecognition of Communist China, China's policy toward the Korean Armistice Agreement, fisheries agreements, and trade agreements with Japan, Canada, Cuba, and the Scandinavian countries, as well as economic aid agreements. It closes with a review of the relationship between Communist China and the U.N. International Children's Emergency Fund. The author surmises that, while negotiations with Peking are not always easy "once an unambiguous agreement is reached, compliance likely will follow." The treatise concludes with a plea for a systematic study of the Chinese concept of law, which is split between "li" and "fa," meaning approximately "customary norms of behavior" and "enacted law." In case of conflict "li" generally prevails over "fa" even in present-day China, "where Mao's 'li' is being actively advanced through the Cultural Revolution to replace the century-old Confucian li."

952
Lern, I. [AFRICA TURNS AWAY FROM PEKING] Afrika otvorachivaetsia ot Pekina. Aziia i Afrika segodnia, v. 11, Feb. 1968: 4-6.
DS1. S7, v. 11

The Soviet Union has consistently supported the unification of Socialist and the national liberation movement forces in Africa's struggle against imperialism. However, Mao Tse-tung has been pursuing a nationalistic course in an attempt to undermine this cooperation and transform Africa into a region consolidated according to his ideas. Chou En-lai's claim that China is the only unselfish friend of the Third World is impairing economic cooperation between the Socialist and African countries. But Chinese aid to Africa goes into small enterprises that often lack raw materials and whose products are not in demand. Peking's negative attitude toward disarmament and its continuation of nuclear testing cause concern in Africa, and Peking's prestige has also suffered because of the Cultural Revolution with its oppression of the Moslems and Chinese interference in the internal affairs of African countries such as Tunisia or Kenya. Peking's nationalistic and divisive tactics are harming its national interests and adding to its international isolation.

953
Luchsinger, Fred. A GERMAN DILEMMA. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 17, Mar. 1968: 3-4.
D839. S9, v. 17

Points out the partial erosion of the Hallstein doctrine in the implementation of Bonn's new flexible policy toward Eastern Europe.

954
Lukaszewski, Jerzy. THE UNITED STATES, THE WEST, AND THE FUTURE OF EASTERN EUROPE. Journal of international affairs, v. 22, no. 1, 1968: 16-25. JX1. C6, v. 22

The belief that nationalism in Eastern Europe promotes the independence of that area from the Soviet Union (and therefore should be encouraged by the West) is false. The true consequences of nationalism are fragmentation, weakness, and perpetuation of Soviet control. The Russians were quick to realize this after World War II and, following the principle of divide et impera, vigorously encouraged nationalist sentiments, insisting only that national hatreds be directed at Germans, Hungarians, or Jews rather than Russians. Integration on the West European model would be a more beneficial goal for both Eastern Europe and the West. "As a prequisite to independence vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R., to security vis-à-vis Germany, to rapprochement with the West, and to economic progress, the integration of Eastern Europe is more likely to captivate the imagination of the societies, set meaningful goals for the ruling elites, and constitute a more viable alternative to decaying Communism than nationalism." The United States could do much to promote this integration by applying its expertise to solving the problems involved, increasing its own commercial ties with Eastern Europe, initiating a new Marshall plan for the East, and continuing its support for integration in Western Europe.

955
McGhee, George C. THE CENTRAL THEMES OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD EUROPE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, Feb. 19, 1968: 234-237. JX232. A33, v. 58
"Address made before the Foreign Policy Association at New York, N.Y., on January 4," 1968.

Discusses U.S. policy with respect to Germany, NATO, European-U.S. trade relations, and efforts to relax East-West tensions. McGhee is anxious to check the growing belief that U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the willingness of the United States to accept, and even to encourage, European self-reliance signify a decline of U.S. interest in Europe.

956
Markel, Lester. HOW THE NO. 1 POWER SHOULD USE ITS POWER. New York times magazine, Jan. 14, 1968: 22-23, 82-87. AP2. N6575, 1968

Reports on interviews with Government leaders in the United States and Europe who were asked to comment on the world role of the United States. In the course of these talks, Markel discovered that American opinion on foreign matters is powerfully shaped by a mythology of the outside world that bears little resemblance to reality and that foreigners are similarly handicapped in their thinking about the United States. As a first step toward sound policy these myths must be dispelled. By starting from a more realistic outlook on the world--and with hope that the world will adopt a more realistic outlook on the United States--it should be possible to transcend partisan dissension by defining a world role for the United States that would serve both American

and foreign interests and be acceptable to hawks and doves alike.

957
Mettler, Eric. FRIENDSHIPS UNDER STRESS. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 17, Mar. 1968: 1-2.
D839.S9, v. 17

Germany's growing irritation with De Gaulle's obtrusive policy in Europe and its uneasiness about the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty are straining its relations with France and America. This is so because of--among other things--lack of U.S. special security guarantees to West Germany in case the North Atlantic Treaty expires in 1969. The Germans also object to the 25-year term set for the nonproliferation treaty. Bonn needs both allies: France as a means of pressing Washington, and the United States as assurer of German security. Neither France nor "the Community of Six" is able to replace the United States in this role. Only together with Great Britain can the Six gain enough economic, strategic, and political weight to counterbalance that of the superpower. French ideas for federating central Europe will be inapplicable for a long time yet because of the fundamental differences between Communist and free regimes.

958
Middleton, Drew. AMERICA'S STAKE IN ASIA. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott [1968] 240 p.
DS33.4.U6M5

Contents.--The challenge to Asia.--Power, opportunity, and caution in Japan.--The god of war hates those who hesitate.--Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore: the heart of the problem.--Burmese neutralism on the road to ruin.--The Indian question mark.--Pakistan: the lost friend.--The extremes of fortune: Iran, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Indonesia.--Asia, America, and the future.--Index.

Surveys Asian "hot spots" and concludes that the United States must endeavor to raise the Asian standard of living, eliminate poverty, and promote regional unity in order to deter Communist expansion.

959
Miksch, Hans. [A SUCCESSFUL POLICY OF NEUTRALITY: TURKEY 1939-45 AS AN EXAMPLE] Erfolgreiche Neutralitätspolitik: Die Türkei 1939/45 als Beispiel. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, Nov./Dec. 1967: 474-480, 482. illus.
P&GP RR

States that it is entirely possible for a small nation to force warring big powers to respect its neutrality.

960
PAKISTAN: NOT A FLIRTATION. Far Eastern economic review, v. 59, Feb. 29, 1968: 365.
HC411.F16, v. 59

Pakistan's friendship with China and Soviet-oriented countries grew out of a desperate need for help. Disappointed by the U.S. attitude, its suspension of aid, and its preferential treatment of India in defense matters, Pakistan--a staunch Western ally--had no choice but to turn to the Communist world. China in particular proved a friend in need; Pakistani exports to China soared from some 10 million rupees in 1957-58 to more than 150 million rupees in 1965-66. In search of new business partners, exploring all roads that could lead to broadening of foreign trade, Pakistan may seem to be galloping toward the Socialist East. The facts, however, point the other way. The private sector--the pillar of Pakistan economy--has a hard time trading under its government's price equalization law; thus a deeper economic involvement with the Socialist countries is rather unlikely. What Pakistan needs at this time is "a warmer response from her traditional Western partners and more substantial help with less strings attached." Japan has already pledged aid and set up a consultative committee that promises dividends for both countries.

961
Park, Richard L. INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: 1964-1968. Current history, v. 54, Apr. 1968: 200-205, 243-244. D410.C82, v. 54

Traces India's recent foreign policy, which continues to follow the principles of nonalinement and peaceful coexistence advocated by Nehru. The craftsmanship of Indian diplomacy has improved since 1964: closer relationships with Egypt and Yugoslavia have been established, and the planned diversification of cultural and economic interests in Asia and Africa are being realized. The war with Pakistan, the Vietnam War, and the Middle East crisis have been severe tests for India's foreign policy. India may not sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty even though its Government has opposed the proliferation of nuclear capabilities to other countries. Despite U.S. assistance in food and financial support, India has been unwilling to become a close ally of the United States for fear of overshadowing its relationship with the Soviet Union. India now places greater emphasis on securing friends and promoting a more viable Asian regional cooperative system.

962
Power, Paul F., comp. INDIA'S NONALIGNMENT POLICY; STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES. Boston, Heath [1967] 114 p. (Problems in Asian civilizations)
DS448.P6
Bibliography: p. 111-114.

Partial contents.--pt. 1: Indian philosophy and the quest for peace, by T. M. P. Mahadevan. National interest and world reform, by Sisir Gupta.--pt. 2: Inconsistencies and failures, by Adda B. Bozeman. Defects in practice, by J. B. Kripalani. Misconceptions of international politics, by Werner Levi. Illusions of the Nehru bequest, by Michael Edwardes. A need for nuclear arms, by Raj Krishna.--pt. 3: Domestic and Afro-Asian requirements, by K. P. Karunakaran. The controversy of Goa, by Margaret W. Fisher. 1962 and the survival of nonalignment, by Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. Progressive neutralism, by V. K. Krishna Menon. Nonalignment without myth, by M. S. Rajan.--pt. 4: Indian nonalignment and the balance of power, by A. P. Rana. Evolution and permanence, by Arthur Lall.

Selected articles that reveal the controversy surrounding the Indian nonalinement policy. The first part of the book traces the origins of India's independent foreign policy to traditional Indian philosophy and Western political thought. In part 2, critics of nonalinement question the premises underlying Indian foreign policy and point out its failures in coping with world problems. The authors of part 3 defend India's non-

alinement policy and conclude that "its theory or practice is either justified or can be reformed to make it sound and effective." The final section offers two summaries of Indian foreign policy--the first relates India's nonalinement policy to the balance of power in the international community, and the second analyzes India's foreign policy attitudes within the framework of India's complex culture. Although the controversy over India's role in world affairs has not been resolved, many significant ideas for shaping future policy have been brought out by the debate.

963
Richardson, Jacques, and Ford Park. WHY EUROPE LAGS BEHIND. Science and technology, no. 77, May 1968: 20-29. illus. Q1.I587, 1968

Despite unquestioned creative genius, the countries of Western Europe have been slow to exploit many an invention since the War. The result has been a widening technological gap between the Old Continent and the U.S. The reasons for the lag are puzzling and complex. For one thing, the U.S., with its large-scale enterprises, is rich enough to make the competitive going rough. For another, the leavening influence of carefully planned R&D often keeps U.S. firms a jump ahead. Such largess and foresight are thought to be a product of modern managerial techniques as yet but feebly applied in Europe. Bigger, richer, better led science-based firms are only part of the story, though. The U.S. has a more widely educated populace, which makes the diffusion of new products and processes easier than in Europe. The impact of the technological gap is heightened by the burgeoning investment of U.S. firms in Europe and by the drain of technical talent westward to supposedly greener pastures. Steps to close the gap will require action on a monumental, probably multinational scale. If Europe finds the will to act, it may yet be able to tap a market as rich as our own. (Abstract supplied, modified)

964
Rigg, Robert B. CHINA WATCHING AND NATIONAL STRATEGY. Marine Corps gazette, v. 52, Feb. 1968: 31-33. VE7.M4, v. 52

Understanding Communist China is an urgent strategic need for the United States, especially as the passing years make China a stronger nuclear power. The great intellectual gap between the Americans and the Chinese Communists will take a generation to close, but a beginning should be made now. "Direct contact on a broad basis is necessary and the exchange of journalists, students, authors, businessmen, intellectuals, and politicians represents a first step." For this we must wait on "time, the emergence of new leaders in Peking or elsewhere, and opportunity." The future leaders of China may now be emerging among the armed anti-Maoist resistance movements in many regions, and every effort must be made to identify and to contact them. The problem of establishing understanding and rapport with them "is now more urgent than reaching the moon in 1970." Attempts to deal with the present aging rulers of Red China have been largely unfruitful, but contacts with the new leaders might also serve to bring pressure on Mao. "China watching" must be converted into "China contacting."

965
Rostow, Eugene V. NATIONAL SECURITY OR A RETREAT TO ISOLATION? THE CHOICE IN FOREIGN POLICY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, Apr. 1, 1968: 431-438. JX232.A33, v. 58

"Address made before the Women's Forum on National Security at Washington, D.C., on Feb. 20," 1968.

A defense of postwar U.S. security policy and of the U.S. commitment to Vietnam as the corollary of that policy for Southeast Asia. Rostow suggests that the growth of isolationist sentiment in the United States is founded on nostalgia for the past rather than a realistic appraisal of the present international environment.

966
Rouleau, Eric. [FRENCH NEAR EAST POLICY] Die französische Nahost-Politik. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Mar. 10, 1968: 149-158. D839.E86, v. 23

Stresses the abyss between the realist and moralist standpoints in the evaluation of De Gaulle's Near East policy, which is preoccupied with strengthening French interests in the area. Rouleau analyses the development in the last decade of France's relations with Israel, the Arab World, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain in regard to the Near East. De Gaulle sees nationalism as the most powerful motive in the Great Powers' foreign policies.

967
Schneider, Fernand T. [PHILOSOPHY OF A WESTERN CRISIS] Philosophie d'une crise de l'Occident. Revue militaire suisse, v. 113, Mar. 1968: 97-110. U2.R5, v. 113

President Kennedy's dream of an Atlantic community in which each member would be equal appears to have been forgotten. However, the French should not shoulder the blame alone because De Gaulle is not the only guilty party. The United States could revive the Atlantic community but it would have to share the decision-making processes--political, economic, and strategic--with its partners. Western Europeans fear American economic and strategic domination and reject "the solidarity of the superpowers" as a perpetuation of the status quo originated at Yalta. They also repudiate the idea of an independent nuclear force that advocates an "all-azimuths" defense. Any U.S.-European association must include collective decisionmaking, free trade, reduction of technological divergence, and military collaboration.

968
Stockwin, J. A. A. JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY: OR HOW TO BE A NON-IMPERALIST AND STILL WIN. Australian quarterly, v. 40, Mar. 1968: 50-57. DU80.A95, v. 40

Although Japan is stronger and more prosperous than before World War II, its political control in Asia is minimal. The defeat of Japan stopped its imperialist adventures. Japan's postwar economic penetration of the Asian mainland does not, contrary to some opinions, constitute economic imperialism "in any plausible sense of that term." If Japan does gain greater political control in Asia, this will be because of political rather than economic pressures. Relations between Japan and South Korea have been normalized, and it is doubtful that Japanese businessmen, wary of South Korean susceptibilities, would take advantage of the new situation. Although Taiwan is suspicious of

Japan's trade with Communist China, relations between the two countries have improved since the war. An active political role for Japan in Asia would mean preparedness to mediate disputes from a position of impartiality, defend existing governments threatened by military takeover, or undertake military commitments to deter China or the eruption of local conflicts. The prospects for any of these alternatives are dim. The Japan Socialist Party is in decline and the rightwing faction of the Liberal-Democratic Party, which is openly pro-American, is now more "securely in the saddle" than ever. That Japan will commit any troops to the Vietnam War or increase its defense spending is unlikely. If the United States withdraws from the Far East, Japan would be forced to assume the role of an independent great power in Asia. However, a hasty U.S. withdrawal would precipitate a catastrophic instability throughout the Far East, so any changes in Japan's political position more likely will come gradually.

969
Stokes, William N. THE FUTURE BETWEEN AMERICA AND CHINA. Foreign service journal, v. 45, Jan. 1968: 14-16. JX1.A53, v. 45

Recently Radio Peking accused President Liu Shao-chi and his followers of willingness to compromise with the United States in 1949 when they advocated a favorable reaction to Dean Acheson's statement that the United States wished only friendship with the Chinese people. In 1948 the United States did indeed seek a modus vivendi with the new regime in China. But in 1949 Mao Tse-tung rejected any approaches by stating that "as long as the imperialist countries do not change their hostile attitude, we shall not grant them legal status in China." However in 1951 detente with the United States made sense "for the same Marxist reasons that justified Stalin's New Economic Policy at a comparable stage in the Soviet Revolution." Today, although Radio Peking keeps accusing them of implementing the reactionary bourgeois line, important groups in China have adopted pragmatic realism in economic matters. Disenchantment is apparently widespread in the managerial and scientific elite of the country. This fact might ultimately induce China to choose a less aggressive view of the national self-interest in foreign affairs. Then new horizons will open. No one can deny that China has a major voice in Asian affairs. But Mao's rule has already outlived its historical usefulness. The prudent, patient, and steadfast U.S. frustration of Mao's policy of militaristic expansion, as well as keeping the doors open to the possibility of fundamental changes in Chinese internal policy, will mean a major victory. A prudent containment of Stalin's ambitions, against the counsels of preventive war, have fostered fundamental changes in Russian society. A similar development can be expected in China.

970
Strobel, Georg W. [SOME PROBLEMS OF POLAND'S FOREIGN POLICY; CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POLISH POLICY TOWARD THE WEST, INTERNAL POLITICAL FACTORS OF POLAND AND THE SOCIALIST CAMP] Einige Probleme der Aussenpolitik Polens; Abhängigkeiten zwischen der polnischen Politik gegenüber dem Westen und innerpolitischen Faktoren Polens und des sozialistischen Lagers. Köln [Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien] 1967. 47 p. (Berichte des Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 42)
HX15.G468

Contents.--pt. 1. The German question as the principal problem of Poland's foreign policy: Development and the increased gravity of the Germany syndrome. Poland and the reunification of Germany. Normalization of relations. Poland and the German Federal Republic's new Eastern policy. Gomulka's concept of a "united Europe." The German problem as a criterion for foreign policy criticism of (a) the United States, (b) West-European integration, and (c) De Gaulle's France.--pt. 2. Analysis of factors determining Poland's foreign policy. Communist efforts for political penetration with the help of German political arguments. Nationalism in the party and the public, and the conflict between the two. The Polish public's understanding of the German question. The differentiation process in the Polish United Workers' Party. Economic considerations: (a) foreign policy versus foreign trade with the West, (b) regional concentration within the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (the "western cooperation triangle").--pt. 3. Poland and the West: An attempt at a foreign policy prognosis.

Points out a tendency among Poland's Communist leaders to replace the triangle consisting of the Soviet Union, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic by the triangle of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic. The latter would conduct a concerted policy toward the West in a fashion more independent from the Soviet Union than today's.

971
Ter-Grigorian, A. CHINA: THEY HAVE FOUND EACH OTHER. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 20, Apr. 24, 1968: 23-24.
D839.C87, v. 20
Translated from Izvestiia, Mar. 29, 1968, p. 3.
Slav Rm

The understanding between Bonn and Peking is based upon affinity of political aims and economic interests. Bonn is calling for a revision of Europe's boundaries and Mao Tse-tung, who supports Bonn's territorial claims, refers periodically to the revision of Asian boundaries. Both are opposed to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty; Bonn wants access to nuclear arms and Peking is enlarging its nuclear pile. The Chinese press reflects the unofficial improved relations between Peking and Bonn, and Chinese emissaries are distributing propaganda materials and books in West Germany. Bonn's various political forces are even demanding establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking, but for that they need Washington's permission. Trade plays an important role in Bonn-Peking relations; the West German Government grants credit guarantees for periods of 5 to 8 years to firms that trade with Peking. In addition West German firms and capitalists often serve as middlemen for American firms and in sales of American weapons to Peking.

972
Van der Kroef, Justus M. [PEKING PUSHES SOUTHWARD] Peking drängt nach Süden. Moderne Welt, v. 9, no. 1, 1968: 32-45.
D839.M58, v. 9

Discusses Red China's political aspirations in southern Asia. Van der Kroef also considers Red Chinese political infiltration and subversive activities in Asian nations.

973
Vernant, Jacques. AMERICAN POLICY AND ASIAN SECURITY. Revue de défense nationale, v. 24, Apr. 1968: 711-716. D410.R45, v. 24

Comments on Fred Greene's book American Policy and Asian Security, which compares the role of Communist China to that of Germany between 1933 and 1940. Because of its militant ideology, Communist China is both expansionist and unstable. The United States must establish a system of multilateral and bilateral alliances with its allies in Asia, especially Japan. American and Japan should create a joint sea-based nuclear force that would be a difficult mobile target. Above all, America must reach an accomodation with Communist China. It would begin by instituting more tractable trade laws with China; e.g., by lifting the embargo on strategic products that has been in force since the Korean war.

974
Ways, Max. WHAT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY HAS DONE RIGHT. Fortune, v. 77, Mar. 1968: 100-105.
HF5001. F7, v. 77

The U.S. is tormented, and all but traumatized by Vietnam, but it is folly to lose perspective about the long-range record of U.S. foreign policy. It has impressive accomplishments to its credit. In the years since World War II, Americans have put their nation on the side of change. Now a new, drastically changed Europe, a changed France in particular, confronts us with problems, yet of all the France's the U.S. has known, surely de Gaulle's is the most wholesome. Other signs of health abound: the Common Market, stability in Italy, West Germany, and Japan. The prestige and pull of Communism have declined: not one nation has entered that orbit in the Sixties. The world of 1968 is better--less impoverished, less menaced, less divided, freer, more hopeful--than the world of 1948 or 1958. Each year the mortal danger of nuclear war decreases as the forces of progress and cooperation move a little more strongly than the forces of animosity and disruption. Our record gives hope to our prospect. (Abstract supplied)

975
Werth, Alexander. RUSSIA ON THE NILE. Nation, v. 206, Feb. 12, 1968: 198-201.
AP2. N2, v. 206

The ostentatious British contempt for the Egyptians, countered by the overtures of wartime Soviet diplomats, planted the seeds of Russo-Egyptian friendship. But the Soviet leadership, trying to undermine the British in the Middle East, chose the way least appealing to the Arabs--all-out patronage of Israel. However, with Israel's growing identification with American rather than British imperialism, hopes of turning the Jewish state into a Socialist beachhead in the Middle East gradually vanished. The 1950 Anglo-Franco-American declaration for the preservation of the status quo in the Middle East threw Egypt again into Russia's arms; the Suez adventure played into the Soviet Union's hands, and the Aswan Dam subsidy only tightened the grip, turning a major part of the Arab world into a Soviet sphere of influence. Today some 3,000 Russians are said to be in Egypt and as many more in other Arab countries. Egyptian Army and Air Force men are undergoing training in the Soviet Union, side by side with the North Vietnamese, and the Mediterranean is now crisscrossed by some 30 Soviet warships. The situation may appear ominous, with Egypt being rearmed by the Russians and Israel by the United States, yet Russia does not seem to be "grooming Egypt for a resounding revanche." Rather, the Arabs are being worked on to accept a "realistic" peace settlement. Russia does not wish to risk a nuclear war over Egypt nor, for that matter, over Vietnam. Its show of might in the Mediterranean and rearmament of Egypt is but a diplomatic game, whose ultimate purpose is to uphold an image of Russia as the Arabs' best friend.

976
Wilson, Dick. AMERICA IN ASIA. Far Eastern economic review, v. 59, Jan. 18, 1968: 114-116. illus.
HC411. F18, v. 59

To maintain an Asian balance of power the United States must fill the political vacuum left by the colonial powers and Japan after World War II. China's rapid nuclear progress is causing American defense planners to consider the smaller Pacific islands as sites for U.S. military bases rather than the Asian mainland. Proposals to make the Micronesian Islands politically independent in the hope that they will join Guam as the 51st State substantiate this speculation. More important than the military situation is the question of America's political and military role in Southeast Asia, as the case of Indonesia shows. Whether the United States will do too little to help Suharto save his country or too much to make him dependent will demonstrate the extent to which the United States has learned from its mistakes in China and Vietnam.

977
Wilson, Dick. WILL THE TWAIN MEET? Far Eastern economic review, v. 59, Jan. 13, 1968: 59-63. illus.
HC411. F18, v. 59

Although America's leaders agree that accommodation with China must be sought, relations between the two nations are likely to become worse before they become better. China's refusal to renounce the use of force in settling the Taiwan dispute and its "trouble making" in Vietnam are the greatest obstacles to a thaw in Sino-American relations. However, the U.S. policy of nonrecognition and nonaccomodation is contrary to political reality. Efforts are being made to deepen the American public's knowledge of China and its policies. Also, Mao's successors may temper China's militant foreign policy to ensure economic development in the years ahead.

978
Wingo, Hal. THE VEXING PEACE-KEEPER OF CAMBODIA. Life, v. 64, Feb. 16, 1968: 36-38, 41. illus.
AP2. L547, v. 64

Belying all logic, Cambodia remains at peace while its neighbors, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, are threatened by Communist troops and terrorists. The clue to the riddle is the Cambodian head of state himself, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who has succeeded in staying out of the "struggle between China and the United States for the domination of Asia." Americans who consider Sihanouk nothing more than "a mercurial lightweight" do not seem to grasp his principal rule of conduct, which is to say or do "whatever he feels Cambodia's national security demands at the moment." Sihanouk does not care for protectors. He fought the French, and he never served China, although he believes that "sooner or later all of Asia will be Chinese." Burdened by neither political nor military obligations, his flexible policy "is a luxury that only the weak can afford." He freely lashes out at anybody who happens to disagree with him, yet his vilifications are

wrapped in a cloak of charm. With healthy doses of cash from the French, Chinese, and Russians and lesser help from other sources, Cambodia has made significant steps forward in health, education, and industry. During Sihanouk's steadfast struggle for independence Cambodians have gained new self-esteem; and, even though their ruler's approach to the rest of the world is often irritating, the prince charming has kept his country at peace.

979
Winzer, Otto. [ALLIES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF NATIONS; SOME TOPICAL PROBLEMS OF SOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY] Verbündete im Ringen um Frieden und Sicherheit der Völker; zu einigen aktuellen Problemen der sozialistischen Aussenpolitik. Einheit, v. 23, no. 1, 1968: 9-17. HX6. E4, v. 23

The German Democratic Republic's foreign policy serves the "further consolidation of the socialist community of states"; supports the struggle of anti-imperialist nation-states against colonial oppression, imperialist aggression, and intervention; and aims at the establishment of a European security system based on peaceful coexistence. Prerequisite for this is the normalization of relations between the two German states, to which Bonn has long been opposed. Bonn's claim to sole representation of all Germany constitutes a threat of aggression against the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and the Soviet Union. Therefore acceptance by the United Nations of the Soviet proposal for a clear definition of aggression under international law would be enormously helpful in securing the peace in Europe. West Germany's imperialist policy is also evidenced by Bonn's in actuality negative attitude to the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

980
Zagoria, Donald S. WHO'S AFRAID OF THE DOMINO THEORY? New York times magazine, Apr. 21, 1968: 28-29, 59-60, 62, 64, 66, 69-70, 72, 74. illus. AP2. N6575, 1968

The domino theory asserts that a Vietnam settlement short of administration goals will facilitate Chinese domination of Asia, weaken confidence in U. S. commitments to non-Communist allies, and increase the likelihood of wars of liberation. But it is doubtful that the outcome of the Vietnam War will have any effect on China's influence in Asia. That influence will rest instead on China's success in becoming an industrial power, in exploiting its nuclear weapons capability, in capitalizing on interstate rivalries, and in influencing other states by nonmilitary means, and on the weight of countervailing power in Asia. China has recently suffered setbacks in all these areas and has gained limited success only in exploiting the rivalries of other Asian states. Vietnam has proved the U. S. willingness to fulfill its commitments; what is in question is its ability to shore up unpopular regimes. A negotiated settlement will not destroy U. S. credit with non-Communist states, but there is danger in complete and precipitous withdrawal. The outcome of the Vietnam War will not have an appreciable effect on Communist strategy in Asia. Since the breakup of the Communist monolith, strategy has come to depend on local experience and conditions. The conditions that spawned the war in Vietnam exist nowhere else in Asia except in Laos. Recognition that the domino theory is fallacious will permit the United States to put needed pressure on the Saigon regime, consider without fear the possibility of a coalition government, and, in general, approach negotiations with greater realism and flexibility.

II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

A. MODERN WAR

981
Bidziński, B., and R. Mackiewicz. [MILITARY ENCOUNTERS IN THE INITIAL OPERATION OF WAR] Begegnungshandlungen in der ersten Operation eines Krieges. Militärwesen, v. 11, Sept. 1967: 1290-1302.
U3.M47, v. 11

Translated from Myśl Wojskowa (Warsaw), v. 18, no. 1, 1967. (Not in the Library collections)

The original title is "Starcia spotkaniowe w pierwszej operacji początkowego okresu wojny prowadzonej w warunkach groźby użycia przez przeciwnika broni masowego rażenia" (Military Encounters in the First Operation of the Initial Phase of War, Conducted Under Threat of a Possible Use of Mass-Annihilation Weapons by the Enemy).

Explains the courses the encounters can take. In contrast to traditional confrontations, those of today can envelop the entire depth of the frontal, operational-strategic echelon. They can wipe out the forces of one side or prompt the defeated side either to reorganize for defense, to retreat, or to change from conventional to nuclear warfare.

982
Frank, Jerome D. DETERRENCE--FOR HOW LONG? War/peace report, v. 8, Feb. 1968: 3-7.
P&GP RR

Adapted from his book, Sanity and Survival; Psychological Aspects of War and Peace (New York, Random House [1967]).

Although deterrence strategies are intended to prevent nuclear war, they actually foster conditions that favor its outbreak. Deterrence only postpones the nuclear exchange that seems inevitable if nations continue building powerful nuclear arsenals. Emotional tensions are heightened by the constant threat of a nuclear holocaust and could impede the rational judgment required to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in time of crisis. Each superpower must convince the other that it cannot be intimidated and try to intimidate the other side. The rapid pace of weapons development is especially dangerous since if one side feared the other was on the verge of a technological breakthrough it would be tempted to launch a preemptive strike. Even if the threat of nuclear attack no longer existed, the deterrent would probably be maintained because of the strong belief that it was responsible for preventing nuclear conflict. Once a nation becomes heavily committed to a policy based upon widespread public belief, the policy tends to reinforce the belief and becomes difficult to change. Furthermore belief in the false threat could become a self-fulfilling prophecy, for the hostility and mutual distrust generated by deterrence policies could eventually cause enemies to become as evil as they imagine each other to be. However, deterrence is not based on intimidation alone. An effective defense based upon antimissile missiles and civilian defense shelters could deter the enemy and reduce tension by diminishing the fear of a surprise attack. Unfortunately, neither antimissile systems nor public shelter programs are likely to prove successful. A shelter program also tends to reinforce the belief that a nuclear war will eventually occur and so could become another self-fulfilling prophecy. An alternative policy must be devised appropriate to a "world bristling with genocidal weapons."

983
Hodges, H. S., and G. R. Webb. ASPECTS OF THE MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA. Australian Army journal, no. 223, Dec. 1967: 3-12. illus.
Ul.A92, 1967

Describes the influence of Southeast Asian terrain on military operations. Included are discussions of topography and the evolution of land masses during specific geological stages. The rugged relief of Southeast Asia restricts ground movement in time of war. Operations in the deltas and plains are unhampered except during the monsoon season when these areas become "vast sheets of water." The authors conclude that, while the topography of Southeast Asia presents serious obstacles for an army, tactical mobility can be restored through the use of helicopters as has been demonstrated in the Vietnam War.

984
Intriligator, Michael D. STRATEGY IN A MISSILE WAR: TARGETS AND RATES OF FIRE. Los Angeles, University of California, 1967. 77p. (University of California. Security studies paper no. 10)
UF767.I57

Partial contents.--Purpose and conclusions.--Dynamic model of a missile war.--Strategy in wartime where the enemy strategy is known.--Strategy in wartime where the enemy strategy is to be influenced.--Strategy at war termination.

Analyzes problems involved in the most efficient allocation of missiles in a war. In his discussion of the wide range of alternatives available for targets and rates of fire, Intriligator purposely omits the influence of political, psychological, technical, and all other factors related to strategy. He uses a mathematical model to illustrate the most effective application of firepower at various stages of war. In order to terminate the war by inflicting an unacceptable account of damage upon the enemy, Intriligator recommends varying the rates of fire and alternating targets between population centers and missiles during the course of the war. A summary of the current debate over missile strategy, a graphical illustration of the strategic choices available when the enemy's missiles and cities are collocated, a table and explanation of missile exchange ratios, and a series of tables simulating missile exchanges under varying conditions are appended.

985
Roberts, Adam, ed. CIVILIAN RESISTANCE AS A NATIONAL DEFENSE: NON-VIOLENT ACTION

AGAINST AGGRESSION. Harrisburg, Stackpole Books [1967] 320 p.
UA926.R57 1968

Partial contents.--Forms of military attack, by Alun Gwynne Jones.--The coup d'etat, by D. J. Goodspeed.--Aspects of totalitarian systems, by E. K. Bramsted.--The technique of non-violent action, by Gene Sharp.--The Ruhrkampf of 1923: economic problems of civilian defence, by Wolfgang Sternstein.--Norwegian non-violent resistance during the German occupation, by Magne Skodyin.--The resistance against the German occupation of Denmark 1940-5, by Jeremy Bennett.--Non-violent resistance against Communist regimes?, by Theodor Ebert.--Lessons from resistance movements--guerrilla and non-violent, by B. H. Liddell Hart.--Civilian defence strategy, by Adam Roberts.--Organization in civilian defence, by Theodor Ebert.--Political conditions for civilian defence, by April Carter.--Transarmament to civilian defence, by Adam Roberts.--Some questions on civilian defense, by Thomas C. Schelling.

A collection of essays that describe the use of non-violent methods in political and social struggles and examines whether these methods could be used to provide the basis for a nation's defense policy. The embodiment of this policy is "civilian defense" which is aimed at changing the will of the opponent as well as making it difficult for him to achieve his objectives. Defiance of an enemy's orders, encouragement of non-compliance among his troops, and the creation of a parallel system of government are among the methods that could be employed. Civilian defense inculcates morale and cohesion among victims of aggression. It differs from military defense and is not regarded as a substitute for it. It is based on the recognition that war in international relations is inevitable and offers a revolutionary approach to the control of political and military power. It is not a last resort but a mechanism which should be further studied in view of the failure of proposals for arms control, disarmament, and world government.

B. MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

986
AEC BUDGET FOR FY-69. Nuclear news, v. 11, Mar. 1968: 5-11. tables. QC770.N75, v. 11

Analyzes the Atomic Energy Commission's budget estimates for FY 1969 in the categories of raw materials, special nuclear materials, weapons, reactor development, physical research, biology, medicine, and isotope development. Highlights of the budget are increased spending for Poseidon and Sentinel weapons and the liquid metal fast breeder reactor.

987
[AERODYNAMIC MISSILES] Flugkörper. Flugwehr und -Technik, v. 30, Jan./Feb. 1968: 26.
TL503.F625, v. 30

A survey of American, Australian, French, and Soviet missile and satellite launchings. The Russians have developed communication satellites and successfully launched "Kosmos 197" at the end of December, 1967. The Soviet fractional orbital bombardment system, the Soviet mobile strategic guided missiles, and new ballistic missiles for submarine combat operations are discussed.

988
["ALL AZIMUTHS" DEFENSE: TOWARD A LONG-RANGE FRENCH MISSILE] Défense "tous azimuts": vers un missile français à longue portée [par] J. M. Air & cosmos, v. 5, Feb. 10, 1968: 17.
P&GP RR

To implement an "all-points" defense policy the French will need a long-range missile capable of traveling over 10,000 miles. Although the United States and the Soviet Union (from what is known from official pronouncements) do not possess such a missile, the French are seriously looking into the possibility of producing one. They will have to build a three-stage rocket combining different stages of different missiles that can travel at 5 miles per second, has absolute precision, can stay up long enough to achieve an optimum trajectory of over 10,000 miles, and is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead that weighs more than a ton. The greatest problem will be guidance. One mistake in speed calculations could mean missing a target. Furthermore the investment necessary to obtain more precise gyroscopes and accelerometers will constitute a major problem.

989
Andrews, Walter. TACTICAL MISSILE DESIGN WILL STRESS MODULARITY. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Apr. 22, 1968: 14.
UG630.M54, v. 21

The trend in U.S. air-to-ground missiles during the early 1970's will be to multiservice, multimission missiles with modular warheads and relatively universal guidance systems. This new missile generation will probably consist of only short-range and long-range missiles, both carrying maximum payloads.

990
[AVIONS MARCEL DASSAULT'S MIRAGE F1 AND F2. A NEW GENERATION OF FRENCH FIGHTERS] Avions Marcel Dassault Mirage F1 u. F2; eine neue Generation französischer Kampfflugzeuge. Flug Revue, Mar. 1968: 22-23. illus.
TL503.C524, 1968

Avions Marcel Dassault has developed, in an amazingly short period, a new category of combat aircraft: the Mirage F2 and Mirage F1. Neither of these models has the characteristic delta wings of the former Mirage models, but sweptback wings and low horizontal tail surfaces. The main functions of the F2 will be reconnaissance and low attack missions at just about ground level at a speed of Mach 1.1--its maximum speed at an altitude of 33,500 ft. is around Mach 2.5. A decision concerning series production of the F2 has not been reached up till now. On the other hand the Mirage F1 seems to have a good future as an aircraft for the surveillance of the French air space and as an interceptor of high-and fast-flying aircraft. In the meantime, Dassault has received an order for the production of three F1 pre-production models. (Abstract supplied)

991
Babich, V. [COMBAT EMPLOYMENT OF THE F-4 "PHANTOM" FIGHTER] Boevoe primenenie istrebitelia F-4 "Fantom." Aviatsiia i kosmonavtika, Jan. 1968: 95. illus. TL504.V45, 1968

Discusses the plane's history, technical design, and performance. According to the U.S. press the Soviet

MiG is more maneuverable than the Phantom; the Phantom's deficiencies, disclosed in Vietnam, have forced the Americans to develop a new version of this aircraft, the F-4E.

992
Biely, Norbert. [THE SMALL NEUTRAL STATE AND THE LIMITS OF ITS ARMS PRODUCTION] Der neutrale Kleinstaat und die Grenzen seiner Rüstungsproduktion. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, Nov./Dec. 1967: 465-469.
P&GP RR

Since modern warfare has been determined mostly by technological innovations made since 1945, the next war will be entirely different from World War II. A determined small neutral nation can produce sophisticated weapons for its own defense but, more than a big nation, it must depend on the technical skills of its people in its defense industry and armed forces. There are several political and economic advantages for a nation, especially a neutral one, in producing its own weapons. A great disadvantage however, is the small rentability due to higher costs of development and of serial output. This could be partly overcome by cooperative development and production of weapons by two or more neutral nations, e.g., Sweden and Austria.

993
Burba, Edwin H. MBT-70...THE NEW U.S./F.R.G. MAIN BATTLE TANK. Ordnance, v. 52, Mar./Apr. 1968: 475-479. illus.
UF1.O67, v. 52

Praises the joint U.S.-German efforts in developing an exceptional main battle tank, the MBT-70, for the 1970's. The unique international development program was initiated in 1963 to incorporate the experiences and skills of the two countries in an advanced tank design. Under the direction of the Program Management Board, composed of one representative from each country, civilian and military personnel from both countries worked together on the Joint Engineering Agency and the Joint Design Team to define the military requirements and design concept of the tank. Despite language barriers and conflicting industrial and military practices, research and production schedules for each country were successfully negotiated and the first American prototype was delivered on July 17, 1967. The prototype is an extremely advanced vehicle with an "unusually low silhouette incorporating a rare combination of firepower, mobility, and protective armor." According to the terms of the program agreement, each country will have access to all design information and will be able to build a complete tank.

994
[THE C-5 GALAXY: SPECIAL REPORTS] Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Apr. 1968: 64-68, 75-90, 93-94, 96-100, 102-104.
UG633.A65, v. 51

Partial contents.--How the world's largest aircraft revolutionizes strategy and technology, by Edgar E. Ulsamer.--AFSC: the C-5's principal mentor, by Guy M. Townsend.--Grooming the giant for flight test, by H. Lee Poore.--The TF3: quantum jump in engine technology.--The C-5's unique 'TIPS' system.--The Galaxy aims high in navigation and guidance.--The C-5's advanced multimode radar system.--C-5 opens a new era in strategic airlift.--The C-5: capable of many different missions, by F. A. Cleveland.--How AFLC designed intrinsic ease of maintenance into the C-5.--C-5 points the way to even more advanced aeronautical technologies, by R. B. Ormsby.

Chronicles the profound impact of the 354-ton C-5 Galaxy aircraft upon aeronautical technology, military strategy, component design, and procurement procedures. The role of the revolutionary new aircraft is explained in summaries of briefings presented at the Air Force Association's 1968 convention. Although it was primarily designed to increase America's strategic mobility, the C-5's phenomenal range and payload capacities make it potentially suitable for other military missions, including use as an airborne command post, fuel tanker, missile launcher, and minelayer. "By pushing the state of the art in terms of available technology," the C-5 is responsible for innovations in structural materials, propulsion, and flight dynamics which could lead to great improvements in future aircraft performance.

995
Carlton, David. LABOUR AND THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT. Socialist commentary, Mar. 1968: 16-18.
HX3.S74, 1968

The Labor government has not kept its campaign promise of an independent nuclear deterrent. Britain's only nuclear strike force, the Royal Air Force's V-bombers, cannot penetrate Soviet defenses. But with completion of its four Polaris submarines, each armed with 16 Polaris missiles, Britain will be capable of delivering nuclear bombs to Soviet cities until at least the mid-1970's. Despite pressure on the Labor government to "re-negotiate" the British Polaris order and some American offers to purchase the British Polaris missiles, England does not want to sell or give away the fleet. However, it would be appropriate for Britain to offer at the disarmament conference to sell its Polaris fleet to the United States if a specified number of nonnuclear powers accept the nonacquisition clauses of the treaty. England would save a considerable amount by this transaction and would show the nonnuclear powers that nuclear powers can also make sacrifices.

996
CHINA'S ROAD FOR DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. China reconstructs, v. 16, Dec. 1967: 24-25.
DS701.C643, v. 16

Extolls China's achievements in the field of nuclear weapons. In 1958 Chairman Mao had predicted that "some atom bombs and hydrogen bombs [would] be made in ten years' time." Despite Soviet coercion to rely on the Russian nuclear umbrella the Chinese people "went on along the road of self-reliance," and mastered nuclear technology, thus smashing the "U.S. imperialists' and Soviet revisionists' nuclear monopoly." America's hydrogen bomb was built 7 long years after its first atom bomb explosion. The British and the Soviet development took 4 years. But China came out with its first hydrogen bomb only 2 years and 8 months after its first atom bomb--showing the world that "nothing can defeat a people armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought."

997
Christ, Rolf F. [A SUCCESSOR TYPE OF AIRCRAFT BEING CONSIDERED] Nachfolger gesucht [by] ct.

Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Jan. 10, 1968: 34-36. illus. U3.W38, v. 12

West German parliamentary debate last December on the nation's defense problems turned out to be far less informative than expected by German and foreign aircraft manufacturers. Defense Minister Schröder gave only vague indications of the equipment required for the future Luftwaffe aircraft. The article speculates on the succession of the existing weapons systems and discusses bids for their production and delivery dates. Considered also are the West German-American AVS aircraft project (which is now in the prototype phase), the West German-Italian VAK. 191, and the German NFK (new fighter).

998
[DEFENSE INDUSTRIES OF EUROPE'S NEUTRAL STATES (9); AUSTRIA--A REVIEW] Die Rüstungsindustrien der neutralen Staaten Europas (9); Österreich--ein Überblick. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 6, Jan./Feb. 1968: 28-33. illus. P&GP RR

Lists Austrian weapons manufacturers and describes weapons they produce--chiefly artillery, military vehicles, and tanks.

999
Einhorn, Richard N. RADIATION-HARDENED ICS STILL UNPROVED. Electronic design, v. 16, Feb. 15, 1968: 36, 38, 40. illus. TK7800.E437, v. 16

Presents views of microelectronics experts on the development of dielectrically isolated metal-oxide-semiconductor [MOS] integrated circuits for use in ballistic missiles. Proponents of the MOS devices believe that they are less vulnerable to radiation than bipolars and could be designed to survive radiation conditions in a nuclear weapons environment. Although they agree with the skeptics that the oxide layer of the MOS is highly susceptible to radiation, they feel protective measures could be devised. Under a contract with the Air Force, TRW Systems will explore the radiation-resistance potential of the MOS circuits. However, it will be difficult to completely dispel uncertainty about the MOS devices without actual atmospheric testing of the missiles.

1000
Feigl, Hubert. [THE TECHNICAL ASPECT AND DEVELOPMENT POSSIBILITIES OF ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE] Technischer Stand und Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten der Raketenabwehr. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Feb. 10, 1968: 89-100. illus. D839.E86, v. 23

Describes both "point-defense" and "urban defense" antiballistic missile systems and their underlying concepts. Feigl cites the potential efficacy in different versions of the Sentinel system and other ABM systems --including one utilizing laser beams--that are now under consideration and concludes that no adequate system yet exists to protect American and West European cities from massive missile attack.

1001
Fink, Donald E. FIRST ANGLO-FRENCH JAGUAR TO FLY IN MAY. Aviation week & space technology, v. 88, Apr. 22, 1968: 20-22. illus. TL501.A8, v. 88

Announces completion of the first prototype of the Anglo-French Jaguar, a multipurpose trainer-attack aircraft with five basic versions, which is scheduled for delivery to the French Air Force in 1970 and to the Royal Air Force in 1972. In addition to fulfilling domestic needs, the versatile Jaguar should have a substantial overseas market in countries with small defense budgets that need aircraft that can perform a variety of tasks.

1002
[FIRMS SPECIALIZING IN DEVELOPMENT OF ARMAMENTS TECHNOLOGY] Rüstungstechnische Entwicklungsfirmen. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Jan. 10, 1968: 45. U3.W38, v. 12

Reports on two companies, Marinetechnik-Planungsgesellschaft and Elektronik-System-Gesellschaft, the first engaged in research on naval weapons systems and the other on electronic systems for aircrafts. Both firms are owned by groups of West German industrial concerns.

1003
[FORECAST OF MAJOR AEROSPACE PROGRAMS] Aviation week & space technology, v. 88, Mar. 18, 1968: 60-318. illus. TL501.A8, v. 88

Partial contents.--Dollar drain saps U.S. strategic stance.--Tactical-forces budget expected to soar.--U.S. military exports facing lean year.--Aerospace research sacrificed to Vietnam.--Soviet Union seeks balance in technology.--Europe challenges U.S. for world market.--Joint missile projects expand.--British seek solutions in civil arena.--NATO acts to counter two-way threat.--Air Force space effort to grow.--Vietnam straining MAC fleet, facilities.--Soviets plan space platform tests.--European projects reaching hardware stage.--AWACS seen gaining long-term impact.--Europe seeks self-sufficiency in avionics.

Reports on the status of major American, Soviet, and West European aerospace projects. Many of the political, technical, and economic considerations involved in shaping the aerospace outlook are reviewed and numerous individual projects are described in detail. A table is included that lists basic descriptive data for a number of the world's leading spacecraft and aircraft.

1004
Foster, John S. FOSTER CALLS FOR INCREASE IN BASIC RESEARCH FUNDING; OUTLINES FY '69 R&D PLANS. Journal of the Armed Forces, Feb. 24, 1968: 16-17, 25. U1.A66, 1968

Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee by John S. Foster, Director of Research and Development, Department of Defense.

Unless the Department of Defense receives more funds, America's national security will be weakened. Since 1964 there has been a drop in the number of research and exploratory weapons programs. Because of Russia's and China's secrecy, the United States must continue to develop and deploy systems that will ensure adequate capability to survive a first strike and penetrate any enemy defense. Using and revealing its nonnuclear capabilities in Southeast Asia has proved the most significant threat to America's weapons capability. However the FY '69 research and development [R&D] budget reflects a commitment to reverse the

present trend in R&D and "to seize more of the technical opportunities clearly linked to future national security problems." New developments in strategic and tactical forces include the vertical short-takeoff airplane, the C-5A cargo aircraft, the Poseidon and short-range antiaircraft missiles, and overland radar technology.

1005
Foster, John S. 'TECHNOLOGICAL PLATEAU'--THERE'S NO SUCH THING. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, May 1968: 16, 23.
UG633.A65, v. 51

Excerpts from open testimony before the 90th Congress.

Warns against the erosion of American defense research and exploratory development programs. In order to avoid technological surprise, the United States must continue its efforts to counter anticipated arms developments by potential enemies. By preliminary planning the United States was able to install the new over-the-horizon radars in response to the Soviet fractional orbital bombardment system and will be prepared to harden the Minuteman silos if the Russians should decide to deploy missiles with multiple warheads. Research programs are now underway to assure the retention of U.S. air superiority and facilitate future command and reconnaissance missions. Since "intuitive" judgments may not be adequate for solving defense problems, America's future security can best be safeguarded by comprehensive studies of new military systems.

1006
Garwin, Richard L., and Hans A. Bethe. ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS. Scientific American, v. 218, Mar. 1968: 21-31. T1.S5, v. 218

Comments by two physicists on the capabilities of various types of ABM systems and the techniques that could be employed to reduce the effectiveness of such systems. Garwin explains that a country can maintain its assured destruction capability against an enemy equipped with an ABM system by attacking with a greater number of warheads or by mixing decoys with the actual warheads. Since the components of the U.S. Sentinel ABM system are so highly publicized, Communist China could easily design its missile force to nullify the light U.S. missile defense. Technically, offensive missiles can be provided with considerable protection against neutron, radiation, or blast damage from antimissile missiles. Furthermore, the attacker could deploy penetration aids such as fragments of booster rockets, decoys, wire chaff, electronic countermeasures, and radar blackout mechanisms to complicate the defense. Thus missile defense is highly vulnerable and cannot be designed to provide an adequate shield against attack. The authors conclude that an ABM system would be a foolish investment since it could not provide effective protection and it could lead to a dangerous escalation of the arms race.

1007
Geiger, G. J. NEW EUROPEAN MISSILES. Ordnance, v. 52, Mar./Apr. 1968: 487-489. illus.
UF1.O67, v. 52

Lists many of the missile systems displayed by European nations at the 27th International French Air Show. Although the capabilities and sizes of the systems varied, all were highly mobile and most were automated to some degree.

1008
Geisenheyner, Stefan. NEW SWEDISH FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR: 'VIGGEN' MEANS THUNDERBOLT. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Mar. 1968: 63-67. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 51

Applauds Sweden's new multipurpose combat aircraft, the Viggen (SAAB System 37), which is scheduled to replace the Draken and the Lansen by 1975. As a short takeoff and landing aircraft with excellent low-speed and supersonic capabilities, the Viggen is extremely versatile and is particularly suited to Sweden's geography and military-political situation. While it can be modified to suit the needs of other air forces, the Viggen was tailored for integration into the Swedish defense system, which utilizes dispersed road sections for runways and relies on the loyalty of the surrounding population to protect the road bases. The Viggen is designed to carry a variety of armaments and can be built in ground support, intercept, reconnaissance, and training versions. Preliminary work on the Viggen began in 1962, and its unique operational characteristics were first demonstrated in a flight test on February 8, 1967. The success of the Viggen can be largely attributed to careful planning by Sweden's defense experts and the close cooperation of its aerospace industry.

1009
Gerbert, Karl. [PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HIGH SPEED FLIGHT] Psychologische Probleme des Hochgeschwindigkeitsfluges. Flug Revue, Mar. 1968: 24.
TL503.C524, 1968

The point has been reached where the demands made upon pilots in civil and even more so in military aviation are clearly showing the boundaries of human capacities. The most obvious boundaries arise for pilots who fly aircraft with unusual speed range, either V/STOL or high-speed aircraft. In this article the psychological problems of high-speed flight are brought out, mainly from the military side, where the human capacities of the pilot must be considered as practically drained to the last reserve: one man in an aircraft, whether he is a fighter bomber, reconnaissance or fighter pilot, is today at the limits of his capabilities. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1010
Ghaswala, S. K. MR. ATOMIC ENERGY IN INDIA. Science & technology, no. 75, Mar. 1968: 13-14, 16, 19.
Q1.I587, 1968

An interview with Vikram Sarabhai, chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission. Sarabhai defends India's decision not to become a nuclear-weapon state, describes the present status of nuclear technology in India, and discusses the political and economic problems that plague India's civil nuclear power program.

1011
Hebel, Yves. [THE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES OF YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW] Les missiles air-air d'hier, d'aujourd'hui et de demain. Aviation magazine, no. 480, Dec. 1, 1967: 16-17, 19-20. illus.
TL502.A854, 1967

Discusses the problems of guidance and detection that an air-to-air missile must overcome to strike effectively at a moving target. Included are investigations of autoguidance and telecommand guidance systems. The latter system is no longer useful in

connection with air-to-air missiles because it cannot pinpoint targets and can be rendered ineffective as a result of jamming and interference. The problem of guidance dynamics can be resolved by proportional navigation and detection of targets. Hebel also discusses missile propulsion, blast-off and explosion effects, and structure and equipment.

1012
Holloway, Bruce K. OUR AERIAL ARMAMENT. Ordnance, v. 52, Mar./Apr. 1968: 460-462.
UF1.O67, v. 52

The nonnuclear firepower of U.S. tactical aircraft has increased dramatically over the past 5 years. In the mid-1950's the Air Force concentrated on strengthening America's nuclear deterrent, and the conventional armament budget dropped to $460,000. However, by 1966 spending in this area had increased by a factor of about 160 because of the unsuitability of nuclear weapons for use in limited wars. Since tactical air firepower was found to be particularly useful for combating insurgency in rugged terrain, equipment was created for delivering this firepower rapidly and selectively. Developmental work is now underway on more accurate bombing systems, better area bombing devices, air-delivered weapons for area denial, new fighter aircraft, new weapons for air-to-air and air-to-ground fighting, and an armament control system. Eventually the United States may be able to deter small-scale war as effectively as it prevents nuclear war.

1013
Kasatonov, V. [THE NAVY] Voenno-morskoi flot. Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, v. 10, Jan. 1968: 29-41. illus.
DK50.A32, v. 10

History of the Soviet Navy. After the U.S.S.R. liquidated the U.S. monopoly in atomic weaponry in 1949, the Soviet Union equipped its missiles and torpedoes with nuclear warheads and constructed nuclear-powered submarines. Some submarines are built to fire long-range missiles capable of hitting enemy ships and land targets. The Soviet Navy has become a modern global navy able to protect U.S.S.R. interests on the seas and oceans against the Western aggressors, especially the American imperialists.

1014
Krylov, Nikolai. GUARDING SOCIALISM'S GAINS [interview] New times, no. 8, Feb. 28, 1968: 3-5.
D839.N483, 1968

The Soviet Army and Navy have achieved power and strength despite wartime hardships, economic chaos, and both internal and external foes. Because of the imperialists' aggressive designs, they must continue to improve their weapons and combat preparedness. Soviet economic, scientific, and technological progress gave an impetus to changes in the organization, tactics, and strategy of the defense system after World War II. The Strategic Missile Forces are the main deterrent against imperialist nuclear attacks and their weapons are capable of striking any target on the globe. These missiles are launched from either underground or mobile bases, and the warheads are designed to thwart ABM's. If aggressors risk a nuclear war the Soviet missile forces will spearhead the retaliatory response. Corresponding changes have occurred in the firepower of the other services. The ground forces have been mechanized and equipped with modern missiles, tanks, and artillery; the Air Force has supersonic jets and all-weather ICBM's; and the Navy has missile-carrying aircraft and nuclear submarines capable of launching long-range ballistic missiles underwater. But the main power of the Soviet Armed Forces is in its personnel. The more complex the weapons, the more skill, education, and training that is demanded of those who use them.

1015
Le Masson, Henri. [SOVIET NAVAL POWER] La puissance navale soviétique. Revue militaire générale, Feb. 1968: 154-169. U2.R48, 1968

The past year's Middle East events have convinced Russia that having a Mediterranean fleet with offensive and amphibious capabilities is valuable. The Russians are developing new aircraft carriers and missile-launching cruisers. The latter carry two types of ballistic missiles: surface-to-surface and antiaircraft missiles. The Soviet Navy has three types of surface-to-surface missiles: the Strella, subsonic with a range of 100 nautical miles; the Styx, also subsonic, with a range of 20 to 25 nautical miles; and the Shaddock, which can travel up to 300 nautical miles. The Soviet Navy is now the second largest in the world.

1016
London, Michael P. TACTICAL AIR SUPERIORITY. Space/aeronautics, v. 49, Mar. 1968: 62-71. illus.
TL501.A786, v. 49

Discusses the technical factors aircraft designers and planners must consider in maintaining America's tactical air superiority. Despite modifications, no existing aircraft will be capable of meeting the threat from new enemy fighters. Therefore designers are utilizing information derived from current fighter performance and intelligence estimates of the enemy's future high-performance aircraft to produce an FX/VFAX fighter for the 1970's. While the FX/VFAX must meet Air Force and Navy secondary-mission requirements, priority attention will be given to maximizing its air-to-air combat role.

1017
McClary, T.C. TOWARD CONTROL OF THE SEAS: NAVY SURFACE & SUBSURFACE WEAPONS SYSTEMS FOR THE 70'S. Data, v. 13, Apr. 1968: 12-16. illus.
P&GP RR

Despite U.S. technological superiority the Soviet Union is keeping abreast with the United States in some strategic areas, notably undersea capabilities. The Russians are spending twice as much money as the United States on weaponry and are replacing obsolete material with newly sophisticated weapons systems. The U.S. Navy is reassessing its weapons programs and is concentrating on developing lighter weight, longer range projectiles-missiles and guns requiring smaller crews and utilizing semiremote control. In addition, antiship missiles such as the Condor, Sparrow, and Shrike are being advanced in effectiveness and production specifications.

1018
McLaughlin, Thomas J. MISSILE GUIDANCE TECHNOLOGY. Signal, v. 22, Jan. 1968: 8-12. illus.
UG1.M65, v. 22

Examines the systems that "obtain and develop target information for the determination of an opti-

mized missile flight path." Included are descriptions "of the most widely applicable missile guidance sensors [that] will aid in understanding the major differences in the guidance requirements for various tactical and strategic missions." Also discussed are the surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-surface missiles, and their components and special characteristics.

1019
Mamuro, T. PHYSICO-CHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF FALLOUT PARTICLES IN RELATION TO BURST CONDITIONS. Atompraxis, v. 14, Jan. 1968: 24-28. illus.
TK9001.A9, v. 14

Physico-chemical properties of highly radioactive fallout particles which were collected in Japan shortly after Soviet or Chinese nuclear explosions are described and discussed briefly in relation to burst conditions. Considerable differences in nature are found between fallout particles from air bursts and those from surface bursts with respect to shape, color, matrix material, specific activity, relation between the initial atom number of the radionuclide and the particle volume, radionuclide fractionation, and U and Pu content. (Abstract supplied)

1020
Mason, John F. 'FLYING RADAR' POSES A DESIGN CHALLENGE. Electronic design, v. 16, Apr. 1, 1968: 36, 38.
TK7800.E437, v. 16

Notes progress in the Air Force Systems Command's airborne warning and control system [AWACS] program. Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas will soon receive authorization to begin contract definition studies for the entire system, which will be designed to fulfill both an antibomber defense role and a tactical air control role. Although designers must still solve problems associated with in-flight maintenance difficulties, long mission times, and electromagnetic interference, production of the $10 million-system is expected to begin in 1969.

1021
[THE MASURCA WEAPONS SYSTEM] Le système d'arme Masurca. Air & cosmos, v. 5, Mar. 9, 1968: 22-23. illus.
P&GP RR

Describes France's Masurca weapons system and the techniques of installing it on a ship. The missile has a range of over 25 miles, can travel twice as fast as the speed of sound, and is self-guided.

1022
Miller, Barry L. MAJOR ROLE IN ELECTRONIC AIR WAR EARNED BY RADAR CHAFF. Aviation week & space technology, v. 88, Mar. 11, 1968: 54-55, 57-58, 62. illus.
TL501.A8, v. 88

The United States can deploy chaff composed of strands of metalized glass or metal foil cut to lengths resonant at enemy radar frequency to screen the passage of real aircraft and to complicate antiaircraft or antimissile measures. Depending on its mission, chaff can be designed to assume a variety of shapes and expelled by a wide range of ejection systems. As improvements are made in the composition of the chaff material and techniques for dispersal, chaff will become an increasingly effective countermeasure in electronic warfare.

1023
Molotkov, A. [ALMOST UNREAL] Na grani fantastiki. Sovetskii voin, v. 49, Dec. 1967: 33-36. illus.
U4.S645, v. 49

Discusses the achievements of U.S.S.R. aviation technology as demonstrated at the Domodedovo air display in July 1967. Molotkov describes the new Soviet fighter and strike aircraft equipped with missiles carrying nuclear or thermonuclear warheads and two high-performance fighters with variable geometry. These combat aircraft combine the qualities of bombers and interceptor and attack planes.

1024
Nazzaro, Joseph J. NATIONAL SECURITY. General Electric forum, v. 10, winter 1967/68: 23-24.
UA11.G4, v. 10

In order to carry out the primary mission of the Strategic Air Command [SAC]--to deter nuclear war and to retaliate against any aggressor anywhere in the world--management must be efficient enough to coordinate the direction of the SAC combat forces, collect and process information that gives accurate knowledge of both friendly and enemy force capability, and develop operational plans to meet changing threats. The machinery that helps management cope with the "compression of time" in modern combat operations and allows it to deal effectively with these complex problems of national security involves the computer as well as the human mind. Computers when integrated into weapons systems such as the B-52 and the Minuteman missile have demonstrated their ability in Vietnam. Those computers that deal with the decisionmaking process serve a variety of planning and management functions; enemy radar, defensive fighters, surface-to-air missiles, and strategic offensive aircraft are categorized by the computer and assessed for vulnerability. The computer then develops an operation for friendly forces to assure optimum effectiveness. The SAC automated command control system "not only embodies highly advanced data processing but is the most effective operational communications system in existence today."

1025
NEW MISSILE, AIRCRAFT PROJECTS AWAIT NOD. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Mar. 25, 1968: 44-45, 48-49. illus.
UG630.M54, v. 21

Status report on six advanced manned strategic aircraft avionics tasks, the FX air superiority fighter and the AX close-support attack aircraft, the AGM-X3 all-weather air-to-ground missile and "dogfight" missiles, the new tactical electronic countermeasures system, air base defenses, and reconnaissance.

1026
NEW SATELLITE ICBM DETECTION SYSTEM PRESSED. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Apr. 22, 1968: 13.
UG630.M54, v. 21

A new satellite-borne radar to detect and identify enemy ICBM's on the basis of stored data on plume signatures is undergoing tests at an Air Force base in New Mexico. The plume signature program uses various fuels, oxidizers, and solid formulas that presumably "include all combinations known or suspected to be in use in the Soviet and Red Chinese missile programs." Data collected thus far are "of excellent quality."

ı, B. V. [FROM THE HISTORY OF SOVIET SHIP-ILDING (TORPEDO BOATS)] Iz istorii sovetskogo rablestroeniia (torpednye katera) Morskoi sbornik, 51, Feb. 1968: 53-56. illus.
V5. M8, v. 51

Traces the development of Soviet torpedo boats. w equipped with missiles, they present a formidable ·eat to any seagoing enemy.

.EAR CANADA. Nuclear news, v. 11, May 1968: -51. QC770. N75, v. 11

Contents. --Foreword, by W. Bennett Lewis. -- anium industry, by R. M. Williams. --Power reac- · industry, by the Canadian Nuclear Association. -- tional nuclear laboratories, by L. R. Haywood. -- nadian Nuclear Association, by Roy F. Gross.

Surveys recent trends in Canadian nuclear science d industry. The most significant developments are :ing place in the mining and processing of uranium, nufacture of nuclear power reactors, and construc- n of research facilities. Williams and the Canadian clear Association both stress the contribution that · uranium and power reactor industries can be expec- l to make to Canada's future export trade.

rg, P. Russell. COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY IN)MMUNIST CHINA. Datamation, v. 14, Feb. 1968: , 41, 43. table. T175. M26, v. 14

Brief history of the evolution of Communist China's search and development in computer technology. The ccess of China's nuclear program can be attributed its assigning top priority to defense-oriented proj- ts and "means that computer technology, so vital a rt of the modern defense establishment, will continue · some time in the future to be subordinated to a role supporting the military sciences in China." A chart ts the organizations that are responsible for develop- g the country's computer effort.

et-Gentil, Jacques. [THE 27TH AIR- AND SPACE-:AFT EXHIBITION IN LE BOURGET: MAY 26TH-NE 4TH, 1967] Die 27. Luft- und Raumfahrtaus- llung in Le Bourget: 26. Mai bis 4. Juni 1967 [by] cques Pergent. Österreichische militärische Zeit- hrift, v. 5, Sept./Oct. 1967: 385-394. illus.
P&GP RR

Appraises world aerospace industries--especially · American, Soviet, British, French, and West Ger- n--on the basis of the newest model aircraft exhib- d by them in Le Bourget. Perret-Gentil discusses · technical characteristics and performance of the litary aircraft shown at the exhibition.

WSHARE. Nuclear news, v. 11, Mar. 1968: 23-44. QC770. N75, v. 11

Contents. --Foreword, by Clinton P. Anderson. -- aceful uses of nuclear explosives: Background. ientific applications. Excavations. Underground gineering, by Thomas S. Sterrett. Creative part- rship, by William L. Oakley. Emerging service lustry. ANS and Plowshare. --Chronology.

Surveys the work of the Atomic Energy Commission in developing peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.

1032
Ponomarev, A. [THE BASIC POWER OF TACTICAL AVIATION] Osnovnaia sila takticheskoi aviatsii. Kryl'ia rodiny, v. 19, Mar. 1968: 26-27. illus.
TL504. V683, v. 19

Notes the trend in the tactical air forces of the United States and its allies toward multipurpose aircraft, primarily fighter-bombers used for "resolving local conflicts." Ponomarev discusses different versions of U.S. and other Western countries' bombers, their performance at low altitudes, and nuclear armaments and concludes that U.S. designers are primarily interested in increasing the speed and maneuverability of the bombers and the variety of weapons for them.

1033
POWER REACTORS OF THE WORLD. In International Atomic Energy Agency. Bulletin, v. 10, no. 1, 1968: 20-26. QC770. I4955, v. 10

Lists nuclear power reactors operating or under construction in states belonging to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Name, location, type, net output, and criticality date are given for each reactor. The list was prepared from data available as of December 18, 1967, and will be amended in later issues of the Bulletin.

1034
Rom, Frank E., and Patrick M. Finnegan. WILL THE NUCLEAR-POWERED AIRCRAFT BE SAFE? Astronautics & aeronautics, v. 6, Mar. 1968: 32-40. illus.
TL501. A688A25, v. 6

Discusses the feasibility of a nuclear-powered aircraft designed to be "no more hazardous than large conventional, chemically-powered aircraft." Theoretically a shield could be developed for the reactor that would minimize radiation hazards for the crew and passengers under normal operating conditions, and a fail-safe system could be worked out that would detect any equipment malfunctions and assure shutdown of the reactor before a collision. Accidents could be reduced even further if the reactor were shut down and the plane operated with chemical fuel during takeoff and landing. However, the possibility of accidents cannot be totally eliminated, so precautions must be taken to prevent fission products from escaping in emergency situations. While many additional analytical and experimental studies are required before any final conclusions can be drawn on collision safety, preliminary studies have revealed no reason a vessel cannot be designed to contain fission products during and after a severe impact.

1035
Schriever, B. A. PIONEERING AND DISCOURAGEMENT GO HAND IN HAND. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Mar. 11, 1968: 16, 18.
UG630. M54, v. 21

Excerpts from an address to the National Space Club at the Smithsonian Institution on March 4, 1968, by General Schriever, retired commander of the U.S. Air Force Systems Command.

The first 10 years of space exploration produced some 500 successful launches and almost 2,000 hours of manned orbital flight. Today, however, public

and official interest in the Nation's space program is disturbingly low. The strength of the U.S. missile force is also declining. While the Soviet force is being enlarged "at a rate of approximately two hundred missiles per year," America is practically at a standstill. For 3 years now U.S. attention has been concentrated on the Vietnam War, and the Russians have been developing "a new and more diversified strategic threat" to the whole free world. The most important element in their new strategic force is a sophisticated space development, which they call an orbital missile. In the light of this threat the requirement to determine the "potential value of manned orbital systems is of increasing urgency." In addition "high priority research and development aimed at protecting us in the high ground of space" is of utmost importance.

1036
Semeniuta, S. [INCENDIARY AGENTS AND DEFENSE AGAINST THEM] Zazhigatel'nye sredstva i zashchita ot nikh. Voennyi vestnik, v. 47, Jan. 1968: 45-57.
U4.V87, v. 47

Assesses the properties and effects of incendiary weapons and concludes that the best defenses against chemical and incendiary agents are reliable antiaircraft weapons and instruction of personnel exposed to the agents.

1037
Shaw, Milton, and Merrill Whitman. NUCLEAR POWER: SUDDENLY HERE. Science & technology, no. 75, Mar. 1968: 22-34. Q1.I587, 1968

Analyzes the growth of the civil nuclear power industry in the United States and attempts to plot the course of future development. The authors predict that widespread availability of civil nuclear power in the near future will radically alter the socioeconomic structure of American society. The technical principles of reactor construction and operation are reviewed.

1038
Shipov, B. V. [NATIONAL ROCKET ENGINEERING] Otechestvennoe raketostroenie. Moskva, Voen. izd-vo Ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1967. 108 p. illus.
TL781.8.R9S5

Outlines briefly the history, achievements, and future of Russian missile production. The volume is intended for military and civilian readers alike.

1039
Sokolov, S. [THE GROUND FORCES] Sukhoputnye voiska. Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, v. 9, Dec. 1967: 26-37. illus. DK50.A3, v. 9

Describes the role of today's Soviet ground forces, equipped with the latest tactical nuclear weapons, in modern war.

1040
STRATEGIC WARFARE. Space/aeronautics, v. 49, Jan. 1968: 96-107. illus. TL501.A786, v. 49

Summarizes the missions, status, and funding of U.S. strategic warfare projects. In addition to listing defensive programs and strike weapons, the article enumerates the various space, airborne, and ground warning and intelligence systems planned by the military. The United States hopes to maintain the stability of the deterrent against the Soviet Union by improvements in its ballistic missile forces and installation of antisatellite and antimissile systems. Despite political pressures, the Defense Department will continue to rely on the penetration capacity of its missile forces and does not plan to go into production of an advanced manned strategic bomber.

1041
Sweek, R. F., and A. Amorosi. THE U.S. PROGRAM ON THE LIQUID METAL FAST BREEDER REACTOR. Nuclear news, v. 11, Mar. 1968: 45-49.
QC770.N75, v. 11

Discusses the Atomic Energy Commission's highest priority reactor development program. The eventual need for fast breeder reactors to meet the growing demands for nuclear fuels has long been recognized. The liquid metal fast breeder reactor [LMFBR] is designed to meet this need; its high breeding ratio and specific power will make possible doubling times of less than 10 years.

1042
TACTICAL WARFARE. Space/aeronautics, v. 49, Jan. 1968: 108-120. illus. TL501.A786, v. 49

Examines the range of tactical weapons that fulfill conventional strike, defense, and support missions for the United States. Numerous modification and development programs are directed at improving the limited-war capabilities of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. In addition, the armed services are all developing a variety of air-to-ground and surface-to-air missile systems for fire support. Communication satellites are slated to perform the vital command and control functions required in a tactical warfare environment. The article lists the missions, goals, and funding of each tactical warfare project and describes the guidance mechanisms, range, weight, and funding of the air-to-ground missile systems.

1043
[TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE AMERICAN ABM] Les aspects techniques de la défense anti-missiles américaine [by] X. Revue de défense nationale, v. 24, Feb. 1968: 298-311. D410.R45, v. 24

Traces the evolution and development of the American ABM system, which originated in response to the Russian ABM and the Chinese nuclear threat. The author classifies the different types of antimissiles that constitute the ABM system: the Nike-Zeus, a three-stage interceptor missile; and the Nike-X (Sentinel), which consists of the Spartan long-range and Sprint short-range missiles. In addition he describes associated radar systems, ranging from the Zeus discrimination radar and the multifunction array radar to the perimeter acquisition radar and the hard-point demonstration array radar, which is capable of pursuing multiple targets as well as detecting incoming missiles. The United States is increasing its offensive nuclear potential and at the same time is endeavoring to negotiate a limitation agreement with the Soviet Union, since an effective defense against the Soviet nuclear arsenal is at best illusory. In regard to China, America must be prepared to accept territorial destruction commensurate with the effectiveness of its ABM system.

1044

Thomas, Paul G. AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL. Space/aeronautics, v. 49, Feb. 1968: 58-70. illus.
TL501.A786, v. 49

Examines the critical factors affecting the development of the Air Force's 411L airborne warning and control system [AWACS]. The technology now exists for building the basic components of AWACS--a long endurance aircraft, advanced surveillance and tracking radar, and data processing and communications equipment. However, the Air Force has encountered difficulties in designing a single system suited for both strategic air defense and tactical operations roles. Assuming the numerous requirements of the two missions can be defined and reconciled and the final components are promptly selected from among the many candidates, the first AWACS plane will go into operation in late 1973. While defining a single configuration for AWACS and integrating it with other tactical and strategic systems is an enormous undertaking, the new system will be cheaper to operate than the existing ground system and will provide far better coverage.

1045

Thomer, Egbert. [THE SUBMARINE AS A WEAPONS SYSTEM] Das U-Boot als Waffensystem. Atlantische Welt, v. 8, Jan. 1968: 2-5. illus.
V3.A8, v. 8

Surveys the present status of American, Soviet, British, French, Australian, Canadian, Dutch, and Japanese submarine fleets. Thomer discusses the equipment of nuclear (nuclear-powered or missile-launching) and modern conventional submarine fleets, especially of the United States and the Soviet Union.

1046

U.S. PONDERS NEW SILO-BUSTING WARHEAD. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Feb. 26, 1968: 12-13. illus.
UG630.M54, v. 21

A new kind of nuclear warhead, intended for destruction of underground missile facilities, may be under development in the United States. Facts pointing to such a program include: Department of Defense appropriations for development of a new superhardened ICBM prototype, heavy stress on studies of "the effects of nuclear detonations at and below the surface of the Earth" at the Air Force Special Weapons Center in New Mexico, and "terradynamic" penetration tests in which air-dropped projectiles are buried 13 to 100 feet deep. Some 350 such tests were carried out in 1967 to study the behavior of underground structures in the nuclear blast environment and the resistance of different earth substances to penetration vehicles.

1047

VSX, AWACS AND A 'F-106X' POP UP IN DOD'S ABM-LOADED RDT&E BUDGET. Space/aeronautics, v. 49, Feb. 1968: 29-31. illus.
TL501.A786, v. 49

Notes increases in research and development spending sought by the Defense Department for FY 1969. Its new budget calls for almost $860 million over last year's request--an increase of 12 percent. Rising costs can be attributed partly to the development of the Sentinel ABM system and the manned orbiting laboratory. In addition, Defense officials are contemplating investments in a new air defense system and a "super-hard" silo for the Minuteman. Other new defense projects include advanced air-launched missiles and fast deployment logistic ships.

1048

Wild, John M. NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOR AIRCRAFT. Astronautics & aeronautics, v. 6, Mar. 1968: 24-30. illus.
TL501.A688A25, v. 6

Notes progress in the development of nuclear-propelled aircraft. Although nuclear energy could greatly enhance aircraft range and endurance capabilities, radiation hazards have so far precluded the construction of a nuclear-powered plane. However, recent advances in nuclear technology and aircraft design have increased its feasibility.

1049

Winston, Donald C. NAVY TO INITIATE VFX-1 DEFINITION. Aviation week & space technology, v. 88, Apr. 8, 1968: 22-23.
TL501.A8, v. 88

Announces Navy plans for developing the carrier-based VFX-1 interceptor by 1970 as an interim replacement for the F-111B. Despite pleas by top Navy officials, the Senate Armed Forces Committee voted to cancel the General Dynamics F-111B program, thus shattering McNamara's "commonality" concept "by which a single airframe was to be utilized by both Air Force and Navy as a money-saving measure." According to an evaluation of preliminary proposals for the VFX-1 by a Navy study group, the new aircraft will cost as much as the F-111B but will have higher performance characteristics.

C. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

1050

Alexander, Holmes. THE VIEW FROM GROSVENOR SQUARE. In American Security Council. Washington report, Feb. 5, 1968: 1-4.
P&GP RR

American seapower is slipping toward a disastrous attrition in the Mediterranean as well as in the North Atlantic yielding the field to the Russians. While U.S. ships are met by demonstrators in almost all ports along the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, Russian seagoing personnel are warmly welcomed in Syria, Egypt, and Algeria. After the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War the number of Soviet vessels in the Mediterranean came close to that of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. "In three years the Soviet presence, measured in ship-days, has increased 600 percent." Off the Norwegian coast, too, the Russians are engaged in dummy battles between surface ships as well as between submarines and land-based planes. In every respect the U.S.S.R. is gaining positions-in-strength that could have serious consequences for the free world; Soviet seapower has taken a tremendous upsurge in the past two decades. Soviet sea routes lead into every ocean carrying supplies, and 20 naval officers' training centers turn out graduates of 4-year courses in navigation, gunnery, engineering, and general seamanship. Copying U.S. "fleet trains," the Russians are developing floating sea bases in international waters: two main anchorages in the Mediterranean are to serve until the Russians make permanent arrangements in Egypt, Syria,

and Algeria. In the Mediterranean and the Atlantic "the Russians are approaching naval parity." The only way to counter their expansion on land and sea is "by the employment of... manifestly superior force in which allies have complete confidence."

1051

Ali, S. M. 'THE SECURITY GAP'--CAN ASIANS FILL IT? Atlas, v. 15, Apr. 1968: 31-32, 37-38.
APL.A83, v. 15
Reprinted from the Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong. HC411.F18

In the light of Communist expansionism throughout Asia the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] must extend its socioeconomic jurisdiction into the realm of a regional defense alliance. The need for regional defense is determined by the uncertainties of the Vietnam War and the British withdrawal East of Suez. The withdrawal created a vacuum that was to be filled by an increase in Australia's defense commitments to protect Southeast Asia, but this is now unlikely. If the United States withdraws from Vietnam after a negotiated settlement, then ASEAN members must formulate a regional alliance that is politically acceptable to Asians, i.e., one that is a symbol of Asia's self-reliance and not of its subservience to the United States. ASEAN must improve its relations with the Soviet Union, East European countries, and North Vietnam. The feasibility of such dialogues depends on Sino-Soviet relations and North Vietnam's ability to assert its national identity. Whether Southeast Asian countries can effectively maintain a defensive alliance will depend on the integration of resources and cooperation of the nations involved. If Southeast Asia is taken out of the U.S.-China conflict it may be able to evaluate its own defense problems and objectives.

1052

Augenstein, B. W. THE CHINESE AND FRENCH PROGRAMS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCES. Orbis, v. 11, fall 1967: 846-863.
D839.O68, v. 11

The analogies between the nuclear policies of France and China may serve to illuminate the future course of the Chinese nuclear program. The Chinese are in a position in the Socialist camp comparable to that of the French in the Western alliance. They want an independent nuclear force to demonstrate their political stature; to use as a strategic deterrent against the United States; and to embroil Russia in their defense, the Sino-Soviet dispute notwithstanding. Both the Soviet Union and the United States are cognizant of this potential "committal" role of the Chinese and French nuclear forces. Although these independent forces are small and are viewed as "facade" forces by U.S. and Russian strategists, their designers look to these forces to "deter attacks against only one nation," their own; the Chinese eventually will have what they believe is a credible deterrent--a fact for which U.S. strategists must be prepared. The Chinese are aware that they cannot develop a nuclear force equal to that of the United States or Russia but they will strive for a compromise force "of sufficient size and technical sophistication to threaten an important segment of the U.S." or its allies' cities and industrial centers. The psychological and political motivations behind the French and Chinese nuclear programs are similar. Both France and China believe national pride demands that nuclear weapons be developed indigenously. In addition they feel that a modern weapons program contributes to the general economy and that such programs reduce overall military expenditures. Both powers agree that complete reliance on the nuclear power of allies is not wise because the superpowers' "defense umbrella" does not answer all security needs. And, finally, an independent nuclear force helps preserve an independent voice for the smaller powers in intra-alliance questions.

1053

Baird, W. J. THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX [editorial] Signal, v. 22, Jan. 1968: 7.
UG1.M65, v. 22

Despite the adverse publicity the military-industrial complex is receiving, the liaison between these two forces is essential for an interchange of ideas and knowledge of each other's needs, problems, skills, and resources. Furthermore this cooperation is imperative if the United States is going to develop the weapons needed to win the war in Southeast Asia. The argument that the military establishment exploits warmongering defense contractors, who in turn seek the profits of wartime expansion, is erroneous. There is no indication of this in the Southeast Asian situation; it has not become a profiteering enterprise for defense contractors. In an open society where human error is inevitable but all too often magnified, the members of the military-industrial team are dedicated and loyal to the goal of protecting the nation.

1054

Baldwin, Hanson W. HOW THE MILITARY RATE MCNAMARA'S PERFORMANCE. Reporter, v. 38, Apr. 18, 1968: 15-18. D839.R385, v. 38

Robert McNamara has solid accomplishments to his credit, among them his cultivation of interservice teamwork to replace old rivalries, elimination of duplication and waste in development programs, introduction of modern management techniques in the Pentagon, and development of the new strategy of flexible response. However, McNamara has left the overall national defense posture weaker than he found it. The notion that strategic parity with the Soviet Union will be politically stabilizing has led to the erosion of our superiority in nuclear strike forces and endangered our ability to wage limited war. In Vietnam, the policy of gradually increasing pressure on the enemy without mobilization at home has depleted our reserves in men and materiel. The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System has discouraged technological innovation and increased leadtimes. The growth of a superbureaucracy at the level of the office of the Secretary of Defense and the centralized defense agencies has more than offset economies made at lower levels. McNamara relied too much on statistical data and rational analysis rather than on his military advisors' experience and professional judgment. His dependence on a bureaucracy of civilian analysts has turned the principle of civilian control into one of civilian command, and the bad results of this system were compounded by the fact that McNamara himself, not the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had become the principal military adviser of the President.

1055

Bartik, Herbert. [CIVIL DEFENSE AND TERRITORIAL ORDER] Zivilschutz und Raumordnung. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, Sept./Oct. 1967: 405-411. illus. P&GP RR

Analyzes Austria's civil defense system. Bartik considers among other things the country's transportation network, centered in Vienna, which poses the most difficult problem in the capital's civil defense.

1056

Batitskii, P. F. [VIGILANT GUARDIANS OF THE AIR FRONTIERS] Zorkie strazhi vozdushnykh rubezhei [interview] Sovetskii voin, v. 50, Jan. 1968: 2-4. illus. U4.S645, v. 50

The imperialist aggressors, primarily U.S. military circles, are planning an attack against the U.S.S.R. and other Socialist countries from the air and outer space and are continually accelerating the arms race. Under these conditions the Soviet Union's air defense troops [PVO] must be in constant readiness to thwart any surprise attack. The PVO, therefore, is provided with supersonic all-weather fighters carrying air-to-air missiles capable of destroying aircraft and winged and air-to-surface missiles at their launching line, and radiotechnical troops maintain constant air reconnaissance. The modern battle against an air enemy will last only a few seconds so every soldier has to be in good physical condition, and highly trained.

1057

Bauermeister, H. [WESTERN POWERS' COOPERATION IN THE ARMAMENT FIELD] Die Zusammenarbeit der Westmächte auf dem Rüstungsgebiet. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Mar. 15, 1968: 72-75.
U3.W38, v. 12

The German rearmament with 12 German divisions in the framework of NATO, carried out under time pressure, was organized with great difficulties. This applies particularly to the build-up of the Ministry of Defence (BMVtdg) which--as it is known--originated from the Blanck administration. It is often overlooked that this was a start at zero level and that, in order to provide the troop quota, a completely new organization had to be built up. Lacking all records on the state of training and equipment of the allied arms' types, the small organization staff had first of all to investigate the situation in all NATO member-states. Besides, the circumstances required them to apply the same logistic principles of the other Western nations. Consequently, a widely ramified multilateral cooperation took place, and cooperation in the technical field helped Germany to catch up on development and production of military hardware. The author of this article, a former officer of the BMVtdg, has worked actively on the build-up of this administration. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1058

Baumann, Gerhard. [STRATEGY AND RESEARCH] Strategie und Forschung. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Jan. 1968: 10-15. U3.W396, v. 17

Considers the present state of scientific research in the West on strategic problems. Baumann points out the importance of various "nonmilitary" disciplines, including philosophy, for such research and consequently for viable defense policies.

1059

Beaufre, André. [THE ROLE OF MILITARY ALLIANCES] Die Rolle der Militärbündnisse. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Mar. 1968: 114-118.
U3.W396, v. 17

Lecture delivered Feb. 11, 1968, at the 5th international Wehrkunde symposium.

Sees a way to European, and German, reunification in the possible establishment by members of the European Economic Community of a West European defense community within or outside NATO. Beaufre analyzes the Atlantic alliance from the standpoint of European defense, economic, and political interests and the alliance's role in the maintenance of peace.

1060

Bell, Coral. SOUTH-EAST ASIA MINUS BRITAIN. Survival, v. 10, Mar. 1968: 73-75.
U162.S9, v. 10

Reprinted from New Society, Jan. 18, 1968.
P&GP RR

The forthcoming British withdrawal from Southeast Asia will drastically affect the security of Singapore and Australia. Strategically located at the Strait of Malacca, Singapore has long depended upon British troops to protect it from external threats and help maintain order between its Chinese and Malay ethnic groups. Since Singapore is not strong enough to cope with its problems alone, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has tried to persuade the British to delay their departure until some sort of Asian regional security arrangement can be worked out. Although the British defense cutbacks will not leave Australia as vulnerable as Singapore, they will substantially increase its dependence upon American power and reduce its prospects for political independence. As a token of its willingness to share the costs and risks of the alliance with the United States, Australia has committed troops to Vietnam and thus is unable to "step into the British shoes in Singapore."

1061

Boffey, Philip M. HUDSON INSTITUTE: THINK TANK'S CIVIL DEFENSE WORK CRITICIZED. Science, v. 160, Apr. 5, 1968: 52-53.
Q1.S35, v. 160

Reports the publication of a General Accounting Office [GAO] study that criticizes the work of the Hudson Institute. Organized in July 1961 by defense strategist Herman Kahn, the institute engages in research related to national security and war. In investigating Hudson studies prepared for the office of Civil Defense [OCD] at a cost of $600,000, GAO officials found that 7 of the 11 studies "were of limited usefulness or required extensive revision." Kahn defended the institute in a letter appended to the GAO study by claiming that Hudson's goal is to "stimulate the imagination" and arguing that there is bound to be a degree of failure in the "rather speculative areas of study" pursued by the institute. Kahn feared that tighter administrative controls by OCD as recommended in the GAO report would inhibit the creativity of his staff. Nevertheless, the OCD leadership has complied with the GAO demands and has issued directives for closer guidance on work performed by the institute.

1062

Brooke, F. H. THE DEFENCE PREDICAMENT. Army quarterly, v. 95, Jan. 1968: 157-169.
U1.A85, v. 95

Britain's defense policy as set forth in the Defence Review is beset with errors and ambiguities. In its determination to save an arbitrary sum of money, the Government has based its military decisions upon unproven and often unwise assumptions about future commitments and obligations. The Government blames defense expenditures for balance of payment problems and consequently has directed a withdrawal of British troops from many overseas bases. Not only would such a move fail to solve Britain's economic problems (particularly since the Government continues to purchase expensive military equipment from the United States), but it could also jeopardize the security of the Western World. The optimistic projections of the world situation drawn up by the architects of the Defence Review are based more upon wishful thinking than upon reality. Despite the trend toward détente, the Soviet threat still exists and international stability continues to rely on the dangerous balance between the nuclear deterrent forces of the superpowers. Furthermore, British overseas commitments have not declined sufficiently to warrant the cuts recommended in the Defence Review. In view of Chinese expansionist aims in Southeast Asia, the British withdrawal East of the Suez is imprudent. Since it may not be able to move its home-based troops fast enough to protect its interests and obligations in the Far East, Britain should at least maintain nucleus organizations in trouble spots. The acquisition of more sophisticated equipment will not compensate for arbitrary reductions in the force structure and could lead to an even greater dependency upon the principal supplier, the United States. Britain should take another look at its defense policy.

1063

Brosio, Manlio. [A PLAIN WARNING] Eine deutliche Warnung. Moderne Welt, v. 9, no. 1, 1968: 8-15.
D839.M58, v. 9

An interview with the General Secretary of NATO on flexible response strategy, relaxation of East-West tensions, reduction of armaments, American and Soviet policies in Europe, national independence and Atlantic solidarity within NATO, France's role in NATO, the German reunification problem, and the question of accommodation between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Brosio contends that the West should conduct a concerted policy toward the Eastern bloc.

1064

Brownlow, Cecil. SOVIETS CHALLENGE U.S. FOR STRATEGIC LEAD. Aviation week & space technology, v. 88, Mar. 4, 1968: 51, 53.
TL501.A8, v. 88

Defense Department officials testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that U.S. strategic supremacy is threatened by the rapid buildup of Soviet strategic capabilities. While the United States has concentrated its resources on the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union has substantially increased its stock of ICBM's, developed a fractional orbital bombardment system, begun to deploy an ABM system, developed advanced jet bombers and fighters, and increased its submarine forces. As it now stands, the U.S. defense budget for FY 1969 provides for the deployment of only a light ABM system and does not provide for production of advanced manned strategic bombers or fighters. Although the Defense Department is permitting preliminary work on the advanced aircraft, it has decided to modify existing aircraft to meet the needs of the immediate future. Defense officials hope to enhance the performance of the modified fighters by the development of an advanced airborne warning and control system aircraft and deployment of over-the-horizon radar.

1065

Cabiac, Roger. [A VICTORY FOR EUROPE] Une victoire de l'Europe [editorial] Aviation magazine, no. 488, Apr. 1968: 9.
TL502.A854, 1968

Discusses the military-industrial consequences of Belgium's choice of the French Mirage M-5 for its Air Force. The imbrication of the French and Belgian aircraft industries is an incontestable victory for all of Europe.

1066

Caldwell, Turner F. SOVIETS INCREASE NAVAL PRESENCE AROUND GLOBE. Undersea technology, v. 9, Jan. 1968: 47-49, 54.
V210.A1U5, v. 9

Interview with Vice Adm. Turner F. Caldwell concerning the rapid increase in Soviet naval power. According to Admiral Caldwell, the Soviet Union is attempting to challenge U.S. dominance of the seas. The Russians are improving their offensive capabilities at sea through a buildup of helicopter carrier forces and submarine forces. The United States must meet the Soviet challenge by maintaining antisubmarine warfare [ASW] forces capable of gathering detailed intelligence on Russian submarines and destroying them if necessary. In order to keep the ASW forces ready for combat at all times, Caldwell suggests that an office for fleet ASW effectiveness be created to supervise this function. While he thinks that the current program for bringing ASW projects in the engineering development stage into the operating forces is quite successful, he feels the costly ASW research and development program is subject to a good many risks and much uncertainty. However, he is confident that the United States has the technological and human resources to keep the ASW forces fully modern and maintain American naval supremacy.

1067

Cameron, Robert A. NEW HOME FOR AN OLD DILEMMA. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, May 1968: 48-52.
UG633.A65, v. 51

Now that NATO's top management apparatus has been streamlined because of expulsion of the NATO Council from French soil, perhaps the members of the alliance will consider other much needed changes. For the first time since the alliance was established, the Military Committee and NATO Council are headquartered under the same roof. NATO's military control system should be altered to adjust to the assumption of greater power by the military-civilian hierarchy. The division of the Supreme Allied Command Europe [SACEUR] into SACNorth and SACSouth would greatly facilitate control of forces in time of crisis. Even though General Beaufre's plan for Europeanizing NATO's command structure is not feasible at this time, the Europeans should begin assuming more responsibility for their own defense by filling more of the key military management posts. In addition to revising its command structure, NATO should reassess its

strategy of flexible response, which is of doubtful value since it reduces the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent by indicating a reluctance to use nuclear weapons under all circumstances. Furthermore, the strategy is not backed by adequate manpower and equipment. As long as NATO is committed to a strategy of flexible response, it should bolster its conventional defenses by increasing the number of national units stationed on European soil and deploying them along the whole of the European frontier instead of just the flanks.

1068

Douglas-Home, Charles. CONCENTRATION OF STRENGTH. Survival, v. 10, Mar. 1968: 76-77, 80. U162.S9, v. 10
Reprinted from The Times (London), Jan. 23, 1968. Newsp

In assuming that a reduction of military forces will automatically mean a loss of power, critics of Britain's defense cutbacks have overlooked the emergence of a new military strategy. Great Britain must now concentrate on maximizing its influence in European affairs since a united Western Europe without British participation would be severely detrimental to its national interest. Although the exact relationship is difficult to define, military power plays a significant role in the attainment of political influence, as demonstrated by France's acquisition of political power despite its basic economic weaknesses. By deciding to recall many of its military resources dispersed around the globe, Great Britain is now in a position to greatly enhance its military position in Europe. Thus the defense cuts signify not the demise of British power but only changing commitments and give Great Britain the potential of becoming the strongest power in Europe.

1069

[THE "DNIEPER" MANEUVERS] Manöver "Dnjepr" [by] GE. Der klare Blick, v. 8, Dec. 13, 1967: 9-10. illus. P&GP RR

Describes the Dnieper maneuvers of September 1967, in which all branches of the Soviet Armed Forces from various military districts took part. The number of participating forces was not disclosed; Russian sources mentioned "many divisions" and Western experts two armies, ascribing four divisions to each. Crossing the Dnieper River, the third largest in Europe, could be equivalent to crossing the Rhine or the Amur. No nuclear weapons were used in the exercises, and the use of paratroops reveals that the Soviet Army assigns to them an important role in offensive and defensive operations.

1070

Dwan, John E. SCANDINAVIA AND THE FUTURE OF NATO. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Apr. 1968: 54-62. Z6723.U35, v. 48

The future of NATO is a major concern of the United States despite pressing problems elsewhere. Because of its strategic geographic position, Scandinavia is certain to play an influential part in that future. Scandinavian attitudes toward the alliance are conditioned by these same geographic realities, by a mixed historical experience that includes both successful neutrality and foreign occupation, and by current international developments. Most Scandinavians are convinced that the U.S. deterrent has neutralized the Russian threat to Europe and, consequently, that NATO as a military alliance is obsolete, though still potentially useful for concerting political and economic policy and imposing restraints on Germany. Many believe that preservation of the Nordic balance is a more realistic Scandinavian policy goal than increased military preparedness. American preoccupation with the Vietnam War and the prospect of further U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe simply reinforce these attitudes and the overall trend toward the reduction of national resources committed to European security. The Scandinavians earnestly desire a détente with the Soviet Union, and the danger exists that they will come to see NATO as standing in the way. In that event, NATO almost certainly would be sacrificed. Europe must not be permitted to fly apart under reduced external pressure and thus lay itself open to Russian penetration and influence. The United States must adapt its alliance policy to the new international environment by discovering ways to pursue East-West accommodation that do not at the same time undermine European unity, strength, and independence.

1071

FOBS, ABM AND ARMS CONTROL. Survival, v. 10, Jan. 1968: 10-11. U162.S9, v. 10
Reprinted from the New Republic, Nov. 18, 1967. AP2.N624

The United States and the Soviet Union are abandoning the quest for arms control and disarmament. The United States is proceeding with what is primarily a Soviet-oriented ABM system to counter Russia's fractional orbital bombardment system. Although the Russians may never obtain a margin of strategic superiority over the United States they are pressing to catch up. The Secretary of Defense is "obviously torn"; he has argued against an ABM system but has compromised and agreed to proceed with a "light" system to appease the military and congressional forces that favor strategic superiority. These forces contend that America must maintain a preponderance of power and reject nuclear parity despite the fact that the Soviet Union cannot "achieve any meaningful strategic superiority over the U.S." since this means it would have to "knock out" the larger U.S. strike forces. As long as either side continues to increase its nuclear power "even though in terms of destructiveness the [new weapon] is not needed," there is a threat that arms control agreements such as the outer space and nuclear nonproliferation treaties will be violated or nullified.

1072

Ferguson, James. TACTICS AND TECHNOLOGY FOR LIMITED WAR: SYSTEMS COMMAND'S ROLE. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Apr. 1968: 109-113. UG633.A65, v. 51
Excerpted from the Air University Review, Nov./Dec. 1967. TL501.A5574

The Air Force Systems Command [AFSC] is responsible for seeking technological innovations that will improve America's capabilities for combating or discouraging aggression at all levels now and in the future. Although the United States has successfully utilized modern technology to achieve strategic superiority, it has yet to develop the capabilities needed to assure tactical superiority in limited war situations. However, scientific advances have already enhanced the U.S. position in Vietnam and should help to deter

wars of a similar nature. The AFSC has endeavored to match technology to operational demands in Vietnam by instituting a Southeast Asia Operations Requirement procedure whereby combat needs can be surfaced for immediate consideration and by improving communications between research and development personnel and the Air Force's using commands. A Directorate of Technical Applications for Southeast Asia was established by AFSC to deal with operational problems suitable for "quick fix" solutions. "Since Systems Command technicians joined with tacticians to produce technical answers to tactical problems, a variety of items to meet a variety of needs have been developed and put to use in the combat zone." While AFSC research programs have succeeded in overcoming many of the environmental advantages of the enemy in Vietnam, further improvements in target detection and destruction techniques are needed to strengthen U. N. offensive power in limited war situations. Therefore, the Systems Command must continue to support Vietnam requirements as part of its overall program for creating a balanced force structure for the United States.

1073

Frank, Lewis A. NASSER'S MISSILE PROGRAM. Orbis, v. 11, fall 1967: 746-757.
D839.O68, v. 11

Egypt has had considerable difficulties in getting its missile program off the ground. When the Arab-Israeli War broke out in June 1967, Israeli intelligence was confident that Nasser's missiles would be of little threat. The nine missiles that were fired after the first news of the Israeli attack either went awry and crashed or were destroyed by ground command. Indeed since its well-publicized beginning in 1961 the United Arab Republic missile force has failed to become an "effective striking arm" because of its difficulties in integrating "personnel and technology problems with the vagaries of international politics in the Middle East." The missile program is an unrealistic attempt to overthrow Israel. Because it has had to depend on foreign sources Egypt has become susceptible to outside political pressures. It has failed to replace foreign employees in its missile program with indigenous talent. As a result Egypt can hardly expect the Soviet Union or Communist China to grant it a ballistic missile capability. It can however expect more arms shipments to avenge its drastic defeat in the June war. The fact that the Russians have a base at Alexandria coupled with the Soviet Union's desire for tighter control over the use and deployment of Russian weapons will further restrict Egypt in future force planning. As long as Nasser rules Egypt and wishes Egypt to be the leading country in the Arab world, the Egyptian missile program will continue, albeit in a modest way. Despite the financial losses incurred in the last war Egypt will continue to sustain a missile program by using outside help "from any country advanced in the field, including the Soviet Union. . . and eventually, even Communist China."

1074

FRENCH DEFENCE POLICY. Survival, v. 10, Jan. 1968: 12-16. U162.S9, v. 10
Translated from Notes et études documentaires, Dec. 6, 1966.

Conventional war is a rational act which is undertaken to resolve a political dispute between two countries. Nuclear war is an irrational act because of its horrifying consequences and because it cannot be employed to solve conflicts between nations. Mutual deterrence exists today between the superpowers and allows them to protect their vital interests without using nuclear weapons. However the strategy of deterrence is becoming the strategy of anticipation. Both powers are increasing their nuclear weapons, and deterrence is no longer confined to "nuclear problems" but to all major types of conventional conflict, which inevitably involve the major powers. For this reason an independent French strategic nuclear force would strengthen nuclear stability in the world; it would increase the element of uncertainty in the calculations of the superpowers with respect to each other's reaction in time of crisis.

1075

Gilpatric, Roswell L. THE ATOMIC ARMS RACE. Survival, v. 10, Mar. 1968: 87-90.
U162.S9, v. 10
Reprinted from the New York Times, Dec. 3, 1967.
Newsp

Although both the Soviet Union and the United States publicly support disarmament objectives, prospects are discouraging for any immediate restraints on the arms race between the superpowers. Each Government continues to improve and expand its conventional and nuclear forces and is under considerable pressure to maintain the "mad momentum" of the American-Soviet arms competition. In the United States defense policymakers are heavily influenced by congressional and military fears that the strategic balance will shift in favor of the Russians unless the administration intensifies weapons development projects. The military constitutes a powerful force within the Soviet Union also, and the Russians are eager to overcome the margin of strategic advantage enjoyed by the United States. Moreover the arms decisions of both countries are heavily influenced by their policies toward wars of national liberation. As the stronger power, the United States is responsible for initiating moves to curtail weapons development. However, in view of domestic political considerations, American policymakers will find it exceedingly difficult to put the brakes on the arms race.

1076

[THE GOAL: A BALANCED NAVY] Das Ziel: Die ausgewogene Flotte [by] ETH. Atlantische Welt, v. 8, Mar. 1968: 25-27. V3.A8, v. 8

Emphasizes the urgent need to overhaul the West German Navy, the nation's most neglected armed service.

1077

Goedhart, F. J. [THE DEFENSE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF NATO] La défense de la Méditerranée et du flanc sud de l'O. T. A. N. Revue socialiste, no. 209, Jan. 1968: 21-50. HX5.R38, 1968
A report presented before the Western European Union in Nov. 1967.

Discusses the challenge of the Soviet Navy to Western maritime supremacy in the Mediterranean. In 1961 the Mediterranean was appropriately termed a "Western lake," but today that has changed. The withdrawal of France from NATO, which has caused the geographic isolation of the southern flank, increasing Soviet political influence in the Arab world, and the Arab-Israeli War serve to emphasize this change.

Goedhart notes the strategic importance of the Mediterranean area and describes what could happen to NATO countries--Italy, Turkey, and Greece--that depend on maritime security because of their geographical limitations. He suggests that the flow of arms into this area could be curbed by an international register agreement that would allow all countries concerned to know what transactions in arms and naval equipment were taking place. Private firms engaged in these shipments would be required to register by law.

1078

Gorbatenko, Dmitrii D. [VVS FRG--THE STRIKING POWER OF AGGRESSION] VVS FRG--udarnaia sila agressii. Vestnik protivovozdushnoi oborony, Dec. 1967: 79-83. illus. UG635.R9A18, 1967

Data on the number and type of planes, organizational structure, weaponry, training bases, and headquarters of the Luftwaffe after its reorganization in October 1967. Luftwaffe squadrons are equipped with atomic bombs, and West Germany's role in NATO has grown since France's withdrawal from NATO military commands. Bonn's revanchists are preparing for war against the U.S.S.R. and other Socialist states.

1079

Gorshkov, S. G. OUR COUNTRY'S NAVY. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 14, Feb. 21, 1968: pt. 2, [item] 4, 1-4.
Slav Rm

Translated and abridged from Krasnaia zvezda, Feb. 11, 1968. Slav Rm

The Soviet Navy is no longer a defensive force but a modern offensive fleet. The Soviet Navy is a modern offensive fleet that includes missile-carrying nuclear-powered submarines, missile-carrying surface vessels armed with antisubmarine and antiaircraft weapons, mobile marine units, aircraft equipped with nuclear weapons, and coastal artillery missile units. The ships are designed to inflict blows against the enemy on the high seas and against his overseas territories, if a war should be started by the imperialists, and for protection of friendly objectives against attacks from the ocean. All Soviet fleets carried out the plan for combat training for the year 1967, and special praise should go to the personnel of ships guarding Russian interests in the Mediterranean.

1080

[GREAT BRITAIN IN SEARCH OF A NEW DEFENSE POLICY] La Grande-Bretagne à la recherche d'une nouvelle politique de défense. Air & cosmos, v. 5, Jan. 27, 1968: 34, 48. illus.
P&GP RR

By 1971 the only British colony or foreign base not affected by the Labor Government's austerity program will be Hong Kong. All other bases East of Suez will either be abandoned or reduced in troop commitment, but Prime Minister Wilson could not conceivably reduce British troops in Europe since this would be inconsistent with his plans for future European cooperation. The Royal Navy will rely on the Polaris submarine for its deterrent force and will maintain only a few types of airplanes. The Royal Air Force is canceling its F-111 order but will keep the Phantom and Buccaneer jets that were originally destined for the navy. Britain will make provisions for the defense of countries affected by the economic program. Already Malaysia and Singapore have been given the equipment to install radar communications, and Singapore will probably receive Bloodhound and Rapier missiles. In the wake of Britain's diminishing strength it will be interesting to see how it will redefine its political and military objectives relating to Europe.

1081

Grechko, Andrei. [50 YEARS OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES] 50 let Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil. Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, v. 10, Feb. 1968: 3-14.
DK50.A32, v. 10

Traces the development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Grechko cites the steady imperialist nuclear buildup and U.S. preparations for war against the U.S.S.R. and the Socialist bloc. But the U.S.S.R.'s conventional and nuclear weapons can inflict a crushing blow on "the madmen who would threaten the safety of the Soviet Union or its allies," and the military power of the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries is an important factor in the prevention of a new world war and ensuring the peace.

1082

Grechko, Andrei. NATIONAL SERVICE IN THE USSR. Survival, v. 9, Dec. 1967: 398-399.
U162.S9, v. 9

From an article in Soviet News, Oct. 17, 1967.
Slav Rm

The new U.S.S.R. national service law, which goes into effect on January 1, 1968, has reduced the compulsory service period by 1 year; for the Army and the Air Force it is now 2 years, and for the Navy, 3 years. A 1-year period of national service is still required for persons with a higher education. A uniform callup age of 18 and an age limit of 27 have been established. Callups and transfers to the reserve will be made twice a year. Preliminary military training is being introduced in secondary schools starting with the ninth grade. Deferments may be granted for family reasons and for full-time attendance at institutions of higher learning. Women between 19 and 40 are eligible for voluntary active military service; they will be assigned duties related to their special training. The development and growth of Soviet industry has enabled it to supply the Soviet Armed Forces with formidable weapons such as "aircraft capable of intercontinental flight in any weather" and equipped with nuclear warheads, and nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles. The Supreme Soviet also voted for a 15 percent increase in the defense budget for 1968. These two enactments indicate efforts to adjust the rising costs of new weapons to the growing commitments of the U.S.S.R.

1083

Gross-Talmon, Paul. [. . . A BILLION-DM MISUNDERSTANDING?] . . . Ein Milliarden-DM-Missverständnis? [editorial by] grt. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Jan. 10, 1968: 9. U3.W38, v. 12

The policy of American nuclear disengagement in Europe, decided upon recently by a NATO conference in Brussels on American insistence, has made the greater part of West Germany's defense policy useless. NATO's new strategy of flexible response amounts to virtual abandonment by the United States of its policy of automatic nuclear defense of Western Europe. The new policy will only increase the chance of war by proxy in that region. Unimpressed by Bonn's argument

that there is no adequate reciprocation by the Soviet bloc for American nuclear disengagement in Europe--for instance in the German reunification question--the United States decided to tighten up still further its control over nuclear bombs in Europe. Thus the German Federal Republic's enormous investment in West German nuclear-bomb carriers has been wasted. The new strategy makes it clear that in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union none of the American nuclear weapons now in Europe will ever be used.

1064

Hirschfeld, Oswald. [THE ALLIANCE'S REVISED STRATEGY] Revidierte Strategie der Allianz. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Jan. 10, 1968: 14-15.
U3.W38, v. 12

The seven years of McNamara's administration of the U.S. Defense Department saw increased Soviet military power in relation to the West's, symptoms of NATO decomposition, "mistrust between the United States and Europe," and failure of an American accommodation policy toward the Soviet Union. McNamara's greatest achievement was in shaping the strategy of flexible response. This strategy was officially adopted by NATO last year, but even without that sanction it would certainly have been applied by the United States in an emergency. His concept of the rotation of military forces, accepted at the end of the 1967 Ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council, seriously undermines that strategy. The reduction of NATO armed forces, dictated by fiscal considerations, contributes to the disintegrating process of the alliance, as does the U.S. policy of achieving East-West détente at any cost. But the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty hampers rather than helps the détente. Owing to conflicts of interest between the superpowers it would not lead to nuclear disarmament at all and would become instead a perfect tool in the hands of the Soviet Union to use against West Germany. NATO's new defense policy, stressing conventional weapons, has created the need for a radical reorganization of West German forces.

1065

Hittle, J. D. NATIONAL SECURITY. V.F.W. magazine v. 55, Mar. 1968: 6.
E181.F7, v. 55

The seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo exemplifies the Communist global strategy to conquer the free world. When the Pueblo was taken, the U.S.S. Enterprise was diverted from its important mission of bombing Communist supply routes along the Ho Chi Minh trail. A major strategic diversion was accomplished. For the Communists, Korea and Vietnam are the northern and southern flanks of the western Pacific battle area. However, the Communists are concerned with more than just the war in Asia. Soviet-Egyptian attempts to encircle the Arabian oil fields in the wake of the British evacuation East of Suez poses a threat to the free world. Should these oil fields fall into Communist hands the consequences would be disastrous.

1066

Howard, Michael. DEFENCE FOR THE 1970S. Crossbow, v. 11, Apr./June 1968: 17-19.
DA492.C7, v. 11

Contrary to Government expectations, a defense policy based on British withdrawal into Europe will neither solve Britain's economic problems nor serve the interests of Western Europe. The recently announced defense cuts will not facilitate the desired shift of resources from home consumption to the requirements of exports during the critical 1968-69 period. Moreover Britain's annual military expenditures overseas are small compared to its financial interests in those areas. From the European viewpoint, the Government's planned withdrawal is undesirable since British troops help protect West European oil resources in the Middle East and could provide a meaningful power base for future European operations in Asia. Therefore if the Conservatives come into power before 1971 they will maintain the British presence in Singapore and the Persian Gulf if it is still wanted by the host governments. In addition, the new British Government would probably discard the present reliance on America's long-range conventional strike and reconnaissance capability and go ahead with purchase of the F-111. NATO allies would probably be glad to help finance this aircraft since it would enhance Europe's conventional military strength. The F-111's could form the nucleus of a European air force that together with the formation of a European nuclear deterrent based on British and French Polaris submarines, would provide Europe with the power to make it an equal partner with the United States in sharing the responsibilities of the Atlantic alliance.

1067

Hudson, Geoffrey. THE RETREAT FROM SINGAPORE. Crossbow, v. 11, Apr./June 1968: 20-23.
DA492.C7, v. 11

British withdrawal from Singapore could increase Southeast Asia's vulnerability to Chinese expansionism. If the Americans are unsuccessful in Vietnam, their influence will be sharply curtailed on the mainland of Southeast Asia and their protection confined primarily to the insular countries of Asia. Although the Chinese Communists have suffered a number of setbacks in challenging Russian power in Asia, in the future they may be able to effectively check Russian ascendancy and become "the world's principal rogue elephant." As the most vulnerable of China's non-Communist neighbors, Burma is likely to be its first victim. Control of Burma would place China in direct contact with East Pakistan and enable it to outflank Thailand and extend its power far down into the Malay Peninsula. Fear of subjugation by the Malay population and Indonesia may drive the Chinese populations of Singapore and Malaysia into the Chinese Communist camp once the British leave Singapore. However, the United States may be persuaded to provide protection to Singapore and Malaysia, particularly if Britain agrees to maintain a small naval force in the Indian Ocean after 1971. A British naval buildup in the Indian Ocean would not only help stabilize relations between Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia but would also provide protection for vital British trade routes.

1068

Jackson, Henry M. PERSPECTIVE ON THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: WE WILL COME HOME. Vital speeches of the day, v. 34, May 1, 1968: 424-427.
PN6121.V52, v. 34

"Delivered to the Fifth International Conference of the Arts Club, Chicago, Illinois, March 23, 1968."

The Atlantic alliance was created to provide adequate military might outside the Soviet sphere and act as a

stabilizing factor in European politics. Today the alliance is clouded by doubts and uncertainties, undermined by President de Gaulle's attitude toward America. Yet despite this all 15 NATO foreign ministers at their December 1967 meeting agreed on the usefulness and desirability of the alliance in the interest of détente. The alliance may undergo changes but it will hardly become obsolete; for future tasks cannot be met "in isolation but in intimate and friendly association."

1089

Kerr, James W. ORGANIZATION FOR CIVIL DEFENSE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Mar. 1968: 75-82. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 48

Present civil defense programs are defective in organization, planning, and doctrine. The first step toward correcting these defects must be development of a more effective structural arrangement of civil defense forces. A centralized structure for civil defense would be unwieldy, a decentralized one inefficient in overall use of resources. Although it too has drawbacks, a system based on local planning, following centrally established guidelines, combines the merits of both approaches. The Director of Civil Defense has promulgated a provisional program with these characteristics. This program divides the country into "operating areas" according to uniform Federal criteria and establishes standard categories of damage assessment. Federal guidelines are not meant to substitute for detailed operational planning at the local level. The executive head of each operating area is responsible for developing comprehensive local operating procedure. The system emphasizes immediate response of local authorities to crisis without guidance from higher echelons. The program requires, however, that local authorities keep higher echelons and adjacent areas informed of the local situation and of any defense measures put into effect.

1090

Kissel, Hans. [FRONTAL DEFENSE INSTEAD OF FORWARD DEFENSE; THE CRISIS IN GERMAN DEFENSE POLICY] Vorne-Verteidigung statt Vorwärts-Verteidigung; zur Krise der deutschen Wehrpolitik. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, Nov./Dec. 1967: 453-459. P&GP RR

With its entrance into NATO in 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany disavowed its policy of nonarmament and obligated itself to create a 508,000-man army (including an air force and small navy). From then on "its defense policy was to be conducted within the framework of NATO." At the same time it renounced production and possession of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. However, since the late fifties West German divisions have been provided with nuclear arms carriers despite the nation's special vulnerability to the enemy's instant nuclear retaliation. The absurd investment in such carriers as Starfighters and Pershing missiles has cost the German taxpayer 12 to 15 billion DM so far. The vital security interests of the German Federal Republic have caused NATO to move its defense line forward from the Rhine, and, since the fall of 1963, NATO's operational command for central Europe has based its defense planning on the forward defense concept. In spite of the immense risk involved in reliance on early use of tactical nuclear weapons against superior conventional enemy forces "the forward defense of NATO's central European sector by 25 weak allied divisions has proved a credible deterrent." Now with the official change in NATO strategy from massive to flexible response in May 1967, stronger emphasis should be laid on adequate increases in Allied conventional forces, especially in frontal defense areas where the Americans and the Russians directly confront each other. But Bonn's frontal defense concept wrongly emphasizes operational warfare, for which the limited West German territory is ill suited. It fails to provide for an adequately equipped modern infantry that would be effective in both stationary and mobile warfare, the latter on the tactical level.

1091

Kolcum, Edward H. USAF REDUCING FIGHTER FORCE IN EUROPE. Aviation week & space technology, v. 88, Mar. 25, 1968: 21-22. TL501.A8, v. 88

Reveals Air Force plans for revising the tactical force structure of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe [USAFE]. In mid-July the Air Force expects to move four fighter squadrons from Germany to the United States. However, the relocated units will continue training for combat missions in the European theater and the aircraft being moved from Europe will remain under NATO control. Officials predict that increasing experience with the McDonnell F-4 aircraft and the influx to Germany of pilots with combat experience will more than offset the transfer. The article lists distribution plans for all USAFE tactical forces following the July changes.

1092

Kristol, Irving. WE CAN'T RESIGN AS 'POLICEMAN OF THE WORLD.' New York times magazine, May 12, 1968: 25-27, 105-107, 109, 112-113. illus. AP2.N6575, 1968

The moving force behind American policy since World War II has been the recognition that the world does need a policeman--some state capable of preserving a decent level of international order. With its adoption of a containment policy directed toward opposing alterations in the status quo by force or violence, the United States itself assumed this role. The debacle in Vietnam has brought about a crisis in this policy and a turning point. In Vietnam, the United States has discovered two limitations on its capacity to enforce the containment policy. First, it has learned that it is not possible to exercise an imperial presence with anticolonialist inhibitions, and since these inhibitions cannot be expunged without permanent damage to the American spirit they constitute an unavoidable restriction on our ability to maintain the peace. Second, it has learned that the very structure of American society puts limits on foreign policy. Containment requires a democratic citizenry prepared to wage interminable frontier wars, but a social democracy--concerned with material welfare--will not fight as reason bids it do. All this means that the limited-war option is closed. In the future, the choice will be between a nuclear confrontation or a swift sortie. U.S. policy will probably oscillate between isolationism and nuclear violence. Settlement of the Vietnam War will bring not peace but a new time of troubles. With the "policeman" off duty there will be an upsurge of disorder everywhere. Nations deprived of American protection or mediation will turn to nuclear weapons in their own defense. Thus at the very moment when a nonproliferation treaty is being offered to the United Nations the stage is set for the further spread of nuclear weapons.

1093

Landon, Alfred M. STATE OF THE WORLD: CONTAINMENT. Vital speeches of the day, v. 34, Mar. 1, 1968: 300-305. PN6121.V52, v. 34
"Delivered before the Hutchinson Rotary Club, Hutchinson, Kansas, January 15, 1968."

Today, the United States faces three wars: two foreign and one domestic, the so-called war on poverty. The two foreign wars--"one for containment and the other on the dollar"--help to create an image of the United States as edging "toward either Empire America or Fortress America." Now the trend is toward building bridges with the Soviet Union and China, not containment bridgeheads in South Vietnam. America must come up with some other policies besides "the negative policies of containment--massive retaliation--and escalating brinkmanship." Moreover politics and economics are inseparable and politics will always bear heavily on fiscal policies. Despite the preelection mood America must devise some permanent solution, not a mere stopgap, to save the value of the U.S. dollar. Formation of a new world monetary system cannot be postponed. It would encourage world development and stimulate a feeling of world community and mutuality between Americans and the rest of the world. For "a peaceful world is always built on stable times"--and stability grows in the marketplace.

1094

Laturner, Hans-Jürgen. [THE NEW ORGANIZATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE] Die neue Organisation der US Heeresstreitkräfte in Europa. Wehrkunde, v. 16, Dec. 1967: 647-648. U3.W396, v. 16

Describes the functioning of the American military command in Europe (Headquarters, United States Army, Europe) within the NATO command structure. Laturner outlines the "national strategic task" and the "NATO tasks" of the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe and includes data on troop deployment.

1095

Lemnitzer, Lyman L. COLLECTIVE DEFENCE--THE BASIS OF MILITARY SECURITY. NATO letter, v. 16, Jan. 1968: 2-7. D845.2.A44, v. 16
Report given at the annual session of the North Atlantic Assembly, Nov. 1967, in Brussels.

If NATO is to continue to fulfill its deterrence mission, it must be prepared to counter any aggressive moves by the enemy. Since the enemy's military forces are far larger, more expertly trained, and better equipped today than they were at the time the Atlantic alliance was established, NATO cannot afford to jeopardize its deterrent by reducing its military capabilities. NATO must maintain a substantial number of forces at a high degree of readiness and must not be forced to rely heavily on poorly trained reserve forces that are "in some undefined state of mobilization." NATO commanders have already been confronted with the potential loss of vital French land and air forces from the center region of Allied Command Europe. Additional troop reductions could seriously weaken NATO's strength and versatility and increase the possibility of deployment of nuclear weapons in a confrontation with the enemy. Furthermore, such a move would reduce the credibility of NATO's deterrent since the enemy might doubt NATO's willingness to deploy nuclear power under all circumstances. Although the Atlantic alliance may face a critical force shortage, Allied commanders are better prepared than ever before to implement and coordinate their missions swiftly and effectively. Through the concerted efforts of all its members NATO can continue to safeguard military security and stability in Western Europe.

1096

Lichtheim, George. 1975. Army, v. 18, Jan. 1968: 59-66. Ul.A893, v. 18

British politicomilitary strategy in the 1970's appears to be headed toward a stronger European coalition in the light of the confrontation between Red China and the United States, which, in the opinion of public leaders and professional commentators, is imminent, probably by 1975. Indicative of this strategy are Britain's plans to withdraw its forces East of Suez by 1975, its determination to enter the Common Market, its proposal for a joint Anglo-French nuclear force, and its Conservative leaders' skepticism about NATO's usefulness. If Great Britain enters the Common Market, it is difficult to see how the "special relationship" between London and Washington can survive. If a politically united Europe comes into being its policy will be determined by France and its desire to remain outside the "triangular conflict among the U.S., the USSR, and China." The proliferation of nuclear weapons will also have a profound effect on British-American relations. The ABM could signify the beginning of a credibility gap for both Russia and the United States. When these two countries withdraw behind their ABM shields, Western and Eastern Europe will unite, and Britain and France will be forced to guarantee European security by a joint nuclear force. The politics of nonproliferation will have their greatest effect on relationships in the Far East. If a nonproliferation treaty were signed by all the Great Powers but France and China it would in effect allow China to develop its present nuclear facilities until it reaches parity with the United States and Russia and exceeds India and Japan in nuclear production. If China continues to threaten India, and Japan joins the Western-oriented free-trade club, the pattern of capitalism and communism in the Far East will be clearly delineated. While those countries on the outer rim enjoy relative prosperity, those in the inner circle will be left out--especially India, which will be forced to adopt a nationalist-socialist program. Until America realizes that only some form of socialism works in these areas, "Americans and Europeans will continue to talk past each other."

1097

Luce, Richard. WHY SHOULD WE STAY IN THE PERSIAN GULF? Crossbow, v. 11, Apr./June 1968: 29-30. DA592.C7, v. 11

Although Britain should not indefinitely delay its departure from the Persian Gulf, it should endeavor to create stability in the region prior to withdrawal. A hasty withdrawal could leave a dangerous power vacuum that would jeopardize British interest in the Gulf's oil resources and might be exploited by Russian expansionists. Britain should not totally disengage itself without first trying to establish regional solidarity between Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. British policy should be directed at ending the Arab-Iranian conflict in the Gulf area and at modernizing the regimes of the sheikhdoms and should not be confined by the arbitrary withdrawal date of 1971.

1098

Mendl, Wolf. PERSPECTIVES OF CONTEMPORARY FRENCH DEFENCE POLICY. World today, v. 24, Feb. 1968: 50-58. D410.W63, v. 24

French defense policy reveals certain weaknesses that could debilitate rather than strengthen plans for European security and cooperation, and France is failing in the attempt to balance its defense effort between nuclear and conventional forces. French strategists believe that nuclear weapons "have introduced a wholly new dimension to warfare in which deterrence is the key concept." However, it is doubtful that France can develop the complex weapons for a deterrence system on its own. Although the Government's policy is to be as self-reliant as possible, France has had to buy American computer equipment and depends on NATO's Air Defense Ground Environment system. France believes that it can no longer count on the United States to protect its allies. The American doctrine of flexible response indicates to most Europeans that Europe will be the theater of warfare while the American and Russian homelands will be spared. The greatest flaws in French defense policy are that France relies on a traditional alliance pattern that contemporary weapons technology has rendered ineffective and that it may succeed in replacing the United States as Russia's partner in the dialogue over Germany. In this case the vital interests of the French may one day clash with the Soviet Union although those of the United States do not. Then America would have little reason to come to the aid of the French.

1099

Mettler, Eric. BRITAIN NO LONGER A WORLD POWER? Swiss review of world affairs, v. 17, Feb. 1968: 3-4. D839.S9, v. 17

Britain is being severely criticized for its decision to further reduce armaments expenditures and accelerate the withdrawal of overseas troops. A number of British commentators have argued that their nation should reduce domestic social spending rather than renounce its role as a world power. Although the United States favors the emancipation of British colonial areas, it values the support of the British troops in policing the area from the Atlantic to the Pacific and resents their withdrawal. While De Gaulle accuses the British "of still not having turned back sufficiently toward Europe," other Europeans criticize the British move for fear it may antagonize the Americans and cause them to withdraw their protection of non-Communist Asia. Unless Britain wants to witness the total breakdown of solidarity between Europe and the United States it cannot separate itself completely from world problems and must at least join with Europe in assisting the United States in its international role.

1100

Monckton of Brenchley, Gilbert W., 1st viscount. FORWARD STRATEGY IN GERMANY. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 113, Feb. 1968: 27-33. UI.R8, v. 113

A lecture given at the Royal United Service Institution on Oct. 18, 1967, and Lord Monckton's replies to questions that followed the lecture.

NATO, primarily a military alliance, has above all to protect its members' security, including that of West Germany, which contributes substantial land and air forces to the alliance. The threat to the Allies' security is likely to continue for the foreseeable future despite relaxation of tensions in Europe and the Sino-Soviet dispute. Part of NATO's forward strategy concept is predicated upon the West securing control of events in a period of political instability in Europe. Paradoxically, along with the development of this strategy the prescribed NATO forces were gradually decreased to levels possible for NATO members to meet. The purpose of this strategy "is to protect the integrity of Western Germany or immediately to restore it or to do so as soon as possible" in any confrontation. The NATO Supreme Commander in an East-West confrontation would try "to retain control, to gain time for sanity to prevail, and to have time and space for various options." But the shortage of reconnaissance forces, including tactical air forces, and conventional and reserve forces means that the pause for transition from conventional to tactical nuclear warfare (the second stage of the conflict) would have to be radically shortened. Clearly any further reduction of NATO conventional forces would be nonsensical. Forward strategy does not preclude Allied offense but limits it to defensive purposes only.

1101

Nazzaro, Joseph J. THE STRATEGIC DETERRENT. Ordnance, v. 52, Mar./Apr. 1968: 456-459. UF1.O67, v. 52

For nearly 22 years the Strategic Air Command [SAC] has played a significant role in preventing the outbreak of a major world war. Through SAC's powerful and flexible striking force the United States has maintained the strategic superiority needed to deter potential aggressors. Since no single weapons system can provide an adequate deterrent, SAC has maintained a mix of manned bombers and ICBM's to "cover the entire spectrum of strategic requirements." Whereas missiles are superior in their "quick-kill" capabilities, bombers give the force flexibility by providing the capability to seek out targets and circumnavigate defenses. By keeping its manned forces on constant alert and widely dispersing its missiles and bombers, SAC assures the survival of a portion of its retaliatory force in the event of an attack. SAC's deterrent mission is further strengthened by the existence of a command and control system designed to operate even under the worst wartime conditions. With careful planning America's strategic forces can be adapted to continue to preserve U.S. security for many years, regardless of the form future weapons may take.

1102

Örvik, Nils. BASE POLICY--THEORY AND PRACTICE: THE NORWEGIAN CASE. Cooperation and conflict, v. 2, no. 3/4, 1967: 188-204. P&GP RR

The willingness of a state to permit the stationing of allied forces on its soil depends on its perception of the threat to be faced and its estimate of its own self-defense capability. Since Norway's security problems have always been insoluble with its own resources alone, its attitude toward this question is determined strictly by the changing aspect of the external danger. In 1949 the Norwegian Government judged the Russian threat to be political and psychological rather than military. Joining NATO was considered an appropriate countermove, but, since the threat was nonmilitary, the presence of allied forces in Norway was held to be unnecessary and a "no bases" reservation on Norwegian membership was announced. If changes in the

nature of the threat occur, they will be dealt with by "farsighted foreign policy leadership" using political and other countermeasures as necessary. Though military leaders have often expressed concern over the danger to NATO's exposed northern flank, there is no evidence that the Western powers have ever tried to force a revision of the base policy. On the other hand pressure from the Soviet Union for a more restrictive interpretation of the policy has been continuous, and in its most recent efforts it has gotten considerable support for its views from the left-wing Norwegian press. The Government, in order to maintain its freedom to maneuver, has resisted any extreme reading of the base restrictions; nevertheless it has moved in the direction of a more comprehensive interpretation and stricter application of the policy. But with the trend away from integration in NATO and particularly in the light of recent French alliance policy, the Norwegian base restrictions have become less significant and, of course, the policy is meaningful only in the context of a viable alliance.

1103

Örvik, Nils. [THE DEFENSE OF A SMALL STATE AND ITS COSTS; AN INQUIRY BASED ON THE CASE OF NORWAY] Die Verteidigung eines Kleinstaates und ihre Kosten; eine Untersuchung an dem Beispiel Norwegens. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 6, Jan./Feb. 1968: 21-28. tables.
P&GP RR

Contends that a small nation's problem is to create a credible deterrent comprising conventional weapons only. Örvik thinks that Norway could increase its defense expenditures threefold without radical pauperization of its population.

1104

Palsokar, R. D. MINIMUM DETERRENT--AN APPRECIATION. In United Service Institution of India, New Delhi. Journal, v. 97, July/Sept. 1967: 231-247.
U1.U5, v. 97

The concentration of sophisticated nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the superpowers creates an impression that only an open conflict between them could pose a nuclear threat to India. China, however, with its instant success in the nuclear field and its militant attitude, endangers "India's territorial integrity, national prestige and her democratic way of life." At the present pace of Chinese technical progress its Army will soon have tactical nuclear weapons firing projectiles many times more powerful than those of conventional service mortars and guns. The behavior of China's leaders indicates that "they do not believe in co-existence and want to establish a puritan Marxist society by world revolution." To this end they now give "indirect aid to local misguided people" and eventually will give direct assistance and Pakistan will be included in their plans. India's only deterrent against China would be tactical nuclear weapons production, which is within the scope of India's economic potential. Thus armed India would "be an effective check to China," adequately prepared to contribute toward safeguarding world peace.

1105

Possony, Stefan T. THE HOSMER-NITZE MISSILE DEBATE. In American Security Council. Washington report, Jan. 15, 1968: 1-4.
P&GP RR

Discusses American-Soviet missile parity, weighing the U.S. assured destruction capability and comparing the strength estimates of Congressman Craig Hosmer of California with those of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze. The matter of multiple independent reentry vehicles [MIRV] was also included in the debate; unless the United States boosts its basic strength soon, it will "create an excellent opportunity for a Soviet missile attack on the United States." The author questions "the validity of Mr. Nitze's estimates" and his ideas on Soviet strategy, concluding that "the Pentagon is viewing the present contest as the fabled race between the tortoise and the hare" and that "Mr. Nitze may be paving the way to hell with wishful estimates."

1106

Powell, John Enoch. THE DEFENCE OF EUROPE. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 113, Feb. 1968: 51-56.
U1.R8, v. 113

The ultimate object of Great Britain's defense should be to prevent "any external human power" from forcibly altering or determining the future state of the British nation. Conceivably, at some date Britain will voluntarily merge with other nations, e.g., with Western Europe. Then "but not until then," defense of the new entity would replace defense of Britain. With the advent of nuclear bombs and later on ICBM's, the prospect of total destruction of the nation from the air and from afar became real for the first time in its history. It might appear that Britain's only defense today "is the known ability to retaliate on a scale unacceptable" to the enemy. However, this "nuclear veto" doctrine rests on the false assumption that suicide would be more acceptable to the nation than defeat. Britain's present strategic environment by no means eliminates or reduces the importance of the adjacent mainland for the islands' defense. "For purposes of defence adjacency is a political concept and must consequently vary according to changes in the political situation on the continent of Europe." An absurd dependence of the size and disposition of the nation's forces on currency policies is novel in British defense policy. Certainly from the standpoint of Britain's overall economy there is no justification for any further reductions of its forces in West Germany. The Atlantic alliance has made a peripheral power, the United States, dominant in matters of the European balance of power and of Western Europe's defense. However, a number of factors are now working for change in that balance, among them the situation in Eastern Europe and the Sino-Soviet feud. Britain's military presence on the Continent and the cultivation of its alliance with West European powers, regardless of the fate of the present NATO structure, are of utmost importance for its defense policy.

1107

[PROCUREMENT] Beschaffung. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Jan. 10, 1968: 16-17.
U3.W38, v. 12

Points out that West Germany's defense cutbacks for 1968-69 will affect not only the nation's military manpower but procurement as well, with the electronics and aircraft industries the hardest hit. The effects of these cuts will be felt into the seventies.

1108

Repnitskii, V. SCRAMBLE ON THE ARMS MARKET. International affairs (Moscow) Mar. 1968: 47-53.
D839.I465, 1968

Analyzes the U.S. proposal for a defense common market for free and open trade in armaments between NATO members and of the positions taken on it by West European countries. The author comments on U.S. aims to maintain and expand its armaments market in the NATO countries and on Western Europe's concern over the effect of American capital on key European industries, including the defense industry. Because of the West European trend toward military and economic cooperation and evasion of the Atlantic Pact, the defense common market project can neither revitalize the alliance nor strengthen the U.S. position as its leader.

1109

Richard, Ivor. [GREAT BRITAIN'S POSITION IN THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE] Grossbritanniens Position in der Verteidigung Europas. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Mar. 1968: 118-122. U3.W396, v. 17

Lecture delivered Feb. 12, 1968, at the 5th international Wehrkunde symposium.

Believes Great Britain must increasingly participate in NATO defenses, contributing both conventional and nuclear forces. Richard discusses flexible response strategy and the need for military and political consolidation of the Atlantic alliance.

1110

Ruby, Edmond. ["DIRECTED" OR "ALL-AZIMUTHS" DEFENSE] Défense "dirigée" ou défense "tous azimuts." Écrits de Paris, no. 266, Jan. 1968: 24-28. AP20.E355, 1968

General Ailleret's military strategy of an "all-points defense" is formulated in such vague terms that it can hardly be called a directive, but it does warrant investigation to determine whether it is based on political and military facts. Contrary to Ailleret's thesis Russia remains a threat to Europe. It continues to pour arms into the Middle East and build up its Navy to wield political and military influence in that area and to threaten NATO's southern flank. When France was a member of NATO it was treated as an equal. It was not oppressed by its allies, nor forced to help America in Vietnam; its allies did not oppose the deployment to Algeria of French troops stationed in West Germany. France's nuclear forces are incapable of deterring another nuclear power--France could hardly be expected to withstand a nuclear saturation attack from either superpower--and it is inconceivable that France would use its nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear power. A strategy that purports to preserve a nation's independence with inferior or "research" weapons must be termed "infantile."

1111

Rusk, Dean. "SHARE IN FREEDOM." In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, Feb. 19, 1968: 228-231. JX232.A33, v. 58

Address made in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 10, 1968, before a Savings Bond Voluntary Conference sponsored by the Treasury Department.

Describes and defends postwar U.S. security policy and asserts the reasonableness of the U.S. course in Vietnam as an aspect of that policy. Rusk stresses the need to combine firmness with restraint in opposing those who threaten the peace and suggests that the most effective deterrent to war in present circumstances is U.S. integrity in its mutual security agreements.

1112

Russell, Bertrand Russell, 3d earl. NATO FOREVER? New statesman, v. 75, Mar. 15, 1968: 329. AP4.N64, v. 75

When NATO was created, according to George F. Kennan, it forced individual nations to choose sides and blasted any hopes for reunifying Germany and reintegrating the peoples of central and Eastern Europe into the European community. If NATO was misconceived 20 years ago, today it is unintelligible. As evidenced by U.S. missile policy, the focus of evil in the world has shifted from the Soviet Union to China. The Russian threat to Europe no longer exists. However, as long as America's allies in Western Europe are tied to NATO they are active accomplices of war criminals; NATO policy supports, with the aid of American assistance, the remnants of European colonialism in Asia and Africa while the United States wages a barbarous war in Vietnam. Great Britain must withdraw from NATO in order to pursue an independent foreign policy. Otherwise NATO will continue to dominate Britain's foreign policy and the policies of all the junior members of the American alliance.

1113

Schramm, Werner. [THE UNITED STATES AND THE VALUE OF ITS ALLIANCE] Die USA und ihr Bündniswert. Zeitwende, v. 39, Mar. 1968: 145-148. BR4.Z83, v. 39

When Russia acquired long-range missiles 7 years ago, the United States became vulnerable to direct nuclear attack, and for that reason changed its massive retaliation strategy into one of flexible response. This gave the President and NATO choices besides concession and nuclear war for dealing with aggression in Western Europe. The new strategy has also been largely responsible for a visible cooling of American-West German relations, since it exposes the German Federal Republic to a much greater risk of a devastating conventional attack from the East than did the old one.

1114

Seuberlich, H. E. [THE SOVIET UNION'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY] Atomstrategie der Sowjetunion. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Jan. 1968: 16-26. U3.W396, v. 17

Discusses the Soviet Union's "remarkable" adaptation since 1945 to the nuclear age's strategic requirements. Seuberlich considers dialectics of Soviet nuclear strategy, including disarmament, which in the Soviet view should not embrace means of class struggle.

1115

SHIPS AGAINST A NEIGHBOUR. Economist, v. 226, Mar. 30, 1968: 30. HG11.E2, v. 226

India has increased its Navy budget by 80 percent from last year in a drive to build up its naval self-defense forces. Although it cannot afford to purchase new aircraft carriers or cruisers, India is replacing its smaller ships and plans to purchase four Russian submarines. Until 1971, when the first new Indian frigates are commissioned, India will continue to rely on American and Russian protection in the Indian Ocean.

II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

1116

Sixsmith, E. K. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE. Army quarterly, v. 95, Jan. 1968: 134-138.
Ul. A85, v. 95

Since Great Britain is not strong enough to pursue an independent defense policy, it must choose between complete reliance upon the United States or participation in the creation of a united Western Europe. Only through an integrated Europe could Great Britain obtain any sizable influence in directing the affairs of the Western powers. Therefore it is unlikely that British leaders would consider withdrawing from NATO, as Lord Chalfont allegedly claimed last October. NATO could not only serve as a springboard to a united Europe but is essential for maintaining allied control of the situation in West Germany. Despite Russia's policy of coexistence, the security of the frontier between East and West Germany must continue to be safeguarded. In addition NATO forces must be prepared to meet any problems arising from the Soviet naval buildup in the Mediterranean. NATO powers need not develop separate nuclear capabilities to fulfill their mission but should continue to rely on the current alliance policy for nuclear sharing. However, nuclear weapons proliferation would only escalate the arms race, impose economic hardships, and contribute to international instability.

1117

Slobodenko, A. NATO "REORGANISES." International affairs (Moscow) no. 2, Feb. 1968: 36-41. map.
D839. I465, 1968

France's withdrawal from the NATO military organization has compelled NATO to change the structure of its military and political organization and to shift its military administrative operations and logistics bases to West Germany and the Benelux countries. NATO's military strategy has changed from "massive nuclear retaliation" to "flexible response,"; mobile naval forces have been established, a new Mediterranean command in Naples created, and the Iberian Atlantic Command reorganized. France's departure increased Bonn's importance in the Atlantic bloc; tactical nuclear weapons, missile installations, and atomic artillery are now stationed on West German territory; the Bundeswehr has become NATO's main striking force in Europe; and West Germany has become a permanent member of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group within the Nuclear Defense Committee--a development which disturbs world opinion. But Bonn's revanchists are still making territorial claims and oppose the nonproliferation treaty, hoping to get access to nuclear weapons. Despite NATO's reorganization it remains a hindrance to a European détente; only a collective security system can ensure peace in Europe.

1118

Smith, Philip. THE NUCLEAR BALANCE. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization. EMO national digest, v. 8, Feb. 1968: 12-15.
P&GP RR

"Extracted from an article published in Weekend Magazine, Jan. 6, 1968, entitled 'Back to the Brink.' "

The uneasy peace of the last two decades is attributable to the balance of terror. However, advances in the technology of defensive weaponry have caused the recent deterioration of this concept. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, after opposing the construction of an ABM defense, now has reversed his position and come out for a "thin" ABM screen sufficient to deter a Chinese attack in the 1970's but not a Russian one. The perfected U.S. Nike-X ABM system has a "3-D function"--detection, discrimination, and destruction. Detection and discrimination are closely linked. Radar and computers detect incoming ICBM's and track their courses. Destruction itself is then handed over to two nuclear-armed missiles: the Spartan, designed to intercept incoming ICBM's at a distance of 400 miles, and the smaller Sprint, which "kills" missiles after they enter the atmosphere within a range of only 25 to 30 miles. The real ability of the Nike-X system to cope with a determined attack has not been tested. The Nike-X may well be powerless against short-range missiles fired from submarines, as well as the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle with multiple warheads and the fractional orbital bombardment system being developed by the U.S.S.R. Critics have charged that the decision to build the Nike-X was politically motivated and also claim that rationality must be introduced into the world armaments picture, "looking toward an ultimate time of international control and very great reductions in national weapons systems." ABM supporters argue that a nation capable of defeating an enemy attack would be more willing to give up its offensive weapons than a nation whose only defense is offensive capability.

1119

Stehlin, Paul. [THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE; THOUGHTS ON THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE'S POLITICAL FUNCTION] Partnerschaft zwischen Nordamerika und Europa; Gedanken zur politischen Funktion der Atlantischen Allianz. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Feb. 25, 1968: 115-123.
D839. E86, v. 23

States that NATO's main problem now is to achieve political consensus rather than to find a new form for its military structure. Stehlin also discusses American leadership in NATO and U.S. involvement in Europe and interest in European unification.

1120

Steibel, Gerald L. WHERE DOES BRITAIN'S RETREAT FROM THE EAST LEAVE US? American Legion magazine, v. 84, May 1968: 12-17, 45-46. illus.
D570. A1A32, v. 84

Britain's withdrawal East of Suez will affect both America's war effort in Vietnam and its security policy from New Zealand to the Mediterranean. The power vacuum in those countries affected by the withdrawal must be eliminated to deter the Communists. Malaysia and Singapore can be kept free with a defense pact composed of Asian countries and backed by Great Britain. Singapore would be more amenable to an Australian-led defense pact that would include the United States. America can depend on Australia and New Zealand for support against Communist aggression in South Asia, but Burma, India, Japan, and Indonesia remain big question marks. And internal Communist agitation in both Thailand and the Philippines will vitiate their resolution to cope with the Communist threat in other parts of the Far East. Although the United States would like to see regional security systems and alliances created to protect the countries of the Far East, such projects are beyond the political horizon. Instead America will probably be forced to fill the power vacuum there.

1121

Steinhoff, Johannes. [GERMAN LUFTWAFFE TASKS--TODAY AND IN THE SEVENTIES] Die Aufgaben der deutschen Luftwaffe heute und in den siebziger Jahren. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Jan. 10, 1968: 30-33.
U3.W38, v. 12

The present report consists of a collection of excerpts of comments made by the Inspector of the German Luftwaffe, Lt. General Johannes Steinhoff. The literal citations originating from a speech given by the Inspector on November 27, 1967, at the Staatspolitische Gesellschaft e. V. at Hamburg, are combined in somewhat different order. He treated on this occasion mainly the possible tasks of the German Luftwaffe in the near future. He mentioned also today's general requirements of the Luftwaffe for a successor type of aircraft and dealt with planning problems. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1122

Sterling, Claire. NATO AND THE PAX ATOMICA. Reporter, v. 38, Mar. 21, 1968: 27-30.
D839.R385, v. 38

NATO's foundations have been weakened in the last year by French withdrawal from its integrated military command, Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean area, and the U.S. shift of priorities from Europe to Asia. The Harmel report, while ignoring these and other problems, has created new ones by recommending a flexible response strategy. This strategy cannot work without a major buildup of conventional forces on the Continent, but budget restrictions in Europe and U.S. balance-of-payments problems make reduction rather than augmentation of European and American conventional forces likely. Attempts by the United States to resolve its payments problems by shifting the defense burden to European shoulders frequently have had the reverse effect of further accentuating European dependency. Not surprisingly, NATO is eager for détente, especially in the form of "balanced mutual force reductions or partial disarmament," although such proposals get nowhere with the Russians. Meanwhile Europeans are convinced that the nonproliferation treaty is a device to protect U.S. supremacy in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and, furthermore, that it points to an eventual U.S.-Soviet hegemony. Faced with this possibility, some states are tempted to come to terms with the U.S.S.R. on their own. NATO seems doomed to impotence, and, though the Pax Atomica is likely to remain effective, the Continent could drift back into that "diffusion of will" that plagued prewar Europe. Which states would end on the Soviet and which on the American side is the crucial question, particularly with respect to Germany, since it is the key to Europe.

1123

THE STORY OF FEDERAL PLANNING FOR TRANSPORTATION EMERGENCIES: THE EMERGENCY TASK IN AIR TRANSPORTATION. Defense transportation journal, v. 24, Jan. Feb. 1968: 3-4, 6-9.
U1.A88, v. 24

"Special report prepared by Federal Transportation Agencies for DTJ."

The third in a series of five articles giving a detailed review of tasks assigned to industry and Government parties that will enable them to effectively deal with any national emergency. The duties of the various emergency transportation services: the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Military Airlift Command, and War Air Service Program [WASP], are described. A chart illustrates WASP air priorities and organization and a map indicates the Civil Aeronautics Board's Domestic Regional Air Priorities Control Offices.

1124

Strausz-Hupé, Robert. A LOOK AT NATIONAL DEFENSE AS A SYSTEM. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Mar. 1968: 35-40. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 51

Despite their preoccupation with systems theory, Pentagon planners have often neglected to evaluate U.S. security programs in relation to the total defense environment. In deciding against a Soviet-oriented ABM system, U.S. strategic analysts underestimated Soviet military goals. The Russians do not seem to agree with the U.S. contention that military technology has reached a plateau and are seeking technological breakthroughs that will enhance their assured destruction capability. In addition to threatening America's strategic superiority, the Soviet Union is pursuing defense measures that may well create a "defense gap" by 1970. While the Russians are taking steps to protect their population and strategic forces, U.S. strategists continue their reluctance to invest in massive civil defense projects and emphasize offensive over defensive strategic systems. U.S. military strategy cannot be isolated from the political environment, however, and the President decided to depart from the convictions of Pentagon leaders and ordered deployment of a light ABM system. In order to assure its Asian and European allies that it won't leave them vulnerable to Chinese and Soviet nuclear blackmail, the United States should follow up its ABM decision with provisions for protecting Asia and Western Europe. Perhaps the United States could consult with its allies on the technological feasibility and political desirability of a cooperative missile defense program. At the same time American military planners should reassess the adequacy of U.S. defensive forces in relation to the political and technological environment.

1125

Thomer, Egbert. [SEA TRANSPORT CAPACITY, AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY] Seetransportraum, ein Mittel der Politik. Atlantische Welt, v. 8, Mar. 1968: 2-4. illus.
V3.A8, v. 8

Points out the strategic importance of troop transport fleets, especially those with amphibious vessels. Thomer compares the British, American, French, and Soviet navies in this respect and concludes that the Soviet Union's strategic policy attaches less importance to naval troop transport capability than do the Western countries.

1126

Tripathi, K. S. STRATEGY IN A CHANGING WORLD. In United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, Journal, v. 97, Apr. June 1967: 106-113.
U1.U5, v. 97

The ABM has drastically altered the balance of terror: a nation that perfects the ABM will have a definite advantage in missile technology. The Soviet Union has already deployed a network of antimissile missiles around some of its major cities. In the light of this, U.S. strategy, which had been based on offensive might, is now being revised. The United States is con-

structing a "thin" ABM system, even though Secretary of Defense McNamara believes that the strategy of deterrence based on offense is viable. Communist China will also follow the ABM path despite its depleted economy: it may already be ahead of France in nuclear power. Since total disarmament cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future, the safety of the world would be best guaranteed by constant review and readjustment of defense strategies within the context of the latest technological advances.

1127

Vasil'ev, V. THE WAR MACHINE OF IMPERIALISM TODAY. International affairs (Moscow) Mar. 1968: 104-106. D839. I465, 1968

Gives information on the strength, organization, weaponry, programs, and locations of the U.S., British, French, and West German Armed Forces.

1128

Wetmore, Warren C. GERMAN ARMY SEEKING ARMED HELICOPTERS. Aviation week & space technology, v. 88, Apr. 8, 1968: 27-28. TL501. A8, v. 88

Reveals West German Army plans for developing an air cavalry arm for the 1970's composed of light and medium transport helicopters, armed combat helicopters, and light observation helicopters. By giving up all aspirations for fixed-wing aircraft, the army hopes to soothe air force opposition to the former's acquisition of combat aircraft. According to Gen. Kurt Kauffmann, Chief of Army Aviation, the goal is to be able to transport 800-1,000 men and 120 tons of equipment in one assault wave.

1129

[WHERE IS THE BUNDESWEHR GOING?] Ou va la Bundeswehr? [by] J. H. Perspectives, v. 24, Mar. 16, 1968: [item 6] 1-7. HC10. P4, v. 24

NATO is on the verge of collapse but it continues to survive by the grace of the United States. Until now the West German Army has been a U.S. pawn, but it is growing stronger and may pose a threat to its neighbors as U.S. military control in central Europe is relaxed. The German Army will become independent, and as it gains power it could induce its Government to negotiate with the Soviet Union for reunification. When the United States abandons Europe, the problems posed by a free and powerful German Army may be difficult to reconcile peacefully.

1130

Wickremasinghe, Sivapali. NUCLEAR CALLER. Far Eastern economic review, v. 59, Feb. 1, 1968: 178. HC411. F18, v. 59

In the light of China's rapid nuclear progress Japan is modifying its attitude toward nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Sato has persuaded the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission to approve the entry of the U.S.S. Enterprise with no on-board inspection. Japan could have refused to allow the Enterprise to dock at Sasebo under the terms of the Washington-Tokyo military alliance, which prohibits ships from entering Japanese ports if they are bound for war operations. Washington may also be able to force Japan to agree to the berthing of Polaris submarines. In fact the day may come when U.S. nuclear weapons will be based on Japanese territory.

1131

Winston, Donald C. SENATE GROUP TO SCRUTINIZE ADVANCED BOMBER DEFENSE. Aviation week & space technology, v. 88, Apr. 22, 1968: 19. TL501. A8, v. 88

By denying the Defense Department's request for $28 million to convert the Convair F-106 into the F-106X interceptor, the Senate Armed Services Committee effectively placed a moratorium on Pentagon plans to update the U.S. defense system against manned bomber attacks. Despite testimony by Defense officials that the present U.S. bomber defense system is highly vulnerable to Soviet attack, many committee members questioned the wisdom of improving bomber defenses in the absence of adequate ballistic missile defenses. While Defense officials stressed the urgency of the $13.3 billion 1-year program for building a new bomber interceptor force, they expressed confidence in the present U.S. capacity to counter the Soviet fractional orbital bombardment system. Pentagon experts reassured committee members that the Soviet Union is not yet capable of destroying America's second-strike forces but must be watched to ensure that it does not achieve that capability.

1132

WITHDRAWAL INTO EUROPE. Survival. v. 10. Mar. 1968: 70-72. U162. S9. v. 10
Reprinted from the Economist, Jan. 20. 1968. HG11. E2

By deciding to further reduce defense expenditures and accelerate troop withdrawal from East of Suez, the British Government has sharply curtailed British influence in world affairs. Furthermore the defense cutbacks involve the breaking of specific promises to allies and were not subjected to the approval of the British electorate. Although Prime Minister Wilson claims the cutbacks are needed for economic reasons, in reality they have been instituted to garner Labor Party support for restraints on domestic consumption. The Government also attempts to justify the withdrawal of British forces from outside Europe by arguing they are necessary to enhance Britain's position in Europe. However, the move will not significantly increase the strength that Britain can deploy in Europe: in fact, if Wilson carries out his planned force reductions, by 1973 Britain's Army and Air Force will rank fifth in size in Western Europe and its Navy, second. Moreover other parts of the world need British soldiers far more than Europe. By pulling out, Great Britain is washing its hands of the responsibility to protect developing democracies.

1133

Wolfe, Thomas W. RUSSIA'S FORCES GO MOBILE. Interplay of European American affairs, v. 1, Mar. 1968: 28, 33-34, 36-37, illus. P&GP RR

Under Stalin Soviet foreign policy was oriented largely toward Eurasia, but during Premier Khrushchev's regime "the Soviet Union was transformed into a global power, breaking out of its continental shell to assert its influence and interests in every quarter of the world." Khrushchev built up the strategic offensive and defensive components of the

Soviet military apparatus: but only near the end of his rule did the military authorities recognize the need for mobile and versatile forces. Today, although the Soviet Navy has made great strides toward building an effective airborne-amphibious naval force, it has not undertaken the massive construction program needed to create a balanced naval force in the Western sense. Several changes in technology and doctrine have taken place under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime: Soviet submarines have conducted patrols in distant waters, helicopter carriers are being built, Soviet admirals are recognizing the changing role of Soviet seapower, and the Soviet Navy has established a permanent presence in the Mediterranean. Airlift potential has been improved through technical advances and new air landing equipment, and there has been a wider acceptance of the view that the Soviet Union should be better prepared for military operations below the level of general nuclear war. Despite these new trends the overall balance of military power will probably not be upset. Russia's quest for a global military force can be considered not a direct challenge to U.S. power but rather a move to step in where U.S. influence has receded.

D. CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

1. Biological

1134

Bernard, J. G. [PROBLEMS OF SPECIFIC PROPHYLAXIS FOR MILITARY TROOPS] Die Probleme der spezifischen Prophylaxe beim Militär. Wehrmedizinische Monatsschrift, v. 12, Jan. 1968: 83-90.
P&GP RR

During the 19th century infectious and epidemic diseases were a bigger problem for military troops during wartime than war itself. Nevertheless, this era contained the seed of the methods for specific prophylaxis, which was subsequently developed fully in the first third of the 20th century. Currently it is essential to reconsider these problems and to take into consideration present experiences, which indicate a restriction of the methods of passive prophylaxis in favour of active prophylaxis. New tactical situations, including the dangers of biological warfare, are the reason to search for new methods of production and administration of vaccines. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1135

Gregory, Peter B., and others. SPLEEN SHIELDING IN SURVIVORS OF THE ATOMIC BOMB. Radiation research, v. 33, Feb. 1968: 204-215.
QC770.R3, v. 33

Reports the results of "efforts to detect an influence of the spleen on the recovery of those human beings exposed to ionizing radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki."

1136

Machta, Lester. RADIOIODINE FALLOUT OVER THE MIDWEST IN MAY. Science, v. 160, Apr. 5, 1968: 64-66.
Q1.S35, v. 160

High concentrations of radioiodine in milk, found preferentially over the midwestern United States after atmospheric nuclear tests in May 1962, 1965, and 1966, can best be explained by high-reaching intense thunderstorms that scavenge passing radioactivity from the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere. (Abstract supplied)

1137

Málek, Ivan. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: CURRENT PROBLEMS. Scientific world, v. 11, no. 6, 1967: 20-22.
Q1.S8415, v. 11

A thorough study must be made of the nature and control of biological weapons before any agreement can be reached on general disarmament. Members of the Pugwash movement considered the dangers of biological warfare in detail at their 1959 conference and later established a study group to identify the problems of international control of biological weapons, publicize the dangers inherent in their use, and seek methods to ban them. A trial inspection of microbiological institutes in four countries answered many of the study group's questions concerning the conditions under which a voluntary ban on biological weapons could be worked out. Other factors which have aided the endeavors of the study group include the adoption in 1966 by the U.N. General Assembly of a resolution banning the use of biological weapons, the condemnation of biological warfare by microbiologists affiliated with the International Association of Microbiological Societies, and research on the problem of biological weapons by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Once the public becomes more informed about biological warfare and a system of international guarantees is devised, perhaps an increasing number of countries will cease work connected with biological weapons and permit international inspection, and an organization similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency could be established to ensure peaceful research in the field of microbiology.

1138

Monaco, M. D. [THERAPEUTIC LESSONS FROM TREATMENT OF PATIENTS AFFECTED BY NEUROTOXIC AGENTS] Therapeutische Erfahrungen bei der Behandlung von nervengiftgeschädigten Patienten. Wehrmedizinische Monatsschrift, v. 12, Jan. 1968: 104-110.
P&GP RR

The author describes the physical and chemical properties of the phosphorus-containing neurotoxic agents and he reports their biological modes of action, which are based on cholinesterase-inhibition and the resulting acute acetylcholine poisoning. After a presentation of the symptoms the author describes preventive and therapeutic measures. Physicians are against the use of chemical warfare agents for humanitarian reasons. However, they must be acquainted with their modes of action in order to be able to render proper help if such agents should possibly be used. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1139

Neel, James V. ATOMIC BOMBS, INBREEDING, AND JAPANESE GENES. Michigan quarterly review, v. 6, summer 1967: 202-209.
AS30.M48, v. 6

Reports findings of studies on the genetic effects of "irradiated" marriages and of consanguineous mar-

riages in Japan. Dr. Neel based his reports on data on children whose parents were exposed to radiation by the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima and those produced by first-cousin marriages there and on the island of Hirado. Although the surveys did not yield precise information on the mutation rates for the progeny of radiated or closely related persons, they provided valuable insights into the upper limits of radiation that can be endured by man.

1140
Rothe, W. [THE MEASUREMENT OF INDIVIDUAL DOSES IN MIXED RADIATION FIELDS OF UNKNOWN COMPOSITION WITH MULTICOMPONENT DOSIMETER SYSTEMS] Messung der Personendosis mit mehrkomponentigen Dosimetersystemen in Strahlungsgemischen unbekannter Zusammensetzung. Kernenergie, v. 10, Dec. 1967: 368-372. diagrs.
QC770. K4, v. 10

The paper deals with a compensation method for individual dose measurement in mixed radiation fields of unknown composition. Here, the dose may be determined by means of simple formulae. The method therefore is suitable for the automatic evaluation of the dosemeters. The method is described theoretically and is analyzed. Aspects of the selection of the components for the film badges for mixed X-, γ- and β-radiations are discussed and applied to the new individual dosimeter used in the G. D. R. In evaluating the film badges, the energy dependence amounts to $-40\% \div 50\%$ for 12 keV to 2 MeV quantum energy and to $-30\% \div 100\%$ for maximum β-energies of 0.4 to 3 MeV. (Abstract supplied)

1141
Rugh, R. DAMAGE TO CELLS BY IONIZING RADIATIONS. Atompraxis, v. 14, Jan. 1968: 13-17. illus.
TK9001. A9, v. 14

Ionizing radiations have their effects at sub-microscopic levels and are physico-chemical in nature, but the effects are usually manifest at the cellular level. Such effects may be lethal, depending upon the particular radiosensitivity of a cell or may be sublethal and damage the cell short of lethality. In all cases the effects are due to the absorption of ionizing radiations. The various levels of sub-lethal effects may often be propagated and may give rise to anomalies or even to malignancies. Ionizing radiations are known to be carcinogenic. At minimal levels of effect the cells may never exhibit overt damage, or alter their surrounding media. There is a latent period in cell effects which may vary from minutes to many years. This may be related in part to the proliferation rate of the cells involved. Those mental disorders which have a genetic basis could well originate from damage to individual cells of the embryo or fetus, or even to the germ cells. (Abstract supplied)

1142
RETURN TO BIKINI. Newsweek. v. 71. Apr. 1. 1968: 48.
AP2. N6772. v. 71

After 22 nuclear explosions over a period of 8 years it appears that 300 Bikinians-in-exile will return to their native land. The Atomic Energy Commission [AEC] has declined to release the exact levels of radiation in Bikini's flora and fauna. but the atoll's biological balance seems to have been restored. However it will be up to a panel of AEC specialists to determine whether the radiation count is sufficiently low in food species to allow the return of the Bikinians. In the meantime they are living on Kili Island where they can fish only 8 months out of the year because of treacherous waves and the mosquitoes make life unbearable.

2. Economic

1143
BRITAIN'S AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY SEEMS FATED FOR SECOND-CLASS STATUS. Space/aeronautics, v. 49, Feb. 1968: 31-32, 36, 42, 44, 46, 48.
TL501. A786, v. 49

In order to restrain inflationary pressures in the postdevaluation period Prime Minister Wilson called for substantial cutbacks in military spending and "indirectly consigned Britain's aircraft industry to second-class status." Many aircraft projects were canceled, including the F-111 strike reconnaissance aircraft. Cancellation of the F-111 terminated a lucrative offset sales agreement with the United States and wiped out $50 million in orders held by British firms. For the Defense Ministry, loss of the F-111 meant the final demise of Britain's global authority since the F-111 represented the last combat aircraft that would be available to Britain for use outside Europe after 1971. Britain's only remaining major military aircraft is a highly specialized vertical takeoff and landing vehicle, the Hawker-Siddeley Harrier. The retention of the civilian Concorde supersonic transport will do little to bolster the aviation industry since development costs are high, orders are low, and technological returns are sparse. By canceling the Concorde and using the funds that would be released to develop an F-111 replacement, the Government may be able to save the aviation industry and improve Britain's defense posture.

1144
Burck, Gilbert, and Alan Greenspan. THE NEW ARITHMETIC OF DEFENSE. Fortune, v. 77, Apr. 1968: 92-95, 206, 208, 210, 215-216.
HF5001. F7, v. 77

Hopes for a leveling off in war spending were among the casualties of the Tet offensive in Vietnam. We now have to take seriously the predictions that the U. S. buildup will go as high as 750,000 servicemen in Vietnam. At that level the war would cost an additional $9 billion a year (beyond the $24 billion a year it was costing at the end of 1967). A lot of that increase would go for personnel, helicopters, and ground ammunition, which the U. S. forces are now shooting up at the rate of $12,000 a year per enemy soldier in South Vietnam. Though the additional war costs will impose little strain on the nation's material resources, they will worsen the inflation, big budget deficits, and balance-of-payments troubles already besetting the U. S. Aside from Vietnam, moreover, other defense costs will be pushing upward. The war has eroded the military forces available for dealing with contingencies elsewhere--as witness the Pueblo incident. What's more, Secretary McNamara squeezed outlays for research and development and for missiles and other strategic weapons in the past few years, while the U. S. S. R. has been building up its Navy and narrowing the missile gap. The U. S. must soon start making up for these lags. It will all cost money. (Abstract supplied)

1145

DEBATE ON DEFENSE PROFITS URGED IN U. K. Aviation week & space technology, v. 88, Mar. 11, 1968: 25.
TL501. A8, v. 88

Severe criticism of Bristol Siddeley Engines for substantially overcharging the Government has led to pressure for a debate in the House of Commons on the question of excessive profits in the defense industry. President of the Industrial Court, Sir Roy Wilson, headed the government committee which accused Bristol Siddeley of receiving exorbitant profits on their overhaul contracts with the ministries. The committee also found government directorates to be negligent since they accepted the inflated cost estimates put forth by the company negotiators. Although the executive committee of Bristol Siddeley was not aware of the deceptive methods used by company negotiators, they knew that the firm was making very high profits. The Government rejected the firm's argument that the government profit formula was unrealistic but decided the committee report did not reveal sufficient evidence to prosecute officers of the company.

1146

[DEFENSE DOLLARS SPIRAL WHILE DEFENSE AGENCIES REPORT BIGGER SHARE IN BUDGET] Journal of the Armed Forces, Feb. 10, 1968: 13, 28. tables. U1. A66, 1968

Contents.--Defense dollars continue spectacular growth, but decline as percentage of Federal budget. --Defense agencies and "discrepancies."

Reports that during McNamara's tenure defense expenditures, as a percentage of the total Federal budget, have been consistently reduced except for FY 1966. It also notes that McNamara's "posture" reports to Congress contain revisions in 48 out of 60 entries.

1147

Diepen, F. J. [THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF A EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY] Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung einer europäischen Luft- und Raumfahrtindustrie. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Jan. 10, 1968: 23, 26-28. U3. W38, v. 12

Excerpts from a speech delivered in Sept. 1967 in London to an International Association of Aerospace Equipment Manufacturers symposium.

Points out the importance of international cooperation by aerospace and defense industries for their optimal development, for the national economies, and for defense needs.

1148

Frey, Bruno. [A POLITICAL THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH] Eine politische Theorie des wirtschaftlichen Wachstums. Kyklos, v. 21, fasc. 1, 1968: 70-101. Hl. A15, v. 21

Includes summaries in English, German, and French.

Modern growth theory concentrates around the concept of the Golden Age and disregards completely many facts which are important in reality. Particularly, the influence of political factors is not taken into account. This article endeavours to formulate a growth theory in which political and economic factors are interwoven. Long term growth is strongly influenced by the amount of infrastructure available, but the supply of infrastructural capacity is determined not by the market mechanism but by political decisions. As long as there is an oversupply of infrastructure, the economy grows rapidly and with little price rises. This means that voters are satisfied and the government party gets many votes. As soon as infrastructural capacity is fully used up, growth is reduced, inflation is high and voters are also harmed directly in their consumption. Only the opposition party gives a clear alternative--namely more infrastructure--and wins the next elections. The lack of infrastructure is subsequently removed and an oversupply of infrastructure reappears. Thus, a growing economy is characterized not by a purely market determined economic equilibrium but rather by a continuing interplay of economic and political factors and their interrelationship with the size of infrastructure. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1149

La Fond, Charles D. MAJOR GROWTH IS FORECAST IN RADAR MARKET. Electronic design, v. 16, Apr. 11, 1968: 34, 36, 38, 44.
TK7800. E437, v. 16

Reports major findings by experts of the Electronic Industries Association in their forecast of the radar market for 1967-75. Because of new defense requirements, technological advances in electronics, and demands emanating from the conflict in Vietnam, radar spending could soar to a total of $1 billion annually by 1975. The marketing experts based their conclusions on estimates of expenditures for large surface radars, tactical ground radars, shipboard radars, and aircraft and spacecraft radars.

1150

Miller, Barry. AEROSPACE FIRMS SEEK MAJOR ROLE IN DX PROGRAM. Aviation week & space technology, v. 88, Apr. 8, 1968: 88-91. illus.
TL501. A8, v. 88

Describes the Navy's multimission DX destroyer program and its expected impact upon the shipbuilding industry. Designed primarily to fill the Navy's anti-aircraft and antisubmarine warfare roles in the 1970's, the $45-50 million vessel will be equipped with an exceedingly complex weapons system and a highly automated command and control system and will be suited for a variety of missions. Few shipbuilding companies have the systems engineering and management skills needed to meet the diverse requirements of the contract definition phase of the DX program; therefore bidding for contract definition studies will begin in April 1968 by teams composed of representatives from the aerospace industry as well as shipbuilders. As the first naval ship to attract such broad industry participation, the DX could "stimulate the emergence of a full-fledged shipbuilding industry," capable of complete design, development, and production of naval shipborne weapons systems.

1151

Richards, J. T. G. DEFENCE AND THE ECONOMY. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 8, spring 1968: 47-51.
UG635. G7A1252, v. 8

Since any government, like any individual, finds that "resources are scarce in relation to human wants," it must carefully allocate its portion of the gross national product to meet the needs of the nation. While in wartime the government must sacrifice economic and social objectives in the interest of national security, in peacetime benefits from defense expenditures must be measured against benefits from public aid in areas such as housing, health, and education. If the government feels that defense activities are consuming a disproportionate share of industrial and manpower resources and are creating balance of payment difficulties and inflation, it may assign a lower priority to defense spending. Most governments have followed the principle set forth in the 1966 British Defence Review: "Military strength is of little value if it is achieved at the expense of economic health."

1152

Weidenbaum, Murray L. ARMS AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A DOMESTIC CONVERGENCE HYPOTHESIS; A MILD REBUTTAL OF PROFESSOR GALBRAITH'S NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE. [St. Louis, Dept. of Economics, Washington University] 1967. 13
HC110. D4W36

Examines the impact of the convergence between the military establishment and its major industrial suppliers. Weidenbaum states that the Government assumes many of the decisionmaking functions of companies that serve military needs. After an extended relationship with the Government, many specialized military contractors begin to exhibit a lack of entrepreneurship and an unwillingness to take risks. Therefore the establishment of a civilian counterpart of the military-industrial complex should be discouraged and the convergence tendencies of military contractors balanced to achieve "enough stability to assure technical competence but enough uncertainty to prod some mutual participation in the innovation process."

1153

Weidenbaum, Murray L. COMPETITION IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY GOVERNMENT MARKETS. [St. Louis, Dept. of Economics, Washington University] 1967. 27 tables.
HC110. D4W37

Study of commercial competition for Government purchases of military, space, and related high-technology products. Although only a few companies receive the majority of defense and space contract awards, an analysis of the size distribution of top defense contractors does not point to the existence of a so-called military-industrial complex. Medium-size corporations--not the corporate giants--are shown to receive the highest percentage of orders for high-technology Government products. Furthermore, an examination of turnover data and concentration ratios in Government markets indicates that there is substantial competition in large segments of these markets.

1154

Witze, Claude. DECLINING DEFENSE PROFITS--GOVERNMENT ECONOMY, OR A NATIONAL SECURITY RISK? Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Apr. 1968: 129-131, 135-136, 140. illus.
UG633. A65, v. 51

Despite Pentagon recognition that profit incentives are needed in order to attract the best industrial capabilities to defense contracts and contrary to congressional charges of rampant war profiteering, the profit margin on defense business is declining. The decline is documented in a report prepared by the Logistics Management Institute on the financial status of 65 companies. Each company included in the survey earned at least $1 million a year on defense sales and devoted 10 percent or more of its resources to defense contracts. During the time span covered by the report the ratio of profit to sales for defense business decreased from 2.7 to 2.4 percent while the ratio for commercial business rose from 3.4 to 5 percent. Companies whose nondefense sales averaged 30-90 percent of total sales offered a much higher return on the investment dollar than companies with defense sales averaging more than 70 percent of the total. Consequently most defense contractors are increasing their percentage of commercial sales. The report reveals the companies are not only attracted by higher profits but also by the greater stability and faster growth rate in the nondefense business. They are also deterred from selling to the Department of Defense by the latter's increasingly greater use of the firm fixed price rather than the less risky cost-plus fixed-fee type of contract. Although there is no evidence to indicate that the defense industry would shun its responsibility by going on strike, the industry's trend toward diversification decreases its dependence on Government funding and points out the need for higher rewards for Government contracting.

3. Ethical and Social

1155

Greenberg, D. S. DEFENSE RESEARCH: SENATE CRITICS URGE REDEPLOYMENT TO URBAN NEEDS. Science, v. 160, Apr. 26, 1968: 400-402.
Q1. S35, v. 160

Recent Senate cutbacks of funds for military research and criticism of defense-backed research by presidential candidate Robert Kennedy indicate that "the specter of external threat is no longer the dominant force that it was once for determining how the United States shall develop and employ its scientific and technological resources." Many Senators exhibited antispending sentiments in supporting the 6 percent reduction in the $8.015 billion requested by the administration for defense research programs, and a number expressed antimilitary feelings and assailed military support of basic research. In his campaign addresses Kennedy has advocated transferring scientific and technical resources from military programs to urban improvement programs. However, it is still not clear whether domestic social needs can motivate American scientific and technological advances as successfully as fear of communism.

1156

Lifton, Robert J. DEATH IN LIFE; SURVIVORS OF HIROSHIMA. New York, Random House [1968, c1967] 594 p.
D767. 25. H6L4
Bibliographical references included in "Notes" (p. [557]-576)

Contents. --Introduction: research and researcher. --Hiroshima. --The atomic bomb experience. --Invisible contamination. --"A-bomb disease."--A-bomb man. --Atomic bomb leaders. --Residual struggles: trust, peace, and mastery. --Perceiving America. --Formulation: self and world. --Creative response: 1) "A-bomb literature."--Creative response: 2) Artistic dilemmas.

--The survivor. --Appendix. --Notes. --Index. --List of survivors quoted.

Relates the psychological effects of nuclear bombing on two groups of Hiroshima residents--the first selected at random from a Hiroshima Research Institute for Nuclear Medicine and Biology list, the second made up of scholars, writers, doctors, and civic leaders. Lifton finds little difference in the psychological reactions of the people within these groups. His composite statement includes what he considers the major immediate and long-range responses to atomic blast exposure; while it covers more than any individual could have experienced, "nothing in it is alien to any hibakusha"--a coined term for an explosion-affected person. The indelible imprint of the holocaust on those who were there and the vividness of recall 17 years later produced "a psychological kaleidoscope of an extraordinary immersion in death," lasting fear of radiation aftereffects, and a persistent awareness of World War II. The persons the author interviewed were most cooperative, each of them emerging as a speaker for some faction of the community of the 90,000 Hiroshima survivors. The extensive research was undertaken in the absence of any Japanese or other systematic study of the bomb's psychological and social impact in the hope that it might contribute "to the mastery of these weapons and the avoidance of their use."

4. Other

1157

Arnoni, M. S. WILL THE U.S. USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAIN? [editorial] Minority of one, v. 10, Apr. 1968: 2-4. illus. AP2.M55985, v. 10

The United States again may use nuclear weapons. Civilian and military officials have refused to disclaim possible resort to these weapons in the defense of Khesanh. They insist on keeping secret all discussions pertaining to the use of nuclear weapons and retaining the option of a nuclear war initiative--divulging the intention to use such weapons would deprive the United States of the precious element of surprise. Since the United States refuses to consider any solution other than military victory and since its escalation of the war has not measurably tipped the scales in its favor, victory will probably come by nuclear warfare. But tactical nuclear weapons would not end the Vietnam War. The North Vietnamese, Viet Cong, and Chinese could respond with their own escalation to produce significant victories against the Americans. Whatever happens the United States would not achieve its primary objective of unchallengeably dominating Asia.

1158

Begemann, Friedrich, and Irving Friedman. ISOTOPIC COMPOSITION OF ATMOSPHERIC HYDROGEN. Journal of geophysical research, v. 73, Feb. 15, 1968: 1139-1147. illus. QC811.J6, v. 73

Thirty-two samples of atmospheric molecular hydrogen, collected at Oberhausen and Munchen, Germany, between 1958 and 1963 have been analyzed for their tritium and deuterium content. The procedure for extracting the hydrogen from the crude neon fraction from air liquefaction plants is described in some detail. Data indicating good reproducibility are given. Where possible the results are compared with results obtained on the same samples in other laboratories. Reasons for discrepancies, which in some cases amount to 50%, are discussed. During the 1958-1961 test moratorium on thermonuclear weapons the tritium level continued to rise; yet, no immediate significant increase due to the large U.S.S.R. test series at the end of 1961 has been observed. (Abstract supplied)

1159

Begemann, Friedrich, and Irving Friedman. TRITIUM AND DEUTERIUM IN ATMOSPHERIC METHANE. Journal of geophysical research, v. 73, Feb. 15, 1968: 1149-1153. illus. QC811.J6, v. 73

Ten samples of atmospheric methane collected at Oberhausen, Germany, and Gary, Indiana, between 1960 and 1963 have been analyzed for their tritium and deuterium content. The results show the tritium concentration in the northern hemisphere to have been essentially constant since 1958, the time the first samples were analyzed. Existing theories to explain the origin of tritiated methane are discussed and rejected as highly improbable. The data can best be explained by assuming that leakage of tritiated methane into the atmosphere from sources in nuclear industry located in the northern hemisphere occurred for a period of years prior to 1958, and then the leak was essentially closed. (Abstract supplied)

1160

BESRL REPORT REVIEWS MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY PROGRESS. Army research and development, v. 9, Jan. 1968: 26-27. U393.A8, v. 9

Summary of a report on the state of the art of military psychology. The report deals with the approaches to military psychological research and emphasizes research on the "total manned-system" rather than on subfactors. The military psychologist must view the military man in a newly defined setting. The classical criterion of performance effectiveness is of value chiefly "when relative measurement suffices and when a single aspect of the 'personnel sybsystem' is of interest, but not sufficient for the modern military psychologist. It is the 'mission accomplished' impact the military user is after, and it is this impact that the total systems criterion must reflect."

1161

Davis, Paul C. SENTINEL AND THE FUTURE OF SABMIS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Mar. 1968: 56-66. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 48

The decision to deploy a Sentinel ABM system may discourage further consideration of the sea-based antiballistic missile intercept system (SABMIS). This would be unfortunate since in a context of deterrence on a global scale as defense invulnerability SABMIS has definite political and strategic advantages over the Sentinel. SABMIS would provide a convincing reply to those Europeans who have expressed doubts about our ability and willingness to defend the Continent. It would provide a superior solution to the problems raised by the growing demand of allies and neutrals alike for U.S. protection against nuclear attack as the price for their accepting a nonproliferation agreement. The political advantages arise from the fact that a sea-based system is mobile and remains under U.S. control no matter where deployed. These characteristics would permit

the United States to make and unmake defensive commitments at will simply by deploying or withdrawing its sea-based ABM's. The United States could alter its defensive arrangements at any time to match changes in the policy of friends, neutrals, and adversaries and, in general, follow a deterrence policy of great flexibility. The strategic advantages rest on mobile forward deployment of the system, which simplifies problems of detection and interception and permits rapid closing of defensive gaps by changes in locale. This would enable SABMIS to cope with a greater variety of attack forms than can a land-based missile. The current focus is on developing an ABM system capable of dealing with the present limited Chinese threat. Although SABMIS would be useful against this threat, its full potential could be realized only against the Soviet Union and in the strategic environment of 1975-80. Prudence suggests that we judge the SABMIS idea in the light of these latter strategic needs.

1162

Ewan, Thomas K. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: A MILITARY-CIVILIAN PARTNERSHIP. Naval engineers journal, v. 79, Dec. 1967: 899-902.
VM1.A5, v. 79

In response to defense needs and the "technological stampede" of the past two decades the military has established a partnership with the civilian scientific community. The Office of Scientific Research and Development for the armed services was created in 1941 to coordinate military and civilian talents and resources in the technological field. Only through such a cooperative program "can we obtain the maximum potential with what we have, build the weapons necessary for our defense, and replenish the storehouse of basic scientific information." While the military is responsible for administering the joint projects, it must conduct the work without the many restrictions common to normal Government operations. The industrial and university groups that carry out the specific assignment should also have a voice in overall program planning and be allowed to pursue general as well as specific research problems. Since the highest caliber scientists and creative engineers are "adventurers into the unknown," they must receive tactful guidance that does not impair their initiative nor infringe too heavily upon their normal peacetime pursuits. As long as the military-civilian relationship continues to stimulate creativity, it will offer the best method for promoting technological innovation in the military field.

1163

Gallois, Pierre M. [AMERICAN AND SOVIET ABM DEFENSE AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION] La défense contre missiles (DCM) américaine et russe et la "prolifération." Revue militaire generale, Feb. 1968: 139-150. U2.R48, 1968

The decisions of the United States and Russia to deploy ABM systems has changed the almost perfect balance of power and initiated a race for the absolute weapon. By their decisions they acknowledge that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is unavoidable. The cost effectiveness of an ABM system in relation to that of offensive missiles was prohibitive, but since the decision the American cost computation has changed; the ratio of nuclear defense to offense has dropped from 100:1 to 4:1 or even 2:1. The United States turned to deployment of defensive missiles because of the inevitable proliferation of nuclear weapons for defense against new national nuclear forces. Technological progress in the detection and interception of ballistic missiles also probably changed American views. Secretary McNamara has rejected any ABM system based in Western Europe since it would be too close to the Russian missile-launching bases. Europe must be defended against a Russian nuclear first strike, and for this an ABM system would not be adequate.

1164

Gray, Charles H., and Glenn W. Gregory. MILITARY SPENDING AND SENATE VOTING: A CORRELATIONAL STUDY. Journal of peace research, v. 5 no. 1, 1968: 44-45. tables.
AS9.J6, v. 5

Bibliographical references included in "Notes": p. 53-54.

The study deals with one aspect of the 'Military-Industrial Complex': the correlation between military spending and voting on liberalism-conservatism and foreign policy issues in the Senate of the 88th U.S. Congress. Measures of manufacturing, education, income, metropolitanism, and liberalism were partialled out of the appropriate correlations. Low, but statistically significant correlations were found. The conclusion was that even low correlations signal further attention to a subject as important as militarism. (Abstract supplied)

1165

Haines, Alan, and B. C. Musgrave. TRITIUM CONTENT OF ATMOSPHERIC METHANE AND ETHANE. Journal of geophysical research, v. 73, Feb. 15, 1968: 1167-1173. illus. QC811.J6, v. 73

Samples of liquid oxygen collected at ground level near Neosho, Missouri, have been processed for recovery of methane, and the tritium content of these samples has been measured. The fluctuation of the T/H ratio in these samples is discussed in terms of possible sources of this radioactivity. Arguments that this tritium-labeled methane has been released from sources in nuclear industry are supported by measurements of tritium in ethane recovered from some of these liquid oxygen samples. The continuing release of labeled methane by nuclear industry is suggested by the fact that the T/H ratio has not changed appreciably during the period 1958 to 1966, although this interval is comparable to the chemical lifetime expected for methane in the atmosphere. (Abstract supplied)

1166

Hitch, Charles J. THE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO DECISION-MAKING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. Operational research quarterly, v. 19, Apr. 1968: 37-45. Q175.059, v. 19

Paper presented before the 1967 Conference of the Operational Research Society, London.

Discusses some of the problems associated with the installation and operation of the PPBS [planning-programming-budgeting] system, first in the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Army and then in the University of California. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1167

Izrael', IU. A., and E. D. Stukin. [GAMMA RADIATION FROM RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT] Gamma-izluchenie radioaktivnykh vypadenii. Moskva, Atomizdat, 1967. 222 p. illus.
QC795.I96

Partial contents. --Formation of radioactive fallout. --Gamma field from sources simulating a site contaminated by radioactive fallout. --Gamma field over an infected environment.

Discusses the harmful effects of the fallout caused by nuclear explosions or radioactive industrial ejections; e.g., in crash cases. The authors give the results of studies of dose strength and the intensity and spectral and angular distribution of gamma radiation in the air over artificial models of a contaminated locality.

1168

Joxe, Alain. [ABM AND WORLD STRATEGIES] A. B. M. et stratégies mondiales. Stratégie, no. 14, Oct./Dec. 1967: 49-80. U162.S78, 1967

Lists the reasons for the U.S. deployment of a "thin" ABM system and examines its effects on Russian-American relations. Included are arguments by both countries for and against ABM deployment. Joxe also describes the ABM weapons and electronic systems. He concludes that rejection of an ABM system for Europe could bring Eastern and Western Europe closer together politically and could also enable it to extricate itself from the machinations of bipolar nuclear strategies.

1169

Leventhal, J. S., and W. F. Libby. TRITIUM GEOPHYSICS FROM 1961-1962 NUCLEAR TESTS. Journal of geophysical research, v. 73, Apr. 15, 1968: 2715-2719. QC811.J6, v. 73

Tritium fallout from the 1961-1962 nuclear weapons tests in the Arctic has been measured in southern California and Lake Michigan and at the poles. From these measurements the stratosphere residence time for moisture has been deduced to be about three years. From the oceanic tritium data, the yields of the tests and increase in surface water have been correlated. The 1961-1962 injections have substantially increased our knowledge of the flow of moisture from the northern stratosphere into the southern stratosphere and into the troposphere. These data confirm and re-enforce earlier conclusions about re-evaporation, runoff, and wind transport effects, giving a firmer base for the calculation of the total tritium deposited and the associated past rainfall concentrations. This information is needed for the study of the hydrology of particular local areas. (Abstract supplied)

1170

Mason, John F. AIR FORCE GETTING WAR NETWORK THAT CAN TRAVEL. Electronic design, v. 16, Mar. 14, 1968: 25-26, 28-30, 32. illus. TK7800.E437, v. 16

Calls attention to the Air Force's 407L tactical air control system. Under the direction of the Air Force Systems Command's Electronic Systems Division at Hanscom Field, Mass., a network of ground equipment needed for tactical air support is being developed that can be consolidated into air transportable modules and sent to remote combat areas within hours. Integrated circuitry and solid-state devices are being utilized in building the network's radar and communications equipment wherever possible in order to reduce bulk and improve performance. After testing is completed at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., the Air Force plans to build five complete networks, each of which will cost $500 million.

1171

NEW HDL X-RAY FACILITY SIMULATES NUCLEAR EFFECTS. Army research and development, v. 9, Feb. 1968: 1, 7. U393.A8, v. 9

Describes the super flash X-ray system that will simulate gamma pulses from a nuclear weapon blast. The X-ray machine is "the missing link" to complement the Diamond ordnance radiation facility, which simulates neutron radiation from an atomic blast. Because of its extremely narrow pulse "the system is a useful tool for examining physical phenomena which are of very short duration."

1172

Normyle, William J. DOD DEFENDS AERONAUTIC RESEARCH POLICY. Aviation week & space technology, v. 88, Apr. 8, 1968: 24-25. TL501.A8, v. 88

Testifying before the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, John Foster, director of defense research and engineering for the Department of Defense [DOD], defended DOD's aeronautical research and development policy. Although he agreed with the committee complaint that civilian utilization of military aeronautical research is declining, he suggested that the National Aeronautical and Space Administration [NASA] was responsible for encouraging civilian application of defense-generated aeronautical technology. While admitting that DOD spends more on aeronautics than all other Government agencies combined, Foster pointed out that of the $981.4 million allocated to aeronautics for FY 1969, $843 million is earmarked for military-oriented projects that preclude technology transfer. He also called the committee's attention to progress on the manned orbiting laboratory project and discussed other DOD space activities. Upon recommendation of the Senate committee, a joint study will be conducted by NASA and the Transportation Department on the diminishing application of military aeronautical research to civilian needs.

1173

REFLECTIONS ON THE QUARTER: THE U.S. DECISION TO DEPLOY A "THIN" ABM SYSTEM. Orbis, v. 11, fall 1967: 637-640. D839.O68, v. 11

The administration is leaving open policy options designed to permit accommodation with the Soviet Union to slow down the arms race by emphasizing the Chinese threat as the main reason for ABM deployment. Implicit in the U.S. decision is a shift from emphasis on a second-strike capability to mutual deterrence--at least where Russia is concerned. Whatever the administration intended, ABM deployment will most likely cause the Soviet Union to increase its efforts to eliminate any strategic superiority the United States may have. The Russians have not responded to any past initiatives by the United States in arms control policy; instead they have pushed ahead in the development of both offensive and defensive weapons. Both countries must assume at least a measure of compatibility in international politics; otherwise the Soviet response to the "'signals' implicit in U.S. arms policy . . . may differ from that intended by U.S. strategic planners."

1174

Rothstein, Robert L. THE ABM, PROLIFERATION AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. Foreign affairs, v. 46, Apr. 1968: 487-502. D410. F6, v. 46

In view of the persuasive arguments against ABM deployment, the U.S. decision to install a thin missile defense system is questionable. At best it reflects an inadequate appraisal of the future consequences of ABM deployment, and at worst it represents a response to domestic political pressures. Since a Chinese ICBM attack on the United States is highly improbable within the next 10 years, it is difficult to justify the immediate U.S. deployment of an ABM system against China. Another purpose often cited for the ABM is that it will increase the credibility of America's commitment to defend Asia and convince Asians to forgo development of their own nuclear arsenals. Unfortunately, even an extreme guarantee policy may not permanently inhibit Asian nations from developing nuclear forces nor persuade them to sign a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Contrary to presumptions that they would consider the U.S. ABM in the common interest, many Europeans believe that it increases their vulnerability. The chances for an effective nonproliferation treaty will sharply decline, and if the ABM renews the arms race between Moscow and Washington, Europeans may decrease U.S. ties in order to "reduce their chances of being an exposed pawn in a resurgent cold war." Instead of interpreting the U.S. deployment of a missile defense system as an attempt to maintain the status quo, Soviet leaders may fear an increase in U.S. nuclear superiority and launch a massive armaments buildup. As the weaker power the Soviet Union feels compelled to respond to any U.S. move to increase its strategic strength, but as the stronger power the United States does not have to "meet every Soviet increase in strength with a symmetrical increase in . . . force structure." As long as each side maintains the capability of destroying the other's cities in retaliatory attacks, the tenuous stability of the present strategic balance can persist.

1175

Schadewaldt, H. [IMPORTANT MILITARY PHYSICIANS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL SCIENCE] Bedeutende Militärärzte und ihr Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der Medizin. Wehrmedizinische Monatsschrift, v. 12, Jan. 1968: 152-160. P&GP RR

The development of surgery was influenced decisively by wartime surgery. Knowledge of modern hygiene and bacteriology either were worked out by military physicians or were immediately utilized for the entire field of medicine. The etiology of numerous pathological conditions was determined by military physicians. The military institutions for medical education have always been of decisive importance. The achievements and accomplishments of renowned military physicians are described. (Abstract supplied)

1176

Seaborg, Glenn T. THE ATOM: DEVELOPING PEACEFUL USES THROUGH RESEARCH. Army research and development, v. 8, Dec. 1967: 28-31. illus. U398. A8, v. 8

Developments in the peaceful uses of atomic energy have become so significant that more than half the Atomic Energy Commission's budget is now devoted to them. The greatest attention has been paid to the atom's ability to produce heat for the generation of electricity. By the year 2000, the total U.S. nuclear power capacity is expected to be about 700 million kilowatts. Nuclear power may also be used in the desalinization of seawater and brackish water, for independent sources of power in remote areas, for the propulsion of merchant ships, and in undersea exploration and space research. It will be essential as power for manned trips to the planets, and nuclear-powered equipment will be used to maintain life and essential functions during these voyages. Nuclear explosives will be used in the future in large-scale excavation projects and for mineral extraction. At the other end of the energy spectrum are radioisotopes, which are valuable for research in medicine, biology, and agriculture. Studies of radiation effects are advancing knowledge in molecular and physical chemistry. Radioisotopes also have a variety of industrial applications. Someday the Plowshare Program for peaceful applications of the atom will be fully implemented, because "a new kind of nuclear proliferation, the proliferation of the peaceful atom, is taking place."

1177

SENTINEL MATERIEL SUPPORT COMMAND CREATED. Army research and development, v. 9, Feb. 1968: 1, 3. U393. A8, v. 9

Reports on plans to establish a U.S. Army Sentinel Materiel Support Command. The proposed command will be part of the organization that deploys the Sentinel system, better known as the Chinese-oriented ABM. The principal function of this command will be "to provide logistical support to the tactical equipment comprising the Sentinel System."

1178

Young, James A., and A. W. Fairhall. RADIOCARBON FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS. Journal of geophysical research, v. 73, Feb. 15, 1968: 1185-1200. illus. QC811. J6, v. 73

The distribution in time and space of C^{14} from the 1961-1962 nuclear weapons tests of the U.S. and the USSR is used as a tracer for atmospheric mixing phenomena and exchange of carbon dioxide between the atmosphere and the sea. The mean residence time of C^{14} injected into the stratosphere by the tests or produced by cosmic rays is about 1.5 years before entering the troposphere. The C^{14} enters the troposphere predominantly at midlatitudes in the late spring. Dispersion of the C^{14} injected into the troposphere is well accounted for by eddy diffusion, with the meridional eddy diffusion coefficients being proportional to the variance of the meridional component of the wind speed. Exchange of carbon dioxide between the atmosphere and the sea (and therefore uptake of excess C^{14} by the sea) is taken to be proportional to the square of the average wind speed over the sea surface. This leads to the conclusion that the bulk of the C^{14} will eventually be taken up by the oceans of the southern hemisphere. A mean residence time of 2.5 years for a carbon dioxide molecule in the troposphere before uptake by the sea is deduced from the model, giving a mean residence time of 4 years for a C^{14} atom in the atmosphere before uptake by the sea. (Abstract supplied)

III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

A. INTERNATIONAL LAW

1179

Boasson, Charles. THE PLACE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN PEACE RESEARCH. Journal of peace research, v. 5, no. 1. 1968: 28-43.
AS9.J6, v. 5

Bibliographical references included in "Notes and References": p. 39-42.

The article first describes the belief, common among lawyers, that they hold the key to all problems in relation to prevention of war. The author compares this belief, and in particular the 'outlawry-of-war' movement in the first quarter of this century, with the subsequent disillusions which led to the attitude that international law has not much to contribute to serious peace research. He rejects the suggestion that international law is still a 'primitive' kind of law that will gradually evolve into a mature and therefore more effective law. The suggestion that international law must first absorb and eventually reflect the cultural backgrounds and patterns of the peoples of the world and their legal systems is critically appraised. The thesis that the desires and demands of the dissatisfied nations are not allowed for in the prevalent legal conceptions of traditional international law is seen in the perspective of the tension normal in any legal order, caused by defective adjustments to ideal demands. The possible beginnings of an international 'criminal' law and its further development, as well as the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, are discussed in relation to the sociocriminological problems of 'lawlessness' and 'differential association,' a recurrent central problem of international law, or rather of the international situation. The article asserts that the experience and the theoretical categories of municipal law are inapplicable to the international constellation. It therefore stipulates that functional and theoretical adaptations to fundamental differences between municipal and international situations be brought into play. (Abstract supplied)

1180

Butler, William E. THE LEGAL REGIME OF RUSSIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS. American journal of international law, v. 62, Jan. 1968: 51-77.
LL

Points to the interplay of "elements"--including Western international law practice and that of the prerevolutionary Russian Empire that have influenced "the course and pattern of the boundaries and the regime of Soviet territorial waters." Also discussed are Soviet doctrines regarding internal waters and seas and closed seas. The long established practice in the Soviet Union is to "regard historic bays and seas as part of the internal waters of a coastal state and subject to its unlimited sovereignty." Recently, however, the Soviet Government has tended to apply the historic-bay principle to areas that thus far have not been deemed historic by Soviet writers, e.g., the Great Bay (the site of Vladivostok) on the Chinese border. In 1957 it established a closing line 108 miles in length for that bay. Butler comments on Soviet legislation on innocent passage, contiguous zones, and the right of hot pursuit. Soviet jurisprudence has refrained so far from discussing applicability of relevant Soviet principles to other bodies of water in the world. This is "the principal legal difficulty with the Soviet positions" in Butler's opinion.

1181

Carstens, Karl. [THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN SUPPORT OF EFFORTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR MILITARY MEDICINE AND MILITARY PHARMACY FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL LAWS AND ADVANCEMENT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW] Wehrmedizinische Monatsschrift, v. 12, Jan. 1968: 11-13.
P&GP RR

Speech by the State Secretary of the German Federal Republic's Defense Ministry.

Exchange of ideas on scientific and human problems of modern military medicine on as broad a base as possible is an excellent method for mutual understanding and cooperation. For this reason, the Federal Government supports all international contacts as genuine peace factors. It welcomes the efforts of the committee to spread the spirit and the contents of the Geneva Convention. Always keeping in mind human dignity, it is our common task to support the mutual understanding of nations and the friendship amongst all countries. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1182

Doherty, Kathryn B. RHETORIC AND REALITY: A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY OFFICIAL EGYPTIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER. American journal of international law, v. 62, Apr. 1968: 335-364.
LL

Considers Egypt's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the U.N. Charter and role in settlement of international disputes. Doherty concludes that Egypt's efforts toward changes in international law have been motivated by its long-term politicoeconomic goals and conditioned by psychological and cultural factors. Along with other new states Egypt tends to stress radical rather than progressive development of international law.

1183

Gottlieb, Gidon. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW: TOWARD THE LEGITIMATION OF WAR. Ethics, an international journal of social, political, and legal philosophy, v. 78, Jan. 1968: 144-147.
BJI.I6, v. 78

One can investigate international relations from either external or internal points of view, each recording different regularities in the international behavior of social groups, including groups of states. The external approach, while taking cognizance of the group's rules, ignores the manner of their functioning "in the lives of those who normally rely upon them." The internal one, discernible for instance in Raymond Aron's Peace and War, seeks explanation of international behavior solely in terms perceptible to the participants. This approach also shows how the rules of international law outline the available alternatives in armed conflicts, particularly in limited wars. Lest it disintegrate, the international legal order itself should not lag much behind political, economic, and social change. The last decades have brought proliferation of new licensing techniques for the use of force (e.g., the doctrine of wars of liberation applied in the U.N. General Assembly resolution of November 1966 on southern Rhodesia). In the absence of compulsory adjudication their legal status is debatable. Some are subject to institutional authorization, which restrains their use. The internal approach "promotes analyses of the way in which the limitations imbedded in the licenses governing the use of armed force actually inhibit the use of such force." The licensing techniques may prove far more successful in controlling the use of force than would notoriously ineffective outright prohibitions.

1184

Meeker, Leonard C. LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY WORLD PROBLEMS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, Apr. 8, 1968: 465-469. JX232.A33, v. 58

"Address made before the American branch of the International Law Association at New York, N.Y., on March 1," 1968.

Discusses problems of international law and peaceful settlement of disputes as exemplified by the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and the Pueblo seizure. Meeker notes that disarmament or a general ban on the use of force to resolve disputes are not alone sufficient to ensure peace; methods of making rational and pacific adjustments of the status quo must be available to the disputants. Since these methods are already available, however, the failure of settlement efforts must be attributed to the political reluctance of states to use existing procedures and facilities.

1185

Meissner, Boris. [PEACE AND PEACE SECURITY IN THE SOVIET VIEW] Friede und Friedenssicherung in sowjetischer Sicht. Moderne Welt, v. 9, no. 1, 1968: 67-77. D839.M58, v. 9

Studies Soviet international law doctrines and policy in regard to peaceful coexistence and "total peace," two entirely disparate concepts. The dynamic character of the Soviet policy allows it to change with the international situation.

1186

Röhner, Edmund. [THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND THE SOCIALIST STATES] Nationale Befreiungsbewegung und sozialistische Staaten. Einheit, v. 23, no. 1, 1968: 92-103. HX6.E4, v. 23

The present era of transition from capitalism to socialism, initiated by the Great October Revolution, has produced, among other things, national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America under the Socialist banner. Close cooperation between Socialist countries and those movements now at a time of "heightened contradiction" between the latter and imperialism, is essential for mankind's future. Hence the Soviet Union's and other Socialist countries' support for nation-states in those areas or for aspirations for such states. This form of state has proved the most advantageous for the further unity of the anti-imperialist struggle and for changing the socioeconomic system in underdeveloped areas. Alliance with national liberation movements and revolutions "is for the Soviet Union and other socialist nations by no means a passing matter or a tactical one," but a main concern.

1187

Sinha, Bhek Pati. UNILATERAL DENUNCIATION OF TREATY BECAUSE OF PRIOR VIOLATIONS OF OBLIGATIONS BY OTHER PARTY. With a foreword by Oliver J. Lissitzyn. The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1966. xx, 232 p. JX4171.T5S5

Bibliographical footnotes.
Bibliography: p. [216]-221.

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Statement of the problem. --pt. 2. Jurists and unilateral denunciation. --pt. 3. Judges and unilateral denunciation.--pt. 4. Private law analogy and unilateral denunciation.--pt. 5. Related problems: Pacta sunt servanda and unilateral denunciation. Unilateral denunciation and unanimity rule. The rule of extinctive prescription and unilateral denunciation. A violated treaty--void or voidable? The limitation of substantial breach. The principle of severability of provisions. Unilateral denunciation and law-making treaty. The concept of the rule of law and unilateral denunciation. The sanction of what is proper and public opinion.--pt. 6. Practice of states and unilateral denunciation: The Anglo-American Treaty of Peace of 3 September 1783. The Treaty of Paris of 1856. The Fifth Treaty of the Triple Alliance, 5 December 1912. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Briand-Kellog Pact), 1928. The Versailles Treaty, 28 January 1919. The Locarno Treaty, 16 October 1925. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of 24 August 1945. The Quadripartite Agreements of 1944 and 1945 on Berlin. Agreement relative to the withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba, October 1962. Treaty on a partial test ban, July 1963.--pt. 7. Discussions relative to unilateral denunciation in international organisations and conferences: The Palestine agreements, 1949. The Korean armistice agreement of 1953.

Points out the general agreement among jurists "that unilateral denunciation is a norm of international law," although not a single case has been decided by an international or national court in that matter. However, a significant body of dicta assumes the innocent party's right to unilaterally terminate its obligations because of violation of a treaty by the other party. Sinha considers, among other things, cases of dissolution of alliances on this basis.

1188

Starr, Robert. INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS COVENANTS. Wisconsin law review, fall 1967: 863-890. LL

Commentary on substantive provisions of the International Covenants on Human Rights, adopted and opened for signature December 16, 1966, by the U.N. General Assembly, and a detailed inquiry into their international implementation machinery. Appended to the Covenants is an optional protocol which provides for the right of individual petition. Starr also investigates some problems in the relationship of the Covenants to U.S. law. For obvious reasons the Covenants fall short of fulfilling the popular hope for establishment of truly universal norms on basic human rights. Even so, they strengthen and refine in considerable measure the principle of international responsibility of states in the human-rights area. However, adequate international procedures for implementation of the Covenants, especially in cases of interstate disputes, are still wanting.

1189

United Nations. International Law Commission. REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND PART OF ITS SEVENTEENTH SESSION, JANUARY 3-28, 1966, AND ON ITS EIGHTEENTH SESSION, MAY 4-JULY 19, 1966. American journal of international law, v. 61, Jan. 1967: 248-473. LL

"U.N. General Assembly, 21st Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 9 (A/6309/Rev. 1). It has been necessary to omit the Annex, consisting of comments by governments on Parts I, II and III of the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties drawn up by the Commission at its 14th, 15th and 16th sessions, and the Appendix table of references to numbers allocated to articles, sections and parts of the draft articles on the law of treaties since 1962."

Contains a full text of the draft articles and the Commission's official commentary on each of them, as well as a summary of the proceedings.

1190

UNITED STATES: COMMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE DRAFT ARTICLES ON THE LAW OF TREATIES DRAWN UP BY THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION. American journal of international law, v. 6, Apr. 1968: 567-575. LL

"U.N. General Assembly Doc. a/6827/Add. 2, October 6, 1967."

The U.S. Government considers the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties a substantial basis for the expected Convention on this law and agrees in essence to a great many of the proposed provisions. It thinks, however, that some articles need improvement in form, technical detail, or substance, and its proposals in regard to these matters will be made later on. The current comments are confined to problems that "require consideration in light of their overall relationship to the establishment of a body of rules on the Law of Treaties." According to articles 1 and 2 (1a) the Convention would not cover treaties between states and other international persons of treaty-making capacity, although this class of treaties is not only sizeable but has become increasingly important, as for example trilateral nuclear-safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency as a party. Article 4, which could be construed as permitting any international organization to exclude application of the Convention to treaties adopted within the organization would practically give such persons a blanket power "to abrogate what should be the generally accepted rules of international law respecting treaties." Section 2 [of part II] establishes a system of dealing with reservations to multilateral treaties [by the acceding party]. Its general applicability, however, may not be appropriate in all circumstances. The wording of the pertinent articles, 16 and 17, obscures the meaning of some of the contents. Articles 27 and 28 on the Interpretation of Treaties place too great a restriction on the criteria to be used for determining the meaning to be given the treaty terms. Principles invoked by articles 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 59, 61, and 62 (on the invalidity and termination of treaties) are undeniable as abstract propositions, but lack legal content. For instance the expression "threat or use of force" in the operative clause of article 49 needs to be more clearly defined; substantial differences have long existed as to its meaning in the U.N. Charter. Also the rebus sic stantibus rule is too controversial to become--in the form in which it was drafted in article 59--a binding norm of a convention on the Law of Treaties.

B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

1191

Berle, Adolf A. REALITIES OF INTERNATIONAL POWER. Humanist, v. 28, Jan./Feb. 1968: 8-12. B821.A1H8, v. 28

Within each state the decisionmaking power is in the hands of individuals limited by the institutions of that state and the idea-system on which those institutions are based. Powerholders in almost all states may join others seeking alliances, cooperative agreements, regional arrangements, or world action; each powerholder, however, will be governed by ideological considerations of his own. Current international life sets forth three ideologies: nationalism in a variety of interpretations; messianism, which seeks to impose its own concept of faith wherever possible; and finally the belief that a "rule of law" for the entire planet must, and some day can, be realized. Meanwhile, groupings and spheres-of-influence (alias empires), their agreed limitations, and the balance of power appear to be the only forms by which world order can be maintained. The only alternative to these "empires" is a "minimal world government" based on a "substantially worldwide consensus on a philosophy," a system of values. This has not been achieved as yet. But, as communications covering most of the world's populated regions improve, an elementary value system is gradually being forged. Because of it, no nuclear bomb has been dropped since 1945, no formal war has been declared, and bits and pieces of international order have been instituted on Cyprus, in the Congo, and in the Dominican Republic. From these attempts a consensus on world order is starting to emerge. The value of scientific knowledge has already been recognized almost everywhere. From it stems the regulation of radio waves and frequencies, efforts to arrest communicable diseases, and rules on civil aviation. And some day the government of international currency and credit, as well as the duty and practice of pooling results of purely scientific research, may materialize. Assuming that a world beginning to be pulled together by communications tends to generate a nucleus of commonly held values, then the United Nations, however limp, can give them "institutional expression and effectiveness," expanding thereby its own strength. A world rule of law may not be at hand, but even today's slow transformation of power realities is definitely headed toward a "newer planetary system," outlined already on the distant horizon.

III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

1192

Chiu, Hungdah. COMMUNIST CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS. American journal of international law, v. 62, Jan. 1968: 20-50.
LL

In the preparation of this article the author was "assisted by R. R. Edwards."

Considers changes in Peking's policy toward the United Nations from 1949 to the present. Chiu discusses Red China's position on the relationship between state sovereignty and the United Nations on the question of the binding force of U. N. resolutions, and on the U. N. role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Chinese Communist doctrine on international public law rejects the possibility of the United Nations becoming a subject of that law. This in its view would encroach on state sovereignty. In contrast to its former position Peking now rejects as a matter of principle the possibility of its "ad hoc participation in the United Nations discussion of . . . particular issues."

1193

Goldberg, Arthur J. THE UNITED NATIONS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, Mar. 4, 1968: 306-309. JX232.A33, v. 58

"Address made before a joint session of the General Assembly of Virginia at Richmond, Va., on February 8," 1968.

Evaluates the contribution of the United Nations to the maintenance of peace. Goldberg admits that, while the U. N. has sometimes succeeded in suppressing or containing violence, it has been unable to deal with its underlying causes. Nevertheless there is no realistic alternative to the U. N., for in the long run only an international organization can provide the kind of national security that will make resort to inherently competitive and unstable unilateral solutions unnecessary.

1194

Hoge, Thomas A. A SECOND LOOK AT THE UN. American Legion magazine, v. 84, Apr. 1968: 20-25, 48. D570.A1A32, v. 84

In its proposed review of U. N. history the American Legion will examine many of the problems that have plagued the organization. The Legion study will probably reveal the inadequacies of U. N. peacekeeping operations. Except for its operations in Korea and the Congo, the United Nations has not been able to intervene in disputes without the mutual consent of the Soviet Union and the United States. Time and again the Russians have invoked their veto power in the Security Council to thwart U. N. intervention in crisis situations--many times the Soviet Union was even a party to the aggression. Besides the veto the Russians have deployed other obstructionist tactics, such as browbeating and walkouts, to promote their interests. Although small countries don't individually have the same leverage as the major powers in promoting their national interests, as a block their voting power is far out of proportion to their size. A new voting formula should be introduced to prevent control of the General Assembly by these states. The United Nations is also hampered by poor financing procedures and confusion concerning its right to "establish broad declarations of principle in human affairs having the effect of treaties." While a comprehensive review of U. N. affairs may not remedy all U. N. failures, it at least will offer a clarification of significant issues.

1195

Kriesberg, Louis. HOW A PLOWING CONTEST MAY EASE WORLD TENSIONS. Trans-action, v. 5, Dec. 1967: 36-39. P&GP RR

The international nongovernmental organizations [NGO's], barely 200 strong at the onset of the century, now total almost 2,000. These organizations promote the common goals of groups with interests ranging from sports to nuclear physics, uniting people of many nationalities. Most of the NGO's are concerned with occupational activities aimed at improving conditions that generate international conflicts. Thus the NGO's "may help ease world tensions," for common interests spur joint efforts. In terms of their potential for consensus the NGO's fall into three groups: the first, with a presumably relatively high consensus, is concerned with technology, science, medicine, or sports; the second, with a presumably moderate consensus, is made up of social and economic organizations; the third group includes organizations concerned with matters about which the consensus is presumably low--philosophy, religion, and international relations--general areas where value differences are likely to be prominent. Yet within the organizational structure of the NGO's the system of committees tends to "transform problems from political issues to be decided by bargaining and negotiation to technical matters to be resolved by consensus among experts." A handful of people in a committee integrated along international lines and exposed to frequent and regular contact is bound to develop common understanding, which in turn reduces value differences. As transnational forums international nongovernmental organizations can "serve as pilot projects for improving world cooperation."

1196

Macmillan, Harold. THE UNITED NATIONS: A UNITY OF POWERS. Vital speeches of the day, v. 34, Feb. 15, 1968: 269-274.
PN6121.V52, v. 34

Delivered at Columbia University, New York, Jan. 11, 1968.

The generation born on the brink of this century was utterly unprepared for the sudden leap into an era of revolutions--the technical one, which propelled man from the horse-and-buggy age into the age of nuclear bombs, the social, which erased the old social structure and bore a new society, and the political revolution, with new nations rising from the ruins of old empires at the foothills of the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. This world, marked by two world wars two decades apart, saw the birth of the United Nations, made up of wartime allies, neutral nations, and ex-enemies as well. But very soon a process of disintegration set in: the "polarisation of power" created two hostile groups and resources that could have been channeled "for prosperity and for posterity" were sunk into armaments. Now, perhaps it is wrong to attribute to the Russians the same emotions that fired them in the early phase of their revolution; maybe natural evolution has softened their line and other events have turned Russia's attention eastward "in anxiety rather than in satisfaction." So the

time may be ripe for a new try at rapprochement. Successful negotiation must include a determination to cooperate, inside and outside the United Nations, to put the world at ease. There should be a return to the U. N. structure as it was intended, with a Security Council armed with military strength and a joint military staff and with the Assembly assuming the place it was originally assigned. This can be accomplished in no other way but "by a new effort for direct agreement between the principals--the Great Powers." Through their unity alone will authority return to the United Nations.

1197

Riklin, Alois. [SCHUMAN'S EUROPE OR DE GAULLE'S?] Schumans oder de Gaulles Europa? Schweizer Rundschau, v. 67, Jan. 1, 1968: 1-20. AP32. S5, v. 67

Since 1950, at the latest, partisans of a United States of Europe have been split into two camps, the internationalists and the supranationalists, differing on the method of realizing their goal. The internationalists would model their European unification process on traditional types of associations between states--associations based on the principle that no Person other than the individual state can create and accept a binding obligation under the law of nations. A number of European organizations rest on this principle. But the European Economic Community, for instance, is based on supranational functionalism. Particular sovereign functions affecting certain industries have been transferred to it by its member states without any national political power being vested in it in the process. Since basic industries are essential for defense, their West European fusion on a supranational functional level would make any Franco-German war materially impossible. The founders of the European Communities hoped that the process of supranational functionalism they initiated, widened to other areas, would lead to political federation of Western Europe. Unfortunately opposition to this was too great. Normal functioning of the European Communities has been considerably impaired since De Gaulle "came back into power" in France. De Gaulle's policy is aimed at European confederation under French hegemony; he has done his best to remove any supranational traces from the communities. "The best one can say of his policy is that it serves the peace. That is by no means little." But concrete measures he has proposed for bringing about his Europe united "from Gibraltar to the Urals" are grotesquely modest in comparison to the goal set. Small nations can only benefit from further development of supranational functionalism.

C. INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

1198

Beaulieu, Paul. PEACE-KEEPING. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 20, Jan. 1968: 31-36. JX351. A3, v. 20

Extracts from statements by the Canadian Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

Summarizes the Canadian peacekeeping role in the United Nations as reported on in the Special Political Committee. Canada, realizing the importance of peacekeeping operations around the world, has taken the initiative to strengthen the peacekeeping capacity of the United Nations by introducing specific proposals, which the General Assembly has failed to approve. Beaulieu discusses the problem of financing and notes that Canada has continued to explore how peacekeeping arrangements can be improved despite disagreement among U. N. members. In addition he reports several opinions of the Special Political Committee with respect to the resolution on peacekeeping: the roles and responsibilities of the General Assembly and Security Council need not conflict; developing nations should be accompanied by progressive moves toward a peaceful and permanent settlement.

1199

Bøhn, Leif. NORSEMEN IN DEFENSE OF PEACE. Norseman, no. 2, 1968: 47-50. illus. AP4. N77, 1968

Despite changing political conditions at home the Norwegian Government has always given the United Nations all possible support in questions of financial aid and military forces for peacekeeping operations. Norway has a special force ready to be deployed at the disposal of the U. N. on short notice. This contingent of 1, 330 is part of the special Scandinavian force of 4, 880. Norsemen have had an outstanding record in guarding the Gaza strip and improving the health conditions in that area. The recent withdrawal of the U. N. forces from Gaza has shown that one party to a conflict alone should not have the power to remove U. N. peacekeeping forces.

1200

Bose, Jadabendra L. A PROBE INTO THE FINANCING OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. Indian journal of political science, v. 28, July/Sept. 1967: 143-153. JA26. I5, v. 28

"The recent controversy within the United Nations over the financing of the peace-keeping operations has brought to the fore not only the financial predicament of the Organization, but the more deep-seated constitutional and political cleavage." Because they question the legality of assessments made by the General Assembly for peacekeeping operations, France and the Soviet Union have defaulted in their payments for these operations. While the United States recognizes that the Security Council is primarily responsible for security matters, it contends that the General Assembly has the right to apportion the expenses of peacekeeping operations. The majority of member states supported this view and accepted the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that upheld the Assembly's right to assess members for operations in the Congo and the Middle East. Although the Assembly did not go so far as to apply article 19 and disfranchise the Soviet Union and France for not paying their bills, it did establish a Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to review the entire question of U. N. peacekeeping activities. The Committee sidestepped the basic issue of responsibility for intervention by agreeing only that the "General Assembly would carry on its work normally in accordance with its rules of procedure." Future controversy over this issue cannot be avoided unless a compromise is reached which would provide for the sharing of peacekeeping authority by the Security Council and the General Assembly. However, by advising that voluntary contributions be used to alleviate U. N. financial difficulties, the Committee established a valuable precedent for the funding of future operations. In the past, mandatory assessments for operations opposed by some of the members have only served to highlight the limitations of the international

body. The United Nations must not abandon its peacekeeping activities for lack of funds but must find ways to increase its resources and seek a sound basis of political support before engaging in preventive diplomacy. There is a growing trend toward a sense of international community, which holds promise for the success of future peacekeeping ventures.

1201

Burns, E. L. M. DISARMAMENT, PEACE-KEEPING AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Disarmament, no. 16, Dec. 1967: 3-7. illus.

JX1981.P7D5, 1967

A statement delivered "to the Congress of the World Association of World Federalists held in Oslo from July 30 to August 5, 1967."

U.N. peacekeeping efforts are jeopardized by the divergency between U.S. and Soviet policies, as evidenced by the Middle East tug-of-war for power. As long as the two belligerents are supplied with offensive weapons, there won't be any point in bringing back a U.N. Force even under the authority of the Security Council. To be successful any future peacekeeping operation must have the support of permanent members of the Security Council, the U.N. Force must be unquestionably superior to that of the belligerents, and an embargo on all arms to the hostile parties must be enforced by the United Nations, which should have reinforcements for its forces if needed; there must also be a clear understanding on financing of operations and a competent military staff at U.N. headquarters to direct operations "in accordance with the political decisions of the Security Council." To assure lasting benefits of U.N. Force operations to the troubled area, negotiations between combatants must be arranged under U.N. patronage--to include mediation and arbitration if necessary, as well as sanctions against the side which refuses to partake in such negotiations.

1202

Fountain, L. H. UNITED STATES URGES RENEWED DEDICATION TO U.N. PEACE AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, Jan. 1, 1968: 20-25.

JX232.A33, v. 58

Statement made by Congressman Fountain in the U.N. Special Political Committee on Nov. 28, 1967.

To fulfill its role as "guardian of the peace" the United Nations must be prepared to resolve international conflicts and prevent outbreaks of violence. As demonstrated by the passage of an amendment to the foreign aid bill expressing the need for improvements in U.N. peacekeeping arrangements, the United States strongly advocates creating effective U.N. peacekeeping machinery. In the U.S. view, a workable system of collective action for peacekeeping should be administered by the Secretary General and financed in a reliable and equitable manner. In addition, member states should place troops and facilities at the disposal of the United Nations to enforce peacekeeping operations. Before major steps can be taken to strengthen peacekeeping arrangements, the Secretary General should undertake an intensive study of peacekeeping concepts and techniques. While awaiting completion of the study, member states can help strengthen U.N. peacekeeping authority by supporting current U.N. peacekeeping operations and devising means of providing logistical support for such operations. Besides pledging its support for improving U.N. peacekeeping arrangements, the United States urges "the development of procedures for coping with underlying causes of conflict and achieving a settlement." However, whether in the role of peacekeeper or peacemaker, the United Nations can only succeed with the political and financial support of all member states. "Political will" is even more important than adequate machinery in keeping the peace.

1203

Nerry, D. P. SABMIS: A NEW NAVAL STRATEGIC DEFENSE. Data, v. 13, Feb. 1968: 7-8.

P&GP RR

The strategic antiballistic missile intercept system [SABMIS] will come under consideration when ABM systems are debated in the second session of the 90th Congress. SABMIS has certain advantages: it could be deployed close to the Chinese and Russian coasts to protect America's Asian allies as well; it could knock out multiple warheads before they separate; and from a political standpoint its secrecy would prevent partisan debate on its technical merits. The SABMIS concept is also fiscally attractive. It could be installed aboard existing vessels of conventional design, and its vulnerability to enemy submarines could be overcome by an antisubmarine warfare [ASW] system. An extensive antiaircraft system would not be required since the aircraft threat from China is small; this would offset the expense of an ASW system. SABMIS, while no cure-all, offers hope against America's "adversaries and threats of limited nuclear warfare." It may be a step toward total war, but it also may just prevent it.

1204

PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS. UN monthly chronicle, v. 5, Jan. 1968: 41-47.

JX1977.A1U564, v. 5

Consideration by the General Assembly and Special Political Committee of the problems of peacekeeping operations. After lengthy debate the Committee members approved a draft resolution requesting the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations to continue its comprehensive review and report its progress to the Assembly by July 1, 1968. In adopting the resolution the Assembly agreed to the preparation of a study on the facilities, personnel, and services that member states could provide for peacekeeping operations. While the original draft resolution had been amended to incorporate many of the suggestions of Special Political Committee members, it did not include provisions for the establishment of a system of mandatory assessments for peacekeeping operations as advocated by a number of delegates.

1205

REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA. In New Zealand. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs review, v. 17, Nov. 1967: 3-8.

JX1591.A35, v. 17

Describes the regional organizations of Southeast Asia. The emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power, the diminishing strength of India, and the decline of cohesion among the "ex-colonial" group have contributed to the establishment of regional cooperative organizations. The Association of Southeast Asia, the Asian and Pacific Council, and the newest group, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, are the most prominent. It is in New Zealand's interest that South-

east Asia become sufficiently developed and stable to withstand Communist pressures and aggression, and Southeast Asian cooperation has made a promising beginning toward this objective. But its success will depend on the willingness of nations to submerge their differences and work for common goals.

1206

Tilney, John. PRESERVING THE PEACE. World federalist, Aug/Sept. 1967: 6-7.
JX1901.W825, 1967

A directly recruited international police force comprising all races could be a vital step toward preserving peace in the world. This force would be highly trained and mobile and would aid countries fighting internal subversion or external threats. "A U.N. Force should be of sufficient size and have enough money to train itself," should be paid for "on a formula of population in relation to gross national product," may not allow the use of nationals against their own country, and should be under the control of the Secretary General. If Israel would give up the Sinai peninsula as a world territory to the United Nations, this force would not only have a superb training area but would be able to keep Israel and Egypt apart.

D. OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

1207

Beaudry, Yvonne. JEAN MONNET--EUROPE'S HYPHENATOR. Michigan quarterly review, v. 7, Apr. 1968: 75-80. AS30.M48, v. 7

A character study and biographic sketch of Jean Monnet of France, concentrating on his lifelong aim to create a unified European community. Now, 10 years after he fathered the Common Market, Jean Monnet presides over the Action Committee for the United States of Europe. Its members, representing all major political parties and labor unions of France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries, meet regularly to talk over ideas and adopt policies that are then applied by the members in their respective countries. Aware of their common destiny, the six Common Market nations set up common institutions under which they follow a common course. Monnet feels that people hardly change but "the context in which they act" can be changed. Acting together is bound to change relations and attitudes and eventually will produce the same community outlook. To Monnet, unification of Europe is a necessity, not an adventure. European nations have to pool their resources so they can create conditions enabling them to improve their peoples' standard of living and to become partners with America on an equal basis. Such partnership will not only illustrate the indivisibility of the West but will become a foundation for coexistence with the Soviet Union and for a lasting world peace.

1208

DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION. UN monthly chronicle, v. 5, Jan. 1968: 34-41.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 5

Presents the resolution adopted by the General Assembly and highlights from the debate regarding the need to formulate a definition of aggression. Upon the recommendation of the Legal Committee, the Assembly authorized the creation of a 35-member committee to study all aspects of the problem and prepare an extensive report for the 23rd session of the General Assembly. The resolution was proposed by the Soviet Union and supported by many delegates who felt the adoption of criteria defining aggression would be a significant step toward the maintenance of international peace and security. Other representatives branded the Soviet proposal a propaganda move and expressed their conviction that general agreement on a definition could only be achieved through extensive nonpolitical legal deliberations. Several delegates pointed out that without universal respect and acceptance a definition would prove ineffective in suppressing aggression.

1209

Eaton, Joseph W. NATIONAL SERVICE AND FORCED LABOR. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 12, Mar. 1968: 129-134. JX1901.J6, v. 12

The purposeful diversion of military manpower into programs of national service is a new and promising disarmament technique. Military elites are likely to oppose disarmament, since it means a downgrading of their influence, but accept participation in service programs where their leadership is preserved. Since the military is usually the best organized bureaucracy in an emerging country, its participation in nation building is crucial. The success of national service programs in several nations, particularly in Israel, has proved the feasibility and effectiveness of combining developmental and military functions. The greatest difficulty is to prevent such programs from degenerating into forced labor drafts in violation of the International Labor Organization charter. Whether this happens is determined by the organizational and ideological framework within which the program is administered. The distinguishing marks of national service, as opposed to forced labor, are voluntarily recruited and altruistically motivated cadres and concern for the mental and physical welfare of the worker.

1210

Glass, Hiram Bentley. PUGWASH INTEREST IN COMMUNICATIONS. Science, v. 159, Mar. 22, 1968: 1328-1331. Q1.S35, v. 159

Since the first Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs in 1957, Pugwash scientists of East and West have stressed the importance of international scientific cooperation in paving the way for universal disarmament. Since cooperation depends on the free exchange of information, the Conferences have issued many recommendations for improving the worldwide circulation of scientific data. Concerned about the ever-increasing volume of scientific publications, delegates to the 1961 Pugwash Conference proposed methods for consolidating and standardizing published scientific materials and recommended measures for distributing information on scientific innovations to interested parties in all countries. None of the 1961 recommendations were fully implemented, however, and the subject was reviewed even more intensively at the Karlovy Vary Conference of 1964. At that Conference a working group issued a recommendation for the establishment of a World Center of Scientific Information to oversee a worldwide system for the storage, retrieval, and analysis of scientific information. While succeeding Pugwash Conferences have reiterated the urgent need for an international center of scientific information, the national and international agencies with the

authority to carry out the proposal have responded very slowly. Despite the independent attitudes of individual scientists and scientific societies, the Pugwash scientists should not be discouraged but should continue their efforts to stimulate action on an information network.

1211

Jack, Homer A. TOWARDS A WORLD CONFERENCE ON RELIGION AND PEACE. Gandhi marg, v. 12, Jan. 1968: 122-126. DS481.G3G22, v. 12

In the nuclear age it is more important than ever that leaders of the world's religions join together in persuading statesmen and politicians to pursue peaceful goals. Since the end of World War II many religious leaders have individually spoken out for world peace, and at least three small international religous conferences on peace have been convened. However, the world inter-religious conference on peace, proposed by the U.S. National Inter-Religious Conference on Peace, would be the first international meeting to include representatives of all religions. Through such an inclusive conference religious leaders would become acquainted with each other's traditions and sanctions for the pursuit of justice in international relations. They would be able to discover the principles of international peace they held in common and discuss common approaches to specific international problems. Finally, the proposed conference would raise the spirits of all religious men by indicating that their leaders were actively striving for peace, and it would "develop a corps of co-workers across religious and national lines who might by called upon, indeed mobilized, in any international emergency." Although progress toward an international conference on peace and religion may be slow because of problems of finances and traditional suspicions between religious bodies, the obstacles can eventually be overcome and the dream become a reality.

1212

Pictet, Jean. THE RED CROSS AS A FACTOR IN WORLD PEACE. International review of the Red Cross, v. 7, Nov. 1967: 571-578. HV560.I56, v. 7

Outlines a roundtable discussion on the Red Cross contribution to peace held in The Hague on August 28, 1967. By its very mission--directed against violence and toward unification of nations--the Red Cross shares indirectly in the work for peace. The participants of the roundtable debate proposed, however, that beyond its relief work the Red Cross "could and should undertake activities specifically to promote peace." These could include education aimed at creating an international civic spirit, cooperation with organizations concerned with the problem of peace, action against threats to peace, studies on the causes of war, and closer contact between members of the Red Cross.

1213

[THE SEARCH FOR PEACE] In International Institute for Peace. Peace and the sciences, Oct./Dec. 1967: 1-18. JX1901.P25, 1967

Contents.--UNESCO and the search for peace.--Riots: The more there are, the less we understand, by Robert J. Samuelson.--The Pugwash movement, by V. Emeljanov.--50th anniversary of the peace decree, by S. W. Molodtsov.

Articles on UNESCO-sponsored research into the causes of war; problems of domestic violence in the United States; the history and significance of the Pugwash Movement; and the Soviet Peace Decree of November 8, 1917, which according to Molodtsov, defined the historical mission of Socialist society.

1214

Stanley, Manfred. THE TURN TO VIOLENCE: A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF INSURGENCY. International journal of comparative sociology, v. 8, Sept. 1967: 232-244. HM1.I54, v. 8

The task of the sociologist is to place insurgency within a broad typology of social movements and then explain why these movements do, or do not, develop insurgent features. This is done by relating insurgency to problems created by sociocultural change and to sociopsychological attitudes toward these problems. Sociocultural issues around which insurgent movements emerge are generated by problems of legitimacy, adaptability, and social restratification. These issues (evils) are then diagnosed within a sociopsychological structure of meaning that determines the degree of receptivity to violence. This meaning structure has four dimensions: orientation to the evil, locus of the evil, remedial agency, and time. Violence cannot be separated from these underlying social factors. A government which ignores them and attempts to deal with insurgency on the basis of "tactical doctrine" alone will be frustrated.

1215

Thant, U. EDUCATION IN A CHANGING WORLD. Michigan quarterly review, v. 7, Apr. 1968: 81-84. AS30.M48, v. 7

Education holds the key to a good many world problems, since it plays a major role in changing and expanding the economic, social, and intellectual framework of the world. Because of this role, an approach to education should be governed by certain criteria, above all by a vigorous pursuit of truth. Educators and students should question "popular assumptions, trends, and moods," thus strengthening what is good and altering what is bad. Education must respond to the realities of life yet remain free of political pressures. Its role of a "mentor of society should never degenerate into any kind of junior partnership with government." In the crowded, interdependent world of today educational institutions are called upon to "develop quality as they deal with quantity," to provide education to masses without stifling imaginative thought, originality, and intellectual excellence. Yet the most urgent task for education is to transfer "men's thoughts from their conflicts to their common interests," so that, in time, common goals and ideals will prove more powerful than the differences. The very essence of all U.N. endeavor is the steady pursuit of this ideal. People everywhere have much the same aspirations, though living conditions differ greatly--and it is these inequalities that are being exploited in search of power. But they could not be exploited if they "did not strike a responsive chord in the minds of people throughout the world," propelling the human race toward conflict and even mutual annihilation. How to cope with this tendency? The answer lies in the realm of education, in schools that can stimulate the more powerful and more constructive human impulses of brotherhood, compassion, tolerance, and reverence for life.

1216

Timasheff, Nicholas S. WAR AND REVOLUTION. New York, Sheed and Ward [1965] 339 p.
HM281. T47

Contents. --Understanding the recurrence of war and peace. --Perceiving cause in social phenomena. --Political system and process. --Conflict and violence. --The movement from peace to war. --The movement from peace to war: case studies. --The movement from order to revolution. --The movement from order to revolution: case studies. --The movement from war to peace. --The movement from revolution to order. --A theoretical restatement. Comparative evaluation of other theories. --A scientific view of the future. --Preventing war and revolution. --Notes. --Bibliography. --Index.

Presents an analysis of social phenomena which lead from peace to war and propel order into revolution, and vice versa.

1217

Weller, Rachel F. "THE EARTH IS BUT ONE COUNTRY." Friends journal, v. 14, Mar. 1, 1968: 105-106.
BX7601. F66, v. 14

The teachings of Baha'u'llah, founder of the Baha'i World Faith some 100 years ago, carry a message similar to the 1963 Pacem in Terris encyclical of Pope John--that of unification of all peoples on earth, which is "but one country and mankind its citizens." Because this faith belongs to recent history it fits the needs of a world already spanned by transportation and communication lines and brought closer together by various forms of international cooperation, yet threatened by total annihilation in a nuclear war. Baha'i doctrine calls for a world court, an international police force, and a world government, based upon a federated structure. In 1963 the Baha'i world community, which reaches "into 309 countries and dependencies," set up an International House of Justice in Haifa, Israel. Although the International House at present deals only with Baha'i matters, non-Baha'is in several countries have asked the help of local Bahai'is assemblies in solving problems. Bahai'is abstain from political activities yet value the efforts of others who work toward human settlement through existing political forms. Baha'is will engage in any work that conditions national populations to universal concern for all, thus "preparing the spiritual soil and climate" for world unity.

IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1218

Alten, Jürgen von. [MOSCOW AND "EUROPEAN SECURITY"] Moskau und die "Europäische Sicherheit." Moderne Welt, v. 9, no. 1, 1968: 95-96. D839.M58, v. 9

Explains that Moscow's "thinly-veiled" maximal demands in regard to a European peace settlement and its concern for "European security" are becoming recognized even in the Soviet bloc as insincere. Before long Moscow will have to change its peace tactics.

1219

Bahnemann, Jörg. [THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGY IN THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ, MOLTKE AND LIDDELL HART; AN INQUIRY INTO RELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIPS] Der Begriff der Strategie bei Clausewitz, Moltke und Liddell Hart; eine Untersuchung der Beziehungen zwischen politischer und militärischer Führung. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau; Zeitschrift für die europäische Sicherheit, v. 18, Jan. 1968: 33-57. U3.W485, v. 18

Like the beginning of the 19th century the present era, marked by profound upheavals, has brought radical changes in the relationship between the political and military activities of a state. Now as then the changes are not based, however, on entirely new ideas. For the whole period three writers stand out whose concepts have remarkably anticipated or matched the changes: Carl von Clausewitz, Hellmuth von Moltke, and Basil H. Liddell Hart. Clausewitz considers a conflict between political and military interests unnatural, because in his opinion war springs from, and serves, politics. If there is any conflict it stems from lack of insight on the part of the politician or the military. For Clausewitz, strategy--although an instrument of politics--is confined to warfare. Von Moltke accepts with qualification Clausewitz's supremacy of politics over strategy. Owing to the progressing technical sophistication of armed forces, military expertise, he thinks, should monopolize "operational" war conduct once the decision to start the war is made. For Liddell Hart, like Moltke, strategy deals with the problem of military victory; but he does not confine it to this. It is entirely possible that political goals, served by strategy, can be attained through military means, but without armed conflict; e.g., through simple displacement of forces. Such indirect strategy is especially suitable for prevention of a nuclear confrontation. Hart also introduces a concept of higher strategy, which aims at bringing about a better peace than that existing when the given strategy is put into effect. Such strategy involves not only a peace settlement, but the consolidation of a newly achieved peace as well.

1220

Clubb, Oliver Edmund. THE END OF EMPIRE. Progressive, v. 32, May 1968: 31-34. AP2.P8655, v. 32

The American empire in Asia is doomed because it stands on shaky ground. While professing "philosophical anti-imperialism," the United States filled the power vacuum left by Japan's World War II defeat with the Pax Americana. As a self-styled guardian of peace it embarked on a crusade to "save" countries from traveling a road of political change contrary to U.S. will. Nations which agreed to U.S. military alliances and U.S. bases became American protectorates, forming an extensive U.S. empire throughout the world. Yet this empire is undefendable, militarily as well as ideologically. America cannot succeed in fanning Asian enthusiasm for a Great Society in Asia nor is it capable of understanding the force of today's Asian nationalism. Throughout the ages empires flourished or faded depending on internal strength and unity; the war in Vietnam has warped the U.S. national purpose so that there is no national consensus in its support. A dead ideology of unilateral military domination cannot uphold the human and economic burden of such a war. Imperialism has long been displayed by a nationalism that calls for political independence free from the interference of the mighty--"even when they come with professions of sterling intentions." America has no mandate to determine Asia's destiny. The war in Vietnam shows the futility of a military campaign against Asian nationalism and should be brought to an end in the interest of America and all mankind.

1221

Djerdja, Josip. THE MEDITERRANEAN--A ZONE OF PEACE. Review of international affairs, v. 19, Feb. 20, 1968: 9-10. D839.R4, v. 19

Discusses the platform of the proposed Mediterranean conference of progressive movements. The progressive forces in the Mediterranean recognize that the United States is the fundamental cause of the difficulties and tensions in the Mediterranean and has contributed to the aggression upon the independent Arab countries, the antidemocratic coup in Greece, and the machinations around Cyprus. It is the duty of the progressive forces to protect themselves and their homelands against this destructive policy. The action program of the conference will include a proposal to free the Mediterranean from all foreign military forces. This program is part of a general effort to put an end to force and violence in international relations and specifically to free the Afro-Arab nations from the remnants of colonialism and imperialist pressure that obstruct their freedom.

1222

Irving, David J. THE GERMAN ATOMIC BOMB. New York, Simon and Schuster [1967] 329 p.
QC773.AII69

Contents.--Solstice.--A letter to the War Office.--The plutonium alternative.--An error of consequence.--Item sixteen on a long agenda.--Freshman.--Vemork attacked.--An unexpected result.--The cynic in command.--The Alsos Mission strikes.--To the brink of criticality.--The German achievement.--Notes and sources.--Index.

Traces the German atomic research effort between 1938 and 1945. One of the reasons Germany did not develop an atomic bomb was the rivalry and lack of cooperation among its scientists. On the other hand Americans cooperated on a tremendous scale: 500 million pounds were spent on a project that employed up to 125,000 people.

1223

Nef, John U. WAR AND HUMAN PROGRESS; AN ESSAY ON THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION. New York, Russell & Russell [1968, c1950] 464 p.
CB481.N4 1968

Bibliographical references included in "Notes": p. [417]-449.

Examines the historical interrelationships between war and industrial progress from 1494 to 1950. While industrial achievements brought about the extensive use of firearms in war after 1494, Nef states that by the middle of the 17th century wars had exhausted the industrial resources of the Europeans and they turned away from massive violence. During the period from 1640 to 1740 economic progress led to a sense of commonality among Europeans, including the development of a "European conscience," which considerably moderated the nature of war. However, Nef warns that the subsequent triumph of industrialism has destroyed the material and intellectual "restraints upon men and societies, which made war more humane and reduced the amount of fighting among civilized peoples." Since in the nuclear age peace is more vital to the survival of civilization than ever before, Nef encourages man to move away from hatred and division and attempt to build a world community of understanding and a feeling of international brotherhood.

1224

Paulus VI, Pope. POPE'S MESSAGE PROCLAIMING A "DAY OF PEACE." Catholic Virginian, v. 43, Dec. 29, 1967: 6-7.
P&GP RR

The Vatican's English-language translation of the Pope's December 8, 1967, message on the foundations of peace. The Pope warns against confusion of "a false rhetoric of words" with genuine intentions of peace and stresses that "peace is the only true direction of human progress." He states that "nationalistic competition, armaments, revolutionary provocations, racial hatred, [and] the spirit of revenge" cause war.

1225

Phillips, Walter A. THE CONFEDERATION OF EUROPE: A STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN ALLIANCE, 1813-1823, AS AN EXPERIMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF PEACE. New York, H. Fertig, 1966. xviii, 320 p.
D363.P5 1966

Reprint of the 2d ed., 1920.

"Lectures . . . delivered at Oxford during Trinity term of 1913."

Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents.--pt. 1. The conception of the confederation: Earlier projects of peace. The peace project of Alexander I of Russia.--pt. 2. The birth of the confederation: The grand Alliance. The Treaty of Chaumont.--pt. 3. The Congress of Vienna.--pt. 4. The consecration of the confederation: The second Treaty of Paris. The Holy Alliance.--pt. 5. The culmination of the confederation: The Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle.--pt. 6. The break-up of the confederation: Revolution and reaction. The Eastern question. The question of Spain and her colonies. The Congress of Verona. The genesis of the Monroe Doctrine.--pt. 7. The federation of the world: The League of Nations.

Describes the early 19th-century attempt of the major European powers to establish an international organization for the maintenance of peace. Phillips' central concern is to counter the "shallow and uniformed idealism" of modern pacifism by illustrating "from a particular period of history the problems involved in the practical application of the principles of International Law."

1226

Richardson, James L. ARMS CONTROL. In his Germany and the Atlantic alliance; the interaction of strategy and politics. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966. p. 224-242.
UA646.3.R48

Some strategists believe arms control in Europe should be synonymous with disarmament and see in the large military establishment the greatest risk of war. Others understand it as détente-oriented arms restraints, believing that relaxation of international tensions is the single most important factor in preventing war. They therefore argue for arms cuts irrespective of their military significance. To "the disarmer," however, like this author, arms control is military measures that reduce the pressures for unwanted war or the expectation of war--military policy "minimizing the risks inherent in the present arms balance." Analyzing existing and possible measures in terms of their potential for reducing the likelihood and destructiveness of war in Europe one must inadvertently come to the conclusion that neither a nuclear-free zone, a demilitarized zone, nor arms reduction is likely to decrease the danger or destructiveness of war. The real danger of war lies in political miscalculation. Unilateral arms control measures that improve political control over nuclear forces or the strategic balance of power are those most likely to enhance European security.

1227

Rosebury, Theodor. TECHNOLOGY AND THE FAILURE OF DISARMAMENT. Minority of one, v. 10, Mar. 1968: 23-27. illus. AP2.M55985, v. 10

Although the means of conducting war are becoming ever more technological in nature, technology is not now and has never been the cause that must be con-

trolled in order to put an end to war. Scientific efforts directed toward peace since World War II have failed in the United States. The Baruch plan, which demanded a system of elaborate safeguards for atomic disarmament, was submitted to the United Nations in June 1946 and was widely endorsed by U.S. scientists. A basic tenet of the plan was the reservation to the United States for "some years" of certain categories of information relating to research in atomic weapons. British scientist P. M. S. Blackett has analyzed the Baruch plan, concluding that rather than a gift, as pictured, it constituted part of the Anglo-American diplomatic offensive commonly called the cold war. He observed that the plan may have been designed not to be acceptable, since the U.S. effort to find total security with it was unachievable, as is any attempt at complete security. U.S. steps since World War II have not been meant to achieve disarmament, but many scientists were misled into backing the U.S. position by the legend of the cold war and the myth that scientists are only competent in the limited fields of their specialties. Technological control of atomic weapons is possible, but "in the absence of international goodwill technological schemes for disarmament are futile . . . given such goodwill they would be unnecessary."

1228

Ruge, Friedrich. [POLICY AND STRATEGY; STRATEGIC THINKING AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR] Politik und Strategie; strategisches Denken und politisches Handeln. Frankfurt am Main, Bernard & Graefe, 1967. 319 p. D843.R78

Bibliography: p. 315-318.

"Herausgegeben vom Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung."

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Basic concepts. Politics. Power. War and armed power.--pt. 2. Fundamentals of strategy. History and concepts till 1945. Total strategy. Partial strategies. Principles of strategy. Indirect strategy.--pt. 3. Means of strategy. Development of conventional armaments. Nuclear, bacteriological and chemical armaments. Other partial strategy means. Alliances as a means of strategy. Disarmament till 1945.--pt. 4. Strategies from 1945 till Stalin's death. American strategy. Soviet strategy. An attempt at control of nuclear development. NATO and its strategy.--pt. 5. The atom and strategy. The United States. The Soviet Union. Red China. NATO. The Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF). German policy. The Allied Nuclear Force (ANF). The British standpoint. The French Government's views.--pt. 6. Other developments. The strategy of disarmament after 1945. From the brink-of-the-abyss strategy to crisis management. Strategy and game theory.--pt. 7. Strategies and examples. Sun Tsu, Clausewitz, Jomini, Moltke, Lenin, Mao Tse Tung. The Cuba crisis, 1962. Russia, the West and the nuclear weapon. List of armed conflicts after World War II.

Considers human freedom "a most important component of Western strategy." Ruge also points out that disarmament strategy is part of general strategy. Although in today's security policies nuclear weapons cannot simply be dismissed, a universal striving for disarmament must be taken seriously.

1229

Shulman, Marshall D. RECENT SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: SOME PATTERNS IN RETROSPECT. Journal of international affairs, v. 22, no. 1, 1968: 26-47. JX1.C6, v. 22

Analyzes the main trends in Soviet foreign policy between the 22d and 23d party congresses. Shulman argues that the Vietnam War and international political factors brought into relief by that conflict have caused Soviet leaders to reassess post-Stalinist trends in Soviet policy toward traditional power-bloc politics and reliance upon the strategy of peaceful coexistence. While the present international environment offers few opportunities to the Russians to introduce new departures in foreign policy the choices that do remain are decisive: whether to outdo Chinese militancy or champion the cause of peace; aim at shortrun political advantages in the struggle with the United States or seek mutual restraint; exploit revolutionary violence or cooperate in containing conflict; and, most important, whether to continue military competition in the form of an uncontrolled arms race or accept safeguards against the risk of war.

1230

Thomas, Wolfgang. [THE LIMITS OF DÉTENTE] Grenzen der Entspannung. Politische Welt, v. 11, Feb. 1968: 1. D839.P65, v. 11

Contrasts the Soviet-American agreement on the nonproliferation draft treaty to Communist unconciliatory behavior elsewhere, as evidenced by growing East-West tensions in Asia, Walter Ulbricht's plan for a new constitution for the German Democratic Republic, Communist-instigated anti-American student riots in West Germany, and the recent increase of Soviet forces in East Germany.

1231

Toth, Charles W. SAMUEL GOMPERS, WORLD PEACE, AND THE PAN AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR. Caribbean studies, v. 7, Oct. 1967: 59-64. F2161.C29, v. 7

Describes the role of Samuel Gompers and the Pan American Federation of Labor [PAFL] in promoting world peace after World War I. Gompers saw the PAFL would provide the impetus for a world organization for international peace. Although the PAFL was originally established to create autonomous trade unions in South America, Gompers realized that this goal would be impossible without world peace. He advocated the acceptance of the League of Nations by the PAFL. Toth reports that the failure of the PAFL to promote world peace and protect the working people of Latin American was largely due to its lack of genuine representation of South American countries.

1232

Trask, David F. VICTORY WITHOUT PEACE; AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. New York, J. Wiley [c1968] 201 p. E744.T68

Bibliographical references included in "Suggestions for Further Reading": p. 174-189.

Outlines America's development as an international power. Trask divides the history of U.S. involvement in world affairs into various stages and relates each stage to both internal and external influences. He writes "about those aspects of the American story relevant to an understanding of the contemporary world crisis" in the belief that a study of the turbulent past may yield valuable lessons for the peaceful resolution of future world problems.

1233

Weeks, Albert L. THE OTHER SIDE OF COEXISTENCE. Reporter, v. 38, Apr. 4, 1968: 11-14.
D839.R385, v. 38

To understand the Soviet Union's present deep involvement in Vietnam, it is necessary to reexamine its policy under Khrushchev. In 1964 that policy aimed at détente with Germany, moderation on the Vietnam issue, and a shift in domestic spending from military hardware to consumer goods. This policy contributed to a partial thaw in the cold war with the United States, but at the same time it alienated the leadership in East European Communist parties, antagonized powerful interests in the Soviet military and bureaucracy, and gave China a free hand in Vietnam. The thaw ended with the fall of Khrushchev and is not likely to be revived. The new policy is described as an "active offensive" against imperialism. It has led to military spending increases sufficient to placate military and industrial bureaucrats and has enabled the Russians to reassert themselves in Vietnam at the expense of the Chinese. But the policy is failing in its principal purpose, which is to reestablish unity in the Communist world.

1234

Young, Hum Kim. TWENTY YEARS OF CRISES: THE COLD WAR ERA. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall [1968] 297 p. D840.K48
Bibliography: p. 290-297.

Partial contents.--The cold war.--The Truman doctrine.--The Berlin blockade.--The Korean War.--The Suez crisis.--The Laotian crisis.--The U-2 incident.--The Congo crisis.--The Cuban missile crisis.--Communist China's attack on India.--The Cyprus issue.--The United Nations financial crisis.--China's atomic bomb.--The war in Vietnam.

Surveys Russian-American relations through the crises of the cold war. Young concludes that China's atomic bomb will ensure its entry into the United Nations and increase pressures for negotiations on the issues in Southeast Asia.

B. GENERAL ANALYSES

1235

Bluhm, Georg R. GERMANY AND DISARMAMENT. Disarmament, no. 16, Dec. 1967: 16-17. illus.
JX1981.P7D5, 1967

From the very start of disarmament talks the German question has been a source of tension, fanning the arms race and obstructing arms control. While the Western allies have made progress in negotiations with the Soviets conditional on a German settlement, the U.S.S.R. has refused to recognize the link between security problems and the division of Germany. Gradually, however the West has abandoned its stand, and West Germany, learning to live with the split, has embarked on a new approach to détente "without legalizing the present situation and thus rendering it permanent." The West Germans launched their new approach with the March 1966 Peace Note bearing a number of peace proposals on nuclear weapons production, proliferation, and control and on nonaggression pacts and bilateral agreements with Soviet-oriented countries. The policy expressed in this note was spelled out and broadened in 1967 by West German Foreign Minister Brandt in his concept of a European security system and European peace settlement. In contrast to its earlier stand West Germany no longer insists on tying military settlements to the German problem, having considerably changed its attitude to détente. Another important step in the direction of détente in Europe would be a nonproliferation treaty--one that would be acceptable to every country, in no way bar its scientific and technical research or nuclear energy development, and--in the case of Germany--would not prejudice its security. But at a time when the superpowers appear to be headed toward a new stage in the arms race, no state should take part in a treaty still far from conclusion "simply in the hope of an ephemeral political effect."

1236

Brosio, Manlio. NATO AND THE EAST-WEST DETENTE. NATO letter, v. 15, Dec. 1967: 2-9.
D845.2.A44, v. 15

A speech by the Secretary General of NATO at the Palais des Congrès in which he evaluates the role that NATO is playing in the achievement of East-West détente. The view that the alliance is a belligerent military agency must not be tolerated. Although it can be an appropriate forum from which to promote détente, its primary purpose is to prevent war. One of the main reasons for the Harmel study was to find out how NATO could promote a relaxation of East-West tensions and at the same time preserve unity in deterrence and defense. NATO has begun this task by multiplying its various contacts (cultural, tourist, economic, and scientific) with the East but at the same time has maintained a sound defensive position that guards against relying exclusively on Soviet goodwill. (In fact Russia has approached the question of détente in the same inflexible manner for the past 20 years.) A détente is not an end but a means whereby agreements and compromises on arms control and disarmament and the problems in central Europe and the Mediterranean area can be realized. Brosio concludes that the Western allies must achieve political solidarity before there can be a viable détente.

1237

Burns, E. L. M. DISARMAMENT. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 20, Jan. 1968: 25-30. JX351.A3, v. 20
Excerpts from a statement in the U.N. General Assembly by the adviser to the Canadian Government on disarmament.

Comments on reports by the Secretary General on the security and economic implications for states of acquisition of a nuclear capability, the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee, general and complete disarmament, and suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. Burns notes that the problem of on-site inspection, which has proved to be the greatest obstacle to conclusion of a comprehensive test ban or nonproliferation treaty, may be resolved through instrumented verification methods; progress is being made in improving seismological recordings and interpretation of the data obtained. The Canadian position on the negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty is based on the right of sovereign states to conclude defense arrangements involving the establishment of military bases on their territory and noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states.

1238

DISARMAMENT AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 20, Feb. 1968: 114-119.
JX351.A3, v. 20

Outlines discussion by the U.N. General Assembly Political Committee, at the Assembly's 22d session, on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, general and complete disarmament, suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, elimination of foreign military bases, and the report of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Canada's position on these questions is included, along with the September 27, 1968, statement on the Canadian arms control and disarmament policy by the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the U.N. General Assembly.

1239

Emel'ianov, Vasilii S. [THE ATOM AND PEACE] Atom i mir. Izd. 2., perer. i dop. Moskva, Atomizdat, 1967. 373 p. illus. HD9698.A2E4 1967

A historical account of atomic research and development from ancient Greece to today. Emel'ianov deals with the prospects of peaceful uses of the atom and Soviet efforts to promote international cooperation in nuclear research, which cannot be achieved, however, until the menace of the utilization of nuclear explosives for war has been removed. The author explores the possibilities of preventing war by nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union has defined its position on the problem: it clearly and unequivocally recommends general and complete disarmament under an effective international control, whereas the U.S. plan recommends disarmament in three stages, the first two of which would not abolish the danger of nuclear war. A major obstacle to any negotiation is West Germany's attempt to gain access to nuclear weapons. If this happens it will endanger not only the security of Europe but the whole world.

1240

Klein, Jean. [SIGNIFICANCE OF AND PERSPECTIVES ON DISARMAMENT] Signification et perspectives du désarmement. Journal du droit international, v. 94, Oct./Dec. 1967: 819-856.
JX6002.J5, v. 94

A general analysis of disarmament and the related problems of nuclear proliferation, general and complete disarmament, the legality of and the obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons. Klein states that new principles should be invoked to enforce disarmament among nations since it is the only alternative to total war.

1241

Mates, Leo. HAS THE PAST YEAR BROUGHT THE WORLD CLOSER TO THE BRINK OF THE ABYSS? Review of international affairs, v. 19, Jan. 5, 1968: 10-13. D839.R4, v. 19

Reviews the events of 1967 and their effect on the possibilities for peace in the world. Mates points out that an awareness of the ease with which the world could be plunged into a nuclear war was present in the minds of statesmen during the year.

1242

Merritt, Richard L., and Ellen B. Pirro. PRESS ATTITUDES TO ARMS CONTROL IN FOUR COUNTRIES, 1946-1963. New Haven, Yale University, Political Science Research Library, 1966. 1 v. (various pagings)
JX1974.M46

A systematic study of editorial opinions on arms control and disarmament issues in French, British, West German, and U.S. newspapers and magazines. To pinpoint "attitudinal patterns" and to analyze them by country and by issue, the authors prepared a list of 10 postwar events that had "a significant impact on the continuing East-West dialogue on arms control and disarmament." Results of this analysis, along with interviews of notables in the four countries and public opinion polls, could indicate the trend in public attitudes to arms control and disarmament.

1243

Passos, Alaor S. DEVELOPMENTAL TENSION AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: TESTING SOME HYPOTHESES CONCERNING LATIN AMERICA. Journal of peace research, v. 5, no. 1, 1968: 70-86. tables.
AS9.J6, v. 5
Bibliographical references included in "Notes": p. 84-85.

Based on census-type data, this article attempts to relate political instability to some social and economic development variables. Starting with some theoretical premises set forth by the sociology of development, it elaborates and tests a system of hypotheses, whose main lines point to the existence of a vicious circle of political instability in Latin America. Besides political instability, it considers the following variables: percentage of military expenditures; rates of economic growth; social structure; and social indecision. Discussing some lines of policy implication, it arrives at the conclusion that the best way of breaking the vicious circle of political instability would be a resolute policy of development, which should include three elements: 1) opening new opportunities for social mobility; 2) decreasing the expenditure for military purposes; and 3) diversifying the roles of the military, by using them for purposes of development. (Abstract supplied)

1244

Rapacki, Adam. TWO CURRENTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Polish perspectives, v. 11, Jan. 1968: 3-11. DK401.P7947, v. 11
Lecture delivered at the Students' Association in Copenhagen on Nov. 18, 1967.

The world's and Europe's security depends on which of the two trends in international relations prevails--peaceful coexistence or a tendency toward expansionist policies, conducted from a position of strength. The present measure of political relaxation in Europe, coupled with remarkable economic progress, induces forecasts of an oncoming era of security for the Continent and of peaceful coexistence between sovereign European nations of diverse sociopolitical systems. However, Europe's division into opposing military blocs persists. Poland has long postulated a system of collective security for Europe that would replace these groupings and their resultant balance of terror. But for many Western politicians European security rests precisely on the East-West balance of power. Not all of them want the arms race to continue; some would like gradual transformation of the two military alli-

ances into instruments of negotiation and rapprochement. Still, if European security is to be based on such a balance, it must invariably rest on the existing territorial-political status quo in Europe. This the Western powers except France refuse to officially recognize, despite the latent threat to European peace inherent in such failure and in their support for Bonn's claim to sole representation of all Germany. No solution to the German problem is possible without "rapprochement and agreement between the two German states," consent of Germany's neighbors, and all Europe's approval. Recognition of the status quo should also be in the interests of the United States. Unfortunately the American global policy rests on quite unrealistic premises. Another problem is the arms race in Europe. A nuclear nonproliferation treaty would be the first realistic step to alleviate this and it should be followed by other measures; e.g., a freeze on nuclear armaments in central Europe, denuclearization of a substantial part of Europe, and reduction of conventional armaments. All this should be accompanied by a gradual elimination of artificial barriers between the two blocs and a growing economic, technological, and scientific cooperation between all nations.

1245

Shubik, Martin. ON THE STUDY OF DISARMAMENT AND ESCALATION. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 12, Mar. 1968: 83-101.
JX1901.J6, v. 12

For several years it has been expected that game-theoretic models would make an immediate operational contribution to the applied art and the hoped-for science of weapons control. The hope was premature. This paper explores the reasons for the lack of direct application of game theory. Stress is laid on mathematical models and institutions; the question "What is the game?" and the meaning of the concept of solution are discussed. A series of formal problems in game and utility theory are noted and suggestions are made concerning the need for work in theory and in experimental gaming to help to solve these problems. The article concludes with a discussion of the crucial role of the concept of threat.

1246

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. REPORT. 7th; 1967. Washington, 1968. 74 p. (90th Congress. 2d session. House Document no. 256)
JX1974.A1U523, 7th, 1967

Relates the 1967 activities of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency directed at carrying out its mission to "lessen the threat of war and bring the arms race under control." The report also includes texts of important public pronouncements and documents pertaining to arms control issued in 1967. Confronted by such problems as improvements in Chinese nuclear capabilities and accelerated U.S.-Soviet competition for nuclear supremacy, the Agency launched an intensive study of the arms race to determine what type of controls are possible within the requirements of U.S. security. Agency negotiators in Geneva made substantial progress toward the conclusion of a draft nuclear nonproliferation treaty and in February 1967 signed a treaty making Latin America a nuclear-free zone. In addition, the Agency was actively engaged in directing and coordinating research on all aspects of the problem of arms control and disarmament.

1247

Willrich, Mason. ABM AND ARMS CONTROL. International affairs (London) v. 44, Apr. 1968: 228-239.
JX1.I53, v. 44

What are the prospects for curbing the arms race in the light of limited ABM deployment? Although a nuclear nonproliferation draft treaty has been agreed upon by the superpowers, certain nonnuclear countries, particularly India and Japan, may be unwilling to relinquish their nuclear options in the face of a threat from a nuclear power. A joint Soviet-American nuclear guarantee could not ensure acceptance of the treaty and would require a degree of East-West cooperation that is below the horizon of political reality today. Furthermore a U.S. nuclear guarantee could have a profound impact on existing bilateral and multilateral security arrangements and would require nuclear force deployments that "could make the cure worse than the disease." Present ABM production will exert substantial pressures for resumption of the Soviet-American nuclear arms race. Although offensive missile production by both sides has tapered off as a result of the multiple warhead, an effective ABM could persuade both sides that nothing short of a massive saturation attack will deter an enemy, and increases in ABM production would lead to the full exploitation of its technical possibilities. This in turn would erase what little progress has been achieved in nuclear arms control. Both sides might be tempted to violate the test ban treaty in order to resolve the uncertainties of the interception problem. The U.S. ABM has been justified on the grounds that it will deter a Chinese nuclear first strike and ensure that rationality will govern American as well as Chinese strategic policies; without an ABM the United States would be prone to launch a preemptive nuclear first strike. But China's growing nuclear capability could induce America to strengthen its ABM and thus also cause a new round in the Soviet-American arms race.

C. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

1248

COMPARISON OF GCD PEACE-KEEPING PROVISIONS. Disarmament, no. 16, Dec. 1967: 8-10.
JX1981.P7D5, 1967

Compares the November 1962 and the April 1965 U.S. and Soviet draft treaties on general and complete disarmament.

1249

DISARMAMENT. UN monthly chronicle, v. 5, Jan. 1968: 9-18. JX1977.A1U564, v. 5

Lists a series of resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly on December 19, 1967. Assembly representatives stressed the urgency of a nonproliferation treaty; they requested that the 18-Nation Disarmament Commission submit a full report regarding a draft treaty to the Assembly before March 16, 1968, and decided to convene a conference of nonnuclear-weapon countries at Geneva from August 29 to September 28, 1968. While representatives from the Soviet Union and the United States disagreed over specific steps to general and complete disarmament, they supported a resolution which requested the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee to consider the prob-

lem of general disarmament at the earliest possible date. The Assembly praised the Secretary General's report on the effects of nuclear weapons and recommended wide publication of the report. Although no consensus was reached on the form of a comprehensive test ban, the vast majority of Assembly members favored a resolution which urged universal acceptance of the test ban treaty and requested nuclear-weapon states to suspend nuclear weapons tests in all environments. The United States abstained from the final resolution, which called for the 18-Nation Disarmament Commission to consider the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, because its representative interpreted the resolution as a Socialist propaganda move.

1250

Fisher, Adrian S. UNITED STATES PRESENTS VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, Jan. 15, 1968: 97-100.
JX232.A33, v. 58

Statement made in the U.N. Political and Security Committee on Dec. 12, 1967.

Soviet resistance to workable disarmament measures has impeded progress toward general and complete disarmament. In its draft treaty on general disarmament the Soviet Union calls for a drastic reduction of armaments in the initial stage of disarmament--before verification machinery can be established. The Soviet proposal does not explain how the reductions are to take place and appears to require complete agreement on the entire disarmament process before it can even begin. On the other hand, the U.S. outline for general and complete disarmament provides for a systematic reduction of weapons and military forces and the creation of adequate verification machinery for each step. Convinced that immediate steps should be taken along the road toward disarmament even though agreement has not been reached on the total process, the United States has proposed realistic measures for reducing nuclear delivery systems and halting production of nuclear material for weapons purposes. In rejecting these reasonable proposals, the Soviet Union is allowing nuclear arsenals to grow ever larger. The danger of waiting too long before taking steps to limit armaments is pointed out by the U.N. Secretary General in his report on the effects of nuclear weapons. The report recommends the conclusion of a nonproliferation agreement and comprehensive test ban treaty, the reduction of nuclear arsenals, and the establishment of guarantees for nonnuclear countries as initial disarmament measures that might facilitate further steps and lead to total disarmament.

V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

A. NEGOTIATION

1251

Djerdja, Josip. THE NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES AND THEIR COURSE OF ACTION. Review of international affairs, v. 19, Mar. 5, 1968: 1-3.
D839.R4, v. 19

The nonnuclear countries have become dissatisfied with the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee negotiations on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and have called for a conference under United Nations auspices to be held at Geneva in August 1968. The conference will deal primarily with the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons, possibilities for peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, destruction of existing weapons stockpiles, dismantling of bases, and the security of nonnuclear countries. The agenda does not include proposals that would orientate the conference's endeavors toward general and complete disarmament but it has not yet been decided upon, so there is still time for amendments and adjustments. Although it is too early to speculate on the results of this conference, one may reasonably expect it to reexamine the disarmament issue, which has become increasingly important in the light of the renewal of the arms race.

1252

Dowty, Alan. NEGOTIATIONS OR WAR. Midstream, v. 14, Mar. 1968: 35-38.
DS149.A336, v. 14

On the assumption that they are unwilling to accept the present situation, Arab leaders have three alternatives available to them vis-a-vis Israeli occupation of the territories conquered in 1967: to force Israel out by nonmilitary means, to force Israel out by military means, or to secure voluntary Israeli withdrawal through negotiations. Since the first two alternatives are most appealing to Arab thought, one of Israel's tasks is to reduce the unpleasantness of the third alternative without sacrificing its own interests. Attempts to force Israel out by nonmilitary means have failed. Israel's policy of continued occupation despite terrorism and of tenacity regarding withdrawal without the proper quid pro quo has contributed to disinterest in this solution on the part of other countries, but the military solution is still attractive to some Arabs in spite of its apparent irrationality. The Israeli position is that continued occupation is deterrence to war, and the only meaningful quid pro quo for Israel would be guarantees that the territories would not have to be conquered again. The Israelis feel that formality is not essential and that "paper guarantees" are worthless in terms of Israeli security. Acceptable evidence of a changed Arab attitude toward Israel could take the form of a reduction in Arab military expenditures, absorption of Arab refugees, and demilitarization. Furthermore present Israeli policy has abandoned insistence on "direct talks" and accepts the possibility of negotiations through a third party. This reflects Israeli determination to use all possible leverage to make the Arab choice accommodation and not war.

1253

Harnett, Donald L., Larry L. Cummings, and G. David Hughes. THE INFLUENCE OF RISK-TAKING PROPENSITY ON BARGAINING BEHAVIOR. Behavioral science, v. 13, Mar. 1968: 91-101.
BF1.B4, v. 13

This study investigated experimentally the effects of risk-taking propensity on bargaining behavior under varying information conditions. Risk-taking propensity failed to explain subjects' bargaining successes (profits), but it did influence their initial asking level and their willingness to yield from this level. The degree of influence was moderated by the amount of information in the bargaining channel. Results suggested that the less the information the greater the impact of risk-taking propensity on bargaining behavior. (Abstract supplied)

1254

Hoedemaker, Edward D. DISTRUST AND AGGRESSION: AN INTERPERSONAL-INTERNATIONAL ANALOGY. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 12, Mar. 1968: 69-81.
JX1901.J6, v. 12

Insights gained from the psychoanalytic treatment of distrustful, aggressively destructive adults are applied to the dynamics of interpersonal disputes in general, wherein one antagonist is unrealistically suspicious and aggressively destructive toward the other. Possible constructive means for resolving such conflicts by the more realistic, psychologically healthy partner are described. Analogically, the same basic psychological elements are then identified and described in certain international conflicts, using three examples: the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference of 1962-63, the 1953 Panmunjom talks between US Ambassador Arthur Dean and the Chinese Huang Hua, and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In each case, international data are analyzed for application of the analogy and for possible untried alternatives. If the analogy is correct, the pathological distrust and aggression of one nation toward another may well represent nonverbalized need for help in achieving greater internal control over these destructive elements. The second nation may provide this help with mutual benefit. (Abstract supplied)

1255

Lall, Arthur S. HOW COMMUNIST CHINA NEGOTIATES. New York, Columbia University Press, 1968. 291 p.
JX1837.L34
Bibliographical references included in "Notes" (p. [269]-284)

Partial contents.--The nature of the Chinese presence in negotiations.--The background and training of Chinese negotiators.--The general approach and

attitude of Communist China toward international negotiation. --The Peking Government and the convening of the International Conference on Laos, May 1961. --The negotiating confrontation at the opening of the Laos Conference. --Was the Sino-American confrontation at the Laos Conference negotiable? --The first fruits of China's willingness to negotiate. --A setback in negotiation. --The deadlock breaks. --Substantive negotiation is under way. --The question of SEATO. --The withdrawal from Laos of foreign forces and military personnel. --Control "over" or "in" Laos. --The concluding rounds at the Laos negotiation. --Peking's negotiations with the three Asian states.

Analyses negotiations during the International Conference on Laos of 1961-62 in the context of the Chinese Communist theory of international relations. Despite the continuing distrust between them, the United States and Communist China endeavored to find a basis for resolving the problems in Southeast Asia, particularly in Laos. The Laos negotiations were successful, but for the achievement of true justice and peace in Southeast Asia the war in Vietnam must be concluded.

1256

Rich, Norman. PEACE-MAKING AND PEACE-KEEPING IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. Centennial review, v. 12, spring 1968: 127-144.
AS30. M55A18, v. 12

A worldwide Pax Americana, following the earlier Roman and British models, appeals to many Americans but is not in fact a feasible solution to the problem of war. An alternative, a preemptive nuclear strike as a war to end all wars, is unacceptable on moral grounds. Balance of power strategy--the traditional response to threats from a strong power--has always led to war and the problems raised by the peace settlements generally have been as dangerous and intractable as those sparking the original conflict. The only course open to the United States is to learn the art of settling disputes through negotiation. Unfortunately U.S. diplomatic experience ill-equips it for such a policy. A wise diplomacy is able to recognize its own true interests and those of its enemies and to decide when and when not to compromise. The fundamental defect of U.S. diplomacy is precisely its inability to do this. The United States must keep its defenses and striking power in good order, continue to cooperate in the defense of Europe, and maintain strategic control of this hemisphere and the island-continent chain extending from Japan to Australia. But it cannot successfully commit itself beyond this point as present Southeast Asia policy bears witness. Having drawn back within these reasonable defensive limits the United States could concentrate on the never-ending task of negotiating settlements of the conflicts disturbing its relations with other major powers. This is the only realistic road to peace.

1257

Smith, Ralph S. THE MYSTERY OF THE GOLDEN ROOM. In U.S. Dept. of State. News letter, no. 82, Feb. 1968: 14-15. JX1. U542, 1968

Describes the plenary meeting of the disarmament conference in the gilded room of the Geneva Palais des Nations. There may be a livelier interest in the negotiations today, but the general public still does not have a clear picture of endeavors in the field of arms control and disarmament. The latter, by itself, has "a utopian ring for many people." Moreover, it is hard for people to realize that in the nuclear age armed strength no longer spells security and that stepped-up armament "may even reduce security if it causes an adversary to over-react." U.S. nuclear arms control proposals are aimed at arresting the geographic spread of nuclear arms and limiting the arms race within the "nuclear club." The limited test ban treaty and now the nonproliferation treaty indicate that progress, however slow and painful, is being made. Drawn-out negotiations can suddenly, surprisingly produce a breakthrough--and that "is the mystery of the golden room."

1258

Thibaut, John. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRACTUAL NORMS IN BARGAINING: REPLICATION AND VARIATION. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 12, Mar. 1968: 102-112.
JX1901. J6, v. 12

This paper describes four experiments all of which investigated determinants of formal (contractual) agreements in a "mixed-motive" dyadic interaction. The types of agreement studied were those governing (a) the equitable distribution of outcomes between the participants and (b) the maintenance of loyalty to the relationship through forbidding withdrawal from it. Although the procedures of the four experiments differed, the results were in agreement in finding the highest frequency of mutually protective contracts occurring under conditions of high conflict of interest between the parties and highly attractive alternatives to the relationship. These two conditions constitute those in which one party is maximally tempted to be exploitive and the other to be disloyal. Data from other research were discussed in an effort to define the conditions differentially favorable to the emergence of formal and informal agreements. (Abstract supplied)

1259

Wettig, Gerhard. [FUNCTIONS OF THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY IN SOVIET POLICY] Funktionen eines Sperrvertrages in der sowjetischen Politik. Aussenpolitik, v. 19, Jan. 1968: 9-23.
D839. A885, v. 19

Asserts that Soviet tactics in negotiating the nuclear nonproliferation treaty aim at removing the strategically important German Federal Republic from the West European defense system. Wettig stresses that nuclear defense is incomparably less important for the Warsaw Pact Organization than for NATO.

1260

Young, Kenneth T. DIPLOMACY AND POWER IN WASHINGTON-PEKING DEALINGS, 1953-1967. [Chicago] University of Chicago, Center for Policy Study [1967] 47 p. E183. 8. C5Y59

Expanded version of a public lecture given at the University of Chicago, Center for Policy Study, in Jan. 1967.

Reviews U.S. diplomatic contacts with China between 1953 and 1967. During that period most official negotiations between the two nations were conducted through an obscure arrangement known as the Ambassadorial Talks. Although the Ambassadorial Talks have resulted in the mutual acceptance of only one agreement, they have provided an invaluable forum for an exchange of information on policies and proposals. Young describes some of the principal elements of Peking's

negotiating style and suggests new policies for coping with China's hostile attitude. A list of the participants and discussion topics at two international conferences on China sponsored by the University of Chicago Center for Policy Study and brief biographies of fellows of the Center for Policy Study are appended.

B. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

1. Escalation

1261

Conde, David W. VIETNAM--FIRST TESTING, THEN WORLD WAR? Eastern world, v. 22, Jan./Feb. 1968: 7-9. DS501. E45, v. 22

As a prelude to World War II, Hitler tried out his new weapons in support of General Franco in Spain. In testing its modern antiguerrilla capabilities in Vietnam, the United States may be bringing the world to the brink of another disastrous international conflict. Vietnam has become a proving ground for the special warfare techniques that the United States has devised to retain its dominance over the free world. American industrialists have profited enormously from the millions of dollars spent on military research and have created chemicals, armaments, vehicles, and other devices designed to obtain maximum control of the population in an insurgency situation. Washington justifies its eagerness to smash rebellions by claiming that popular resistance to the appalling conditions in the underdeveloped countries is Communist-inspired. If the superhuman weapons developed by the Pentagon are misused or their effects miscalculated, the conflict in Vietnam may escalate into a major confrontation among many powers.

2. Conventional Arms Transfers

1262

ARMS FOR SOUTH AFRICA. Intelligence digest, no. 350, Jan. 1968: 10-11. D410. R47, 1968

The British arms embargo against South Africa is "unmitigated folly--criminal folly." This embargo must be lifted because strategically South Africa must be strongly armed and there is no moral case against South African racial policy. Apartheid or separate development is not immoral and in fact has contributed to the political stability of those countries--the Portuguese territories and Rhodesia--that employ it. Furthermore none of these territories has a Socialist or pro-Communist political party of any consequence. The worldwide propaganda against South Africa and its racial policies is based on an attempt by communism to reduce this strategically vital area of the free world to impotency and chaos. As long as Great Britain continues to trade with Russia and its satellites, the moral argument against apartheid is invalid.

1263

BELGIAN BUY SPURS MIRAGE SALES. Aviation week & space technology, v. 88, Feb. 26, 1968: 16-17. TL501. A8, v. 88

France is successfully competing with the United States for the military export market in Europe and South America. Because the French can offer a higher performance aircraft on more generous credit terms than the United States, they won a $150 million order for their Mirage 5 fighters from Belgium. Prospective aircraft customers, including Denmark, Switzerland, Lebanon, and Iraq, may very well select the Mirage 5 in preference to the American Northrop F-5. A few years ago many Latin American countries were eager to purchase the Northrop model, but the U.S. Government would not permit arms sales which would divert resources needed to raise the living standard of the purchasing country. The U.S. Government has now shifted its position, but the South American countries probably will switch their choice to the Mirage 5. Unless the United States is willing to invest in new fighter aircraft design and improve its credit rates, its military sales abroad will seriously decline.

1264

DANES PICK DRAKEN FIGHTER-BOMBER. Aviation week & space technology, v. 88, Apr. 1, 1968: 16-17. TL501. A8, v. 88

American and French entries lost to Sweden's Saab J35XD Draken in the competition for the sale of new fighter-reconnaissance aircraft to Denmark. Since the Danish Air Force found all three contenders to be operationally acceptable, its decision was based primarily on economic, not technical factors. Plagued by budget restrictions, Danish officials were attracted to Sweden's generous offer of two squadrons for $60 million, compared to $73 million for the American Northrop F-5 and $72 million for the French Dassault Mirage 5. Furthermore, the Swedes offered an offset agreement totaling 55 percent of the sales price and up to $20 million in 20-year loans. Although French offset terms amounted to 60 percent of the sales price, the Danish Government feared that purchase of the Mirage might place the Air Force at the mercy of DeGaulle's "ambiguous arms embargo policies." The U.S. offset figure was comparatively low, only 20 percent, which seems to reflect the Government's unwillingness to support its aerospace industry in the competitive European market. Danish officials expect the first deliveries of the Draken to begin in 1970 and stress that they all will be modified to meet NATO standards.

1265

Kemp, Geoffrey. REGULATING THE ARMS TRADE. Disarmament, no. 16, Dec. 1967: 11-15. illus. JX1981. P7D5, 1967

Analyzes "the long-term costs and benefits of the trade to both the suppliers and recipients," its political and economic implications and effects on regional and international stability. The sinking of the Israeli destroyer Elath by the Egyptian Navy with Soviet missiles illustrates the present pattern in international arms transfer: new conventional weapons turned out by major powers are used by their customers rather than by the producers themselves. Attempts to control conventional arms transfers are not likely to succeed. Yet there is hope that the superpowers may be ready to unilaterally alter some of their military aid programs, giving themselves--and the recipients--a chance "to examine more dispassionately their respective interests in this complicated process."

1266

Melnikov, Igor. BONN WEREWOLVES. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 14, Apr. 1, 1968:

pt. 1, [item] 5, 5. Slav Rm
Translated from Pravda, Mar. 30, 1968.
Slav Rm

Analyzes the economic and political goals of Bonn's penetration into Africa, which were discussed in March at Abidjan by Vice-Chancellor Willy Brandt with the ambassadors to the African countries south of the Sahara. The author emphasizes Bonn's profits from the economic "assistance" to the African countries and credit promises for its support against the German Democratic Republic. But the African peoples know that Bonn's monopolists are arming colonialist Portugal and have made arrangements with racialist South Africa for producing and testing nuclear weapons.

1267

THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE. World student news, v. 21, no. 5/6, 1967: 23-25. LB3602.I6453, v. 21

Traces Bonn-Lisbon relations since 1955 and lists Bonn military aid arrangements with Portugal and investments by Western financial groups in Angola, which are hindering the decolonization of Africa south of the Sahara.

3. Nuclear Proliferation

1268

Beaton, Leonard. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. Science journal, v. 3, Dec. 1967: 35-40.
Q1.S57, v. 3

In 1945 the Manhattan Project ushered into the world the first atomic bomb along with the frightening vision of nuclear weapons in many hands. Today there are five nuclear powers; by 1980 there could be 20. Both U.S. and Soviet attempts have failed to block further nuclear weapons development. Thus these nations, with opposing ideologies, have been driven to serious consideration of a treaty designed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Actually, the first step in this direction was the 1960 Irish resolution. Seven long years later the general lines of the Irish formula were incorporated by the Russians and the Americans into a draft treaty, with one new clause: international nuclear inspection. Yet the mere signing of a nonproliferation treaty "will not solve the problem of proliferation." When more countries can develop nuclear weapons they may attempt to get out of the treaty; and the proposed draft already includes a clause giving a government the right to withdraw when "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." At present, however, not many countries have the physical capacity to develop nuclear weapons, but in time "peaceful" reactors in all parts of the world will turn out the inevitable byproduct, plutonium, which can be used to make the bomb. The proliferation problem is thus one of plutonium, and "nations having plutonium alone may ultimately be able to make weapons in the megaton ranges." It is hoped that the major powers will soon realize that the worldwide spread of plutonium must be arrested. One way would be to replace the planned inspection system by one in which countries importing reactors or fuel would acquire these under a leasing system. Meanwhile the proliferation problem will remain unsolved as long as there are 130-odd sovereign units in the world and the notion of sovereignty has not been "drastically curtailed."

1269

Brown, Neville. NUCLEAR PACT IS LITTLE NEARER. New statesman, v. 75, Jan. 26, 1968: 101.
AP4.N64, v. 75

Whether article 3 of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty is successfully implemented will depend upon whether West European "fears of industrial espionage" via the International Atomic Energy Agency can be reconciled with the Russian "distrust of a regional arrangement" involving the European Atomic Energy Community. The final draft appeared to have too many escape clauses and not enough of a firm commitment on the part of the Great Powers to undertake effective measures that would curtail their production of nuclear weapons. Although it has been written into the treaty, this stipulation is unimpressive in the light of Soviet chauvinism over inspection and Soviet and American chauvinism "in respect of their national strategic programmes."

1270

Chen, Shao-hsien. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION VS. PEIPING'S H-BOMB TEST. West & East, v. 12, Oct. 1967: [1], 1-3.
P&GP RR

Fear of Red China's nuclear weapons capability will seriously impede acceptance of the Soviet-American draft nuclear nonproliferation treaty. In their efforts to ease U.S.-Soviet relations following the Chinese H-bomb tests, representatives of both countries agreed to a draft treaty which would prohibit the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nonnuclear-weapon signatories. However, the superpower agreement avoided the controversial question of international control, which is of vital concern to nonnuclear states. The latter would find it particularly difficult to accept an agreement which did not ensure their security since they know Red China will not sign a nonproliferation treaty. Because of its irresponsible attitudes China is considered a threat to world peace even though exact estimates of its nuclear strength are not available. In a reckless moment, China would feasibly destroy its defenseless neighbors or disseminate nuclear weapons to fanatics in other countries. Since the United States no longer seems willing to unilaterally guarantee the safety of nonnuclear states, they will be very reluctant to bind themselves to a treaty that prevents them from establishing their own nuclear defenses.

1271

DeGraf, William B. CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE PAKISTAN-INDIAN DISPUTE. Army quarterly, v. 95, Jan. 1968: 185-196.
U1.A85, v. 95

China's emergence as a nuclear-weapon power will have a significant impact upon Indian and Pakistani foreign policies. As China's principal rival for power on the Asian subcontinent, India must respond to any major shift in Chinese strategic capability; and because of its fear of India, Pakistan would react to any change in India's military capability. The single most important decision for India is whether to join the nuclear club. India is capable of becoming a nuclear power, and there are great internal pressures to do so because of the Chinese threat and growing reluctance to rely on outside protection. Despite opposition by those who believe the development of nuclear weapons would create serious economic hardships, monopolize scarce

scientific resources, and jeopardize world disarmament goals, there are strong indications that the Indian Government may decide to at least develop a nuclear device. If India becomes a nuclear power, Pakistan could turn to Communist China for protection even if it meant sacrificing Western economic aid. On the other hand, should India refuse to develop nuclear weapons, Pakistan would probably attempt to attain a nonalined status by maintaining its good relations with the West while developing contacts with Communist countries. U.S. interests would best be served if India refrained from developing a nuclear capability. By detonating a nuclear device, India might drive Pakistan into the Chinese camp and destroy a vital element of the U.S. defense design for South Asia. Therefore U.S. policymakers should endeavor to reduce tensions between Pakistan and India and give Pakistan guarantees against Indian use of nuclear pressure.

1272

DISARMAMENT: NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. In Canada. Dept of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 20, Apr. 1968: 170-181.
JX351.A3, v. 20

Includes extracts of the concluding statement by E. L. M. Burns and texts of the draft treaty and the draft Security Council resolution.

Reports on the progress of the 1968 session of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee. The Committee revised article 3 of the draft nonproliferation treaty to include a safeguards system that would allow each nonnuclear state to conclude an inspection agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition the United States, Great Britain, and Russia tabled a draft Security Council resolution that would assure nonnuclear nations of protection against a nuclear threat or aggression. The Canadian delegation welcomes these revisions even though it preferred an equitable safeguards article that would have covered nuclear as well as nonnuclear nations. It also supports the prohibitive provisions of articles 1 and 2 because military and civil nuclear explosive technologies are indistinguishable.

1273

EIGHTEEN-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 20, Feb. 1968: 103-108.
JX351.A3, v. 20

Reviews the 1967 session of the Committee, especially its discussion of the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty and a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The position of Canada's representative on various aspects of these problems is outlined.

1274

Feldmann, Manfred. [THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AND SECURITY] Atomsperrvertrag und Sicherheit. Nation Europa, v. 18, Mar. 1968: 37-40. D1050.N3, v. 18

NATO's future existence and Europe's security depend on whether Western Europe can become a nuclear power. A nuclear proliferation ban would prevent Great Britain and France from ceding their atomic weapons to the West European defense community. Also, the division of labor--with the United States taking care of nuclear and Western Europe of conventional defenses--would make it impossible for the latter to ever become a nuclear power. From the disarmament standpoint a reduction in the number of existing nuclear weapons and in the delivery means is now more urgent than the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which would control only nonnuclear nations.

1275

FOR PEACE [editorial] New times, no. 11, Mar. 20, 1968: 1-2. D839.N483, 1968

Leaders from seven of the eight member countries attended the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization held in Sofia March 6-7. The Warsaw Pact is not a military and political alliance in the usual meaning of the word but an agreement between Socialist countries; this in itself makes it an instrument of peace in today's world. The delegates paid the most attention to the Vietnamese people's struggle for liberation and to the nonproliferation treaty and its significance for peace. The conference reaffirmed the principles of the Bucharest declaration of 1966, which condemned U.S. aggression in Vietnam as a menace to world peace and promised to assist the Vietnamese people morally, politically, and militarily. In addition, the Socialist states declared their willingness to allow volunteers from their countries to go to Vietnam upon the request of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. All participants except Rumania signed a declaration pledging their support to the nonproliferation treaty, which will have provisions for checking, preventing, and abolishing the accumulation of nuclear and other weapons.

1276

Foster, William C. UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND SOVIET UNION PROPOSE SECURITY ASSURANCES RESOLUTION. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, Mar. 25, 1968: 401-403. JX232.A33, v. 58
Statement "made before the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on Mar. 7," 1968.

Discusses a Security Council draft resolution concerning the security assurances to be given to nonnuclear states adhering to the nonproliferation treaty and spells out the kind of assurances that the United States will give.

1277

Gasteyger, Curt. THE EIGHTEEN NATION DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. Disarmament, no. 16, Dec. 1967: 26-30. JX1981.P7D5, 1967

Comments on the amendments to the draft treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by many of the nonnuclear-weapon states. The author summarizes these proposals under five headings: peaceful explosions, reciprocal obligations and disarmament, security guarantees, the control problem, and possibilities of treaty revision. A text of the draft treaty is appended.

1278

Gelbe-Haussen, Eberhard. [A NEW PHASE OF THE NUCLEAR AGE; THE WORLD ACCORDING TO THE WISHES AND IDEAS OF THE BIG NUCLEAR POWERS] Neue Phase im Atomzeitalter; die Welt nach dem

Willen und der Vorstellung der grossen Atommächte. Politische Welt, v. 11, Feb. 1968: 19-22.
D839. P65, v. 11

Awed by the prospect of nuclear proliferation, the United States in its 1946 Baruch plan proposed a transfer of its atomic monopoly to the United Nations with a stipulation that nuclear energy must never be at the disposal of individual governments. The plan was rejected by the Soviet Union, which was then developing its own nuclear weapon. In the following years, each addition to the atomic club diminished the chances for an international nuclear arms ban. The advent of the missile era in 1957 and the resulting balance of terror drew the superpowers together to head off an accidental outbreak of nuclear war and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A number agreements were reached, among them the test ban treaty and the American-Soviet draft nonproliferation treaty. None of the agreements forbids atomic underground explosions by nuclear powers, which are necessary for the development of defensive weapons against a second strike. The proposed nonproliferation treaty would create a basis in international law for perpetuating political inequality between nuclear and nonnuclear states. Theoretically this would give the two superpowers freedom to jointly shape the world as they wished, provided that no lesser atomic power, especially China, succeeds in developing a second-strike capability.

1279

Heurlin, Bertel. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE CURRENT LITERATURE. Cooperation and conflict, v. 2, no. 3/4, 1967: 208-223.
P&GP RR

Most of the literature on nuclear proliferation assumes without question that it is dealing with a "problem," and hence automatically adopts a problem-solving or goal-oriented approach to research that emphasizes prognosis and antiproliferation strategy. Policy motivations underlie attempts to answer even the most basic analytical questions, and supposedly objective analysis becomes little more than governmental doubletalk or special pleading. When the international system is viewed through the distorting medium of policy interests, the actual political situation is falsified, problems suppressed, and intentions attributed to states which they do not have. Beyond this, the whole issue of proliferation has been too narowly defined by attribution of an absolute value to nuclear weapons. In fact the spread of these weapons is not likely to cause an appreciable change in the international system, and proliferation in itself is not a "problem" that must be solved.

1280

INDIA: WHAT'S A NUCLEAR GUARANTEE WORTH? from our India correspondent. Economist, v. 226, Mar. 16, 1968: 31-33.
HG11. E2, v. 226

India is skeptical of the new American-Soviet offer of a nuclear guarantee to nonnuclear nations. Indians believe the proposed resolution by the U.N. Security Council committing it "to act immediately" in the event of nuclear aggression or a threat of it provides no special protection. The Council's action is necessarily subject to veto by any of its permanent members, including France, which has dissociated itself from the proposed nonproliferation treaty. Although a veto cannot bar U.N. members from individual or collective actions against aggression (art. 51 of the U.N. charter), rescue of a threatened nation by a superpower "is feasible only in instances where the two superpowers see eye to eye." India's views of its territorial jurisdiction differ from the superpowers' and thus might cause doubt among the latter about when aggression had really occurred. The nation's present objections, in contrast to its former support of its original idea of a nuclear shield, indicate the growing influence of the pro-bomb lobby. New Delhi does not fear that its refusal to sign the treaty would cause Pakistan to do likewise. It intends to declare anew that it has no plans for nuclear arms production.

1281

Johnson, Lyndon B., Pres. U.S., and Adrian S. Fisher. U.S. AND U.S.S.R. SUBMIT COMPLETE DRAFT TREATY ON NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, Feb. 5, 1968: 164-167.
JX232. A33, v. 58

Statements by the President and the acting head of the U.S. delegation to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee heralding the joint Soviet-U.S. completion of a draft treaty on nuclear nonproliferation. Both men expressed hope that recent revisions will make the treaty more acceptable to the members of the Disarmament Committee, which then can review it rapidly and submit it for consideration to the U.N. General Assembly in the early spring. The text of the draft treaty is appended.

1282

Kaliadin, A. [LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY] Ogranichenie iadernykh vooruzhenii i mezhdunarodnaia bezopasnost'. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 4, 1968: 14-23. HC10. M5357, 1968

Cessation of the nuclear arms race is one of the issues that have to be solved to save mankind from a thermonuclear disaster, and a step toward solution is to restrict the number of nuclear states. In addition to the five nuclear countries, over 30 nations have nuclear reactors, and by 1980 the world nuclear powerplants will manufacture enough plutonium for 1,000 bombs yearly. The production of and international trade in fissionable materials is growing; it causes tension in some areas and is a threat to world security--to the satisfaction of the West German revanchists who are attempting to attain nuclear power and call for revision of the postwar European borders. Although its nuclear power would enable it to destroy any imperialist aggressor, the Soviet Union has been constantly working in the international forum to prevent a nuclear war. The highlights of these efforts are the Moscow test ban treaty of 1963 and the identical and complete U.S. and U.S.S.R. nuclear nonproliferation draft treaties of 1968. Despite objections from certain nonnuclear nations to the signing of the treaty, the draft contains good points, such as the obligatory provision to make accessible to the nonnuclear members the newest nuclear technological achievements for peaceful uses and the commitment to negotiate termination of the nuclear arms race and to conclude an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

1283

Kelley, James B. NUCLEAR SCIENCE IN THE ORIENT. America, v. 118, Mar. 30, 1968: 409-411.
BX801.A5, v. 118

Tremendous scientific achievements in the non-Western world disprove the myth that intellectual accomplishment is restricted to a society based on democratic principles and free enterprise. Although following World War II American "authorities" portrayed Russia and China as slow-moving, backward countries, both nations have subsequently exploded hydrogen bombs. A new form of government did not submerge the strong traditions of scholarship in these two countries. Many Chinese scholars came to the United States before World War II to study at university research centers. While a number of them remained in this country after the war, about 1,500 American-trained scientists returned to China between 1949 and 1963. During this same period Chinese universities trained almost 680,000 scientists and engineers, some of whom have pursued graduate studies in the Soviet Union, Japan, or Eastern Europe. Thus the Chinese Government has a highly qualified scientific corps at its disposal. Experts predict that the East will produce the next two nuclear-weapon powers--Japan and India. Although both countries have a strong technological base upon which to build a nuclear weapons program, their leaders are hesitant to divert the necessary funds from other programs. Economic problems, not technological shortcomings, are temporarily keeping them out of the nuclear weapons club.

1284

Nikolaev, N. NON-PROLIFERATION AND PEACE. New times, no. 8, Feb. 28, 1968: 19-20.
D839.N483, 1968

The complete draft of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty was submitted on January 18 to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva. A major achievement for the peace forces, the draft treaty's provisions close all loopholes for nuclear proliferation, yet they would allow both nuclear and nonnuclear countries to develop and use atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Control by the International Atomic Energy Agency would ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted from peaceful to military uses, and the signatories would be obligated to carry on negotiations to end the nuclear arms race. Bonn's revanchists have condemned the draft because it would prevent West Germany's access to nuclear weapons. To delay the signing of the treaty, they are trying to organize the nonnuclear nations against some of the treaty's provisions. West German diplomats argue that the treaty would encroach on the sovereignty of the nonnuclear states; others feel it would interfere with the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. The treaty must be settled promptly as a step toward removing the danger of atomic war that threatens humanity.

1285

[THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY PROJECT] Le projet de traité sur la non-prolifération atomique. Courrier de la république, v. 7, Jan./Feb. 1968: [1]-[4]. P&GP RR

Discusses the risks involved in nuclear proliferation and France's policy toward the nonproliferation treaty. The author deals with the problems facing the negotiators at Geneva, mainly inspection and "industrial espionage." He concludes that France's nuclear policy is the most irrational there is. The French do not regard the nonproliferation treaty as a disarmament measure and feel they have no obligation toward disarmament, which should be left exclusively to the superpowers.

1286

NUCLEAR ARMS: THAT LOOMING TREATY. Economist, v. 226, Mar. 9, 1968: 35-36.
HG11.E2, v. 226

Summarizes new reservations of the nonnuclear nations, especially West Germany, Brazil, and India, about the newly amended draft nonproliferation treaty presented jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union. Proponents of an early conclusion of the treaty argue that a breakthrough in the centrifuge process of enriching uranium achieved recently in Amsterdam "might make the development of a nuclear arsenal much cheaper."

1287

[THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: A TRY FOR A WORLD CARTEL] Atom-Sperrvertrag: Versuch eines Weltherrschaftskartells [by] P.S. Neue Politik, v. 13, Jan. 27, 1968: 5-6.
H5.N377, v. 13

For years this publication has outspokenly opposed any idea of nuclear armaments for the German Federal Republic. Clearly it is not for the sake of West German atomic armaments that it now objects to the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The draft treaty represents "the United States' and the Soviet Union's first attempt to jointly erect their world dominion" over all other nations. If its purpose were really prevention of nuclear war the treaty would certainly commit the superpowers to destroy, under adequate international control, their nuclear arsenals and to subject their atomic industries to effective international inspection. By their refusal to do this when they plus Great Britain had a world nuclear monopoly these powers have virtually invited nuclear proliferation. "They are thus to blame for the French and Red Chinese production of nuclear weapons." The only way for them to stop proliferation now would be for the Americans and Russians to pledge to completely disarm themselves nuclearly under international control in exchange for French and Red Chinese total nuclear disarmament under similar control. To prove it has no ulterior motives in its opposition to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty the German Federal Republic should accept the Rapacki plan for a nuclear-free zone comprising the two Germanies, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Austria, and possibly the Scandinavian states.

1288

Plesset, Milton S. NUCLEAR POWER AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. Engineering and science, v. 31, Jan. 1968: 15-19. T171.C217, v. 31

The potential misuse of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to the world, yet the same nuclear power holds a promise of far-reaching benefits through its peaceful uses. In recent years the nuclear electric power industry has surged in a spectacular way. U.S. plants use enriched uranium produced in facilities which originally served only for weapons-grade uranium. Thus

far the United States is the sole supply source for enriched fuel. In the foreseeable future, however, the U.S. enriching capacity will no longer meet demand, and then the pressure for independent facilities abroad will rise. This pressure is only a part of the nuclear proliferation problem; great concern is focused on the manufacture and use of plutonium. It is particularly suitable for nuclear bombs, one of which requires less than 10 kilograms. By 1980 the world plutonium supply will exceed 100,000 kilograms. In terms of nuclear bombs this is a frightening figure. With the economic benefits of peaceful uses of atomic energy on one hand and the nuclear weapons threat on the other, negotiation of a treaty acceptable to most nations should be easy. But the treaty under consideration is acceptable to only the nuclear powers. The nonnuclear nations are reluctant to sign it, since they would thus be renouncing any attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. However, there are ways to improve the response to the treaty. First, the United States should stop insisting on inspection of fissionable materials by the International Atomic Energy Agency only. Furthermore, programs for development of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be scrapped as such explosions differ from military ones only in intent. The loophole the programs provide is too big and the exonomic advantage too small to justify it. Finally, the test ban treaty should be extended to underground tests; this would supply the final impetus for nonnuclear powers to support and accept the treaty.

1289

Pretsch, J. [THE IAEA AND THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY; ENSURING THE NUCLEAR PEACE, A CENTRAL THEME OF THE 11TH GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE IAEA] Die IAEA und der Atomwaffensperrvertrag; die Sicherung des nuklearen Friedens--das zentrale Thema der 11. IAEO-Generalkonferenz. Atomwirtschaft--Atomtechnik, v. 13, Jan. 1968: 37-39.
TK9001.A97, v. 13

Discussion of a non-proliferation treaty and the security controls for nuclear fuels, reactors and reprocessing plants occupied much more time compared with 1966 at the 11th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was held from 26/9 to 2/10/67 in Vienna. This time the discussion predominantly concerned the conditions for participation of the member countries in the treaty and the role if the IAEA in the technical implementation of its control regulations. The present IAEA control system was developed for monitoring its own relief consignments. The control extends today to 65 reactors in 29 countries, 18 of them development countries, but this covers less than 8% of the present reactor capacity used for peaceful purposes. In addition, because of the curtailment of its budget, the IAEA will have to simplify its control procedures if it is to take over more comprehensive tasks. The difference between the atomic powers who possess nuclear weapons and the "Nonnucs" (non-nuclear weapon states) showed up clearly in the debates at the General Conference. Objections to the present wording of the nonproliferation treaty were mainly raised by industrial nations without nuclear weapons. The delegation from the German Federal Republic made special proposals on important and difficult problems. They stated that, above all, the principle of reciprocity should apply, namely that no country should take part in security controls and inspection which did not itself accept an international control for its own peaceful nuclear activity. An agreement should be concluded between the IAEA and Euratom concerning the combination of the present controls and the incorporation of the Euratom controls into the IAEA system. A further German proposal concerned the simplification of the technical implementation of the controls and particularly their later adjustment to take account of technical progress. (Abstract supplied)

1290

Quester, George H. IS THE TREATY ENOUGH? Survival, v. 10, Mar. 1968: 84-86.
U162.S9, v. 10

Reprinted from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov. 1967. TK9145.A84, 1967

Even if it is ratified by all potential nuclear states, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as it now stands may prove ineffective in a few years. While the treaty would reduce the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and could amount to a no-first-use declaration and a comprehensive test ban among near-nuclear powers, it gives no assurance that nuclear weapons would not be developed from byproducts of civil nuclear projects. A nuclear powerplant can be run most economically by refining the plutonium it produces into reactor fuel, and since the enriched plutonium is also weapons-grade material, this will unavoidably involve the creation of nuclear weapons capabilities. Although the assembly of bomb detonation mechanisms could be interpreted as a violation of the current draft treaty, research in bomb assembly would be difficult to control and yet could significantly shorten the lead time a nation needed to produce a nuclear arsenal. By a broad interpretation of their mandate under the present treaty, the inspectors might be able to enforce a longer time lag on bomb assembly. However, prospects for their success are dim since most nations would be unwilling to give up promising forms of peaceful nuclear development for less economical methods. A more effective agreement is needed that would impose tighter controls on the handling of weapons grade material from the outset. Provisions should be included in the new agreement to compensate the near-nuclear countries for the economic opportunities they would have to relinquish. While ratification of a tougher treaty will be difficult, it would provide far more assurance than the milder version that a minimum time lag of 6 months can be maintained on bomb assembly.

1291

Ranganathan, A. [INDIA AND THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY] Indien und der Atmosperrvertrag. Moderne Welt, v. 9, no. 1, 1968: 94-95.
D839.M58, v. 9

Quotes Indian arguments against the proposed nonproliferation treaty. It would seriously impair India's security vis-a-vis Red China and hamper its technological development.

1292

Schreiber, W. [THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY, BONN AND EURATOM] Sperrvertrag, Bonn und die Euratom. Militärwesen, v. 11, June-Aug. 1967: 806-812, 1084-1093.
U3.M47, v. 11

The author's point of departure is Bonn's propaganda campaign against control measures provided by the

draft nuclear nonproliferation treaty; he then outlines the tasks of Euratom and goals of West German imperialism in this state-monopolistic edifice. Next he describes Euratom's role in procurement and distribution of fissionable materials, and questions [Euratom] control rules from the standpoint of the military use of fissionable materials. Promotion of nuclear research by Euratom; the ends served by fast-breeder programs, pushed by the West German side; the preference given to research in the field of thermonuclear reactions; Euratom's role in the exchange of research findings; and the final results of all this [are also discussed.] (Translation of supplied abstract, modified)

1293

Sharp, Mitchell. NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. Canadian weekly bulletin, v. 23, May 8, 1968: 1-2.
P&GP RR

Address before the United Nations General Assembly, Apr. 30, 1968.

The draft nonproliferation treaty seeks to reduce the sense of insecurity in the international community, which accelerates the arms race, and hopes to minimize existing stocks of nuclear weapons. Nonnuclear states that forgo the right to acquire nuclear weapons should be guaranteed protection against nuclear attack. Great Britain, the United States, and Russia plan to introduce a resolution to the Security Council to protect nonnuclear states either unilaterally or through the U.N. Although the arms race continues, it would be as unreasonable for the nonnuclear nations to blackmail these powers into a cutoff agreement as it would be for them to promise, in the light of France's and China's growing nuclear arsenals, an immediate cutoff date. Likewise an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear and nonnuclear nations will depend on the present international political situation. On the other hand peaceful uses of nuclear energy by the nonnuclear powers are not prohibited by the treaty; the only prohibition is against nationally conducted nuclear explosions for engineering and civil purposes.

1294

Smith, Bruce L. R. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND EAST-WEST DETENTE. Journal of international affairs, v. 22, no. 1, 1968: 89-106.
JX1. C6, v. 22

Three major trends in contemporary international politics are critical to the problem of nonproliferation: the emerging détente between East and West, the continuing technological revolution in civilian uses of nuclear energy, and the growing disarray within the superpowers' European alliances. Détente has led to a number of formal or tacit arms control agreements. This reflects the central concern in the impulse to détente: the desire of both sides to confine conflict within manageable limits. On the other hand détente has not reduced the political rivalry of the superpowers. NATO, by stabilizing Europe and thus eliminating it as a political temptation to the Soviet Union, makes a crucial contribution to a relaxed atmosphere. For this reason the United States must give priority to a viable NATO or its equivalent even if that means putting the interests of its European allies before its own interest in the nonproliferation treaty. The chief European nonsecurity interest threatened by the treaty is that of civilian applications of nuclear power. The locus of international inspection authority is the central point of contention. International Atomic Energy Agency inspection would be discriminatory and liable to cripple progress in peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Thus no treaty requiring this inspection will be acceptable to Euratom states or Japan. The United States should work for a treaty acceptable to all major industrial states and do so in such a way as to contribute to a revitalization of the Atlantic alliance. This probably will require that the United States eliminate the discriminatory character of the inspection provisions of the treaty and guarantee a supply of low-cost fuels to European consumers. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons will prove to be a problem as refractory as that of general and complete disarmament. What a treaty will do is "to satisfy the reasonable aspirations of the industrialized nations of Western Europe for a civilian nuclear economy, while providing some useful guarantee against the anarchic spread of fissile material."

1295

Sondhi, M. L. NOTES AND MEMORANDA: SEMINAR ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY. International studies, v. 9. Oct. 1967: 151-161.
JX18. I55, v. 9

Reports on the Seminar on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy held by the New Delhi Indian School of International Studies. The three main topics of discussion were the world nuclear situation, the Asian military balance of power, and India's nuclear policy. The U.S. nuclear program has been developing at a fast pace, and the Americans are convinced of their superiority over the Soviet Union. However, such overoptimism is dangerous in the absence of reliable figures dealing with Soviet nuclear capabilities. The Chinese and French nuclear programs will eventually affect the nuclear balance of power, and some nonnuclear nations with a nuclear potential will follow the example of France and China by developing their own nuclear weapons. The seminar noted that a unilateral nuclear guarantee is not credible and that a joint nuclear guarantee could lead to the establishment of a condominium of the superpowers dominating the rest of the world. It added that general and complete disarmament was not feasible in present international politics. Although the overall balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union has not been greatly affected by the emergence of China as a nuclear power it has disrupted the regional (Asian) balance of power. The seminar recognized that in the growing struggle between Russia and China on the Asian mainland the Soviet Union was interested in keeping the Asian countries out of the Chinese, as well as the American, bloc. On the other hand India would have to depend on itself to counter any Chinese expansion. India would also have to reject any nuclear nonproliferation treaty that did not include an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilites of the nuclear and nonnuclear powers--vertical as well as horizontal escalation must be terminated.

1296

[SWITZERLAND AND THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY] Die Schweiz und der Atomsperrvertrag. Die Weltwoche, v. 35, Nov. 3, 1967: 11; Nov. 10: 9-10; Nov. 24: 9; Dec. 1: 9-10; Dec. 22: 11. illus.
AP32. W4, v. 35

Contents.--Strategic aspects, by Curt Gasteyger.--Neutrality and legal aspects, by R. L. Bindschedler.--The nuclear nonproliferation treaty and politics, by Leo

Schürmann.--Nonproliferation and inspection, by Urs Schwarz.--Nonproliferation from the military point of view, by Ernst Uhlmann.

Discussion of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty [NPT] from the Swiss standpoint. These scholars support the aide memoire issued by the Swiss Federal Council on November 17, which basically favors the NPT, but with some reservations; recently the caution expressed by the council has come to a focus internationally. It has been stated that the renunciation of nuclear weapons will deprive the country of its protection against a nuclear attack.

1297

TIME, PROLIFERATORS, PLEASE! Economist, v. 225, Dec. 30, 1967: 1275-1276.
HG11. E2, v. 225

Reviews arguments for and against the recently presented draft nuclear nonproliferation treaty. West Germans are "now widely suspected" of objecting to the treaty because they are determined to keep open a going-nuclear option.

1298

WILL THEY BAN THE BOMB? [editorial] Nature (London) v. 218, May 4, 1968: 408-409.
Q1. N2, v. 218

Since the issue of commercial secrecy is merely a red herring, concessions to the nonnuclear powers on this point will not mollify opposition to the nonproliferation treaty. The true cause of resistance to the treaty is the way in which it makes permanent the present disparity between nuclear and nonnuclear powers. The nuclear-weapon states cannot reasonably be expected to meet this objection by divesting themselves of nuclear weapons. Guarantees against nuclear aggression might help but nonnuclear powers know that verbal declarations are not irrevocable. It seems, however, that concrete security fears are of less moment here than supposed affronts to status and sovereignty. If the nuclear powers would agree to make public figures on consumption of fissile materials for weapons manufacture and submit to the same safeguards procedures as those imposed on the nonnuclear powers, resistance might be reduced. It is an open question now whether the General Assembly will approve the treaty or send it back to Geneva where it might not survive. The nonnuclear powers are aware that once the treaty is approved the pressure to adhere will be almost irresistible, and so most would like to postpone debate. The problem is too urgent to be delayed, but if it is the nuclear powers have only themselves to blame.

4. Other (Accidental War, Command and Control of Weapons, etc.)

1299

Nutting, Anthony. BOMBS AND BOYCOTTS. Listener, v. 79, Jan. 18, 1968: 82-84.
AP4. L4165, v. 79

Considers the increase in Soviet influence in the Middle East partially a result of the West's false policies. Nutting also questions the rationality of the British ban on arms sales to South Africa. The ban is incompatible with existing British-South African cooperation on the naval defense of the southern Atlantic.

1300

Strasser, Joel A. NEW DETAILS ON SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Apr. 22, 1968: 16-21. UG630. M54, v. 21

Reports on the new Soviet Orbita-Molniia communications satellite network and its 24 stations, 22 with receive capability only and antenna diameters of 12 meters and two--near Moscow and at Vladivostok--equipped for transmitting as well as receiving. Both these key stations have two 15-meter disc parabolic antennas and in their transmitting systems a new device the Russians call a "tracking oscillator." Description of the Molniia satellite equipment and that of the Meteor weather satellites is followed by an outline of Soviet development plans for high- and low-orbit meteorological spacecraft.

C. REGIONAL

1. Tension Areas

1301

Binder, Leonard. THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES. [Chicago] University of Chicago, Center for Policy Study [1967] 27 p.
DS63. B52

Expanded version of the author's presentation during a special seminar on the Middle East crisis held June 1, 1967, by the University of Chicago, Center for Policy Study.

Discusses the problems of the Middle East in the context of U.S. and Soviet interests in that area, intra-Arab relations, and Arab-Israeli hostility. Although East-West accommodation is slowly emerging in the Middle East, bipolar competition between the Soviet Union and the United States has not totally disappeared. Thus Soviet-American intervention in future Middle East conflicts is still highly probable "even though the consequences of surrendering certain limited interests are unclear." An outbreak of further hostilities will depend a good deal upon the course of Arab nationalism under Nasser's leadership and the resolution of Arab-Israeli tensions. Binder believes that the U.S. role in this highly volatile area "is to continue the moral quest for the just solution" to its problems.

1302

Birnbaum, Karl E. [THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY] Das westliche Bündnis und die europäische Sicherheit. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Apr. 10, 1968: 225-234. D839. E86, v. 23

Distinguishes between direct and indirect paths to European security, the first emphasizing control and management of conflicts, the second political evolution conducive to gradual liquidation of military alliances in Europe. Birnbaum analyzes variants of these concepts in terms of Western interests.

1303

Burke, J. Herbert. NEW MIDDLE EAST THREAT. Data, v. 13, Jan. 1968: 6-7.
P&GP RR

The Soviet Union is moving to control the Mediterranean area and destroy the vital southern flank of

NATO's defenses. Especially alarming is the basing in Egypt of a squadron of Russia's Tupelov 16 bombers, complete with Russian pilots and crews. The Russians also are shipping missiles to the Port of Oran in Algeria for a new rocket complex. The danger of world war III appears more imminent in the Middle East than in Southeast Asia. Contrary to what the U.S. administration may believe, the Russians are as hostile as the Chinese and the North Vietnamese and must be stopped; the Soviet Union has not changed its primary goal--to bury capitalism and rule the world.

1304

Darling, Frank C. THAILAND: STABILITY AND ESCALATION. Asian survey, v. 8, Feb. 1968: 120-126.
DSl.A492, v. 8

Thailand is experiencing relative political stability owing to a high level of unity and agreement within the ruling regime, economic progress, and American aid. But several factors have begun to threaten this political stability. Corruption in the Government remains, and government officials have failed to promulgate a new constitution, which is long overdue. The greatest threat to stability is the increasing violence of the Communist subversive organization, the Thailand United Patriotic Front, which is being supplied by China, but the subversive element is small compared to that in Vietnam. However, the Vietnam War is the key to the future internal security of Thailand and the rest of Southeast Asia, and American-Thai relations have become intensified as a result. The United States has increased its assistance in the struggle against the Thai Communists and has expanded its air bases to six. Thailand is also committing more combat troops to Vietnam. Despite the growing intensity of the political and military situation in Southeast Asia, Thailand continues its effort to strengthen relations with other Asian countries, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Japan.

1305

Dichgans, Hans. [EUROPE FROM SPAIN TO POLAND] Europa von Spanien bis Polen. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Apr. 10, 1968: 235-240.
D839.E86, v. 23

Considers De Gaulle's vision of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals politically useless; a realistic limit for Europe would be the Soviet western boundary. Polish-German accommodation is essential for European, and German, reunification.

1306

[DOCUMENTS ON THE GERMAN QUESTION] Dokumente zur deutschen Frage. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Mar. 10, 1968: D107-D126. D839.E86, v. 23

Includes excerpts from the December 1, 1967, declaration on the status of West Berlin by Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the German Democratic Republic's State Council; the Soviet Government's December 8, 1967, message to the German Federal Republic on the situation in the Federal Republic, especially the advanced stage of West German armament, in contravention to the Potsdam Agreement; the text of Bonn's answer to this message; and excerpts from Walter Ulbricht's January 31, 1968, speech on a draft constitution for the German Democratic Republic, the problem of European security, and the division of Germany.

1307

Epstein, Klaus. THE GERMAN PROBLEM 1945-1950. World politics, v. 20, Jan. 1968: 279-300.
D839.W57, v. 20

Review of Hans P. Schwarz' Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik: Deutschland im Widerstreit der aussenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschaft 1945-1949 [From the Reich to a Federal Republic: Germany as an object of conflicting foreign policy concepts in the years of occupation rule, 1945-49] [Neuwied u. Berlin] Luchterhand [1966] 884 p. (Politica, Bd. 38) DD259.4.S348

With frequent references to other sources Epstein discusses the policies of both the occupation powers and German leaders that clinched Germany's partition.

1308

Ermakov, V. NEONAZISM AND ITALIAN BORDERS. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 14, Jan. 23, 1968: pt. 2, [item] 1, 1-3.
Slav Rm
Translated from Pravda, Jan. 23, 1968.
Slav Rm

Although West Germany and Italy are NATO allies, Bonn revanchists are putting out anti-Italian propoganda. The neo-Nazi German National Democratic Party is active in underground operations against Italy and other states that border Germany in its attempt to restore Germany to its 1937 territorial limits. Trials of Bonn intelligence service agents held in Italy and East Germany reveal that the service is engaging in subversive operations in these and other countries adjacent to Germany. The planning for these operations is done in Munich and is financed by Bonn's leading industrialists and politicians. These subversive operations not only threaten the peace of Europe but necessitate a statement by Italy that would assert the inviolability of Europe's postwar boundaries.

1309

EUROPEAN SECURITY. Czechoslovak life, Feb. 1968: C.
DB191.C7, 1968

Despite their sociopolitical differences European nations are now increasingly aware of their common interest in finding more solid defense for Europe than security maintained "at bayonet's point" and fraught with risk of thermonuclear war. Lately there have been discernible in their policies tendencies toward East-West détente, which could pave the way for establishment of a viable security system in Europe. Such a system might be built gradually, starting with contractual renunciation of use of force and ending with negotiated dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization. American aggression in Vietnam and West German rejection of the territorial status quo in Europe considerably hamper the process of East-West accommodation. "Czechoslovakia in principle favours the idea . . . of calling an all-European conference on European security."

1310

FUTURE ROLE OF SOVIET NAVY. Survival, v. 10, Mar. 1968: 79-80. U162.S9, v. 10
"Condensation of three articles written on 27, 28, and 30 December 1967 by a special correspondent to' Krasnaia zvezda. Slav Rm

Praises Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean. Constantly harrassed by American spy vessels, the Soviet commanders have maintained their composure and steadfastly pursued their duties "in defence of the state interests of the U.S.S.R." During the Middle East crisis, the American 6th Fleet was prepared to act in behalf of the Israelis against the Arabs. However, the situation has now changed and the Russians are ever watchful of America's sinister activities in the Mediterranean.

1311

Geoffroy, Jean. [THE KOREAN TRAP] Le piège coréen. Nouvel observateur, no. 168, Jan. 31, 1968: 16. illus.
AP20.O2, 1968

It is unlikely that world war III will erupt as a result of the seizure of the Pueblo by the North Koreans. Part of the optimism in Washington stems from the relative silence in China over the incident. Instead China is waiting for a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over Korea, but the superpowers are staying away from this "trap."

1312

Hunter, Robert E. [THE FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEAR EAST CONFLICT] Das Versagen der internationalen Krisenbeherrschung im Nahost-Konflikt. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Apr. 10, 1968: 241-250.
D839.E86, v. 23

Contends that the United States and the Soviet Union did not live up to their responsibilities as Great Powers to prevent the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict. They do not appear ready yet to offer viable security guarantees to threatened nations in the area, but without guarantees the nuclear nonproliferation treaty will not be able to prevent some of the countries from going nuclear.

1313

Irvine, Keith. SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE WHITE FORTRESS. Current history, v. 54, Feb. 1968: 72-77, 111-112. D410.C82, v. 54

The wave of independence rolling over Africa has stopped at the Zambezi. Below that river the remnants of colonialism--the South African, Portuguese, and Rhodesian governments--have united for a last-ditch stand against the resolute pace of time across the black continent. In this "phantom coalition," South Africa is playing the role of military mainstay. Its budget estimates for defense expenditures rose from $61 million for 1960-61 to $358 million for 1967-68. Its Air Force is expanding; its Navy of 35 ships is soon to be boosted by submarines. According to a March 1967 report the country has "acquired the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons." And recent press releases indicate that West German scientists are assisting South Africa in the construction of nuclear reactors as well as "development of Harp missiles at the rocket station in Tsumeb, South West Africa." Economically, the white fortress in the African South is booming. Foreign investments are increasing--the U.N. appeal to nations to discourage economic relations with South Africa has not been heeded. And the recent discovery of offshore oil near Portuguese Cabinda will soon spoil any oil embargo against any of the coalition members. The United Nations--already committed to ending the Rhodesian rebellion and to setting up an independent South-West African state "free from apartheid" will remain utterly ineffective against the white fortress' mischief as long as the major powers delay in placing the problem of the African South "high on their agenda." Until then it will remain a powder keg ready to explode into a major conflict of "gravest world-wide consequences."

1314

Katelbach, Tadeusz. PRAGMATISM IN POLISH-GERMAN AFFAIRS. Poland & Germany, v. II, July/Dec. 1967: 29-35. DK418.5.G3P55, v. II

Explains that for the foreseeable future the present division of Germany is in the Polish national interest. Poland's attitude toward German reunification could have been different "if the German Federal Government had accepted the Oder-Neisse frontier years ago, as had most of the West German public."

1315

Kuby, Heinz. GERMAN FOREIGN, DEFENCE AND EUROPEAN POLICY. Journal of Common Market studies, v. 6, Dec. 1967: 156-178.
HC241.J6, v. 6

Analyzes the problems and proposals involved in the question of German reunification. The author states that France would either prevent reunification or impose constraints on German foreign policy that would eliminate any danger to French "independence." And German foreign policy cannot be modeled after French policy because an independent German policy would be considered inflammable and because the French have failed to "unbalance" the bipolar world. A reunited Germany would be able to sign a nonproliferation treaty whereas West Germany must have a voice in atomic matters to keep it from becoming subjected to political blackmail. The neutralization of Germany is an impossible illusion. An attempt to neutralize its economic supremacy could not contribute to the stabilization of the situation in central Europe. The chief objective of German foreign policy should not be the reunification of Germany as a nation-state but the reunification of the German people within a West European federation. Solutions must be made within a European context, and a political Europe will have a better chance of success if it works with, not against, the United States.

1316

Laquer, Walter Z. THE MIDDLE EAST IS POTENTIALLY MORE DANGEROUS THAN VIETNAM. New York times magazine, May 5, 1968: 34-35, 60, 62, 65, 67-68, 70, 72. AP2.N6575, 1968

A fourth Arab-Israeli war appears inevitable. The Arabs, of course, are not ready for another round, but Nasser is unable to find an alternative solution to the frustrations of poverty at home and humiliating defeat abroad, and the supposedly moderate Hussein is the captive of the fanatical Al Fatah. For the militant Arabs the question is not whether to fight but how and when. An economic war of attrition has been suggested, but guerrilla war on the Vietnam model and hit-and-run border raids more likely will be attempted on an increasing scale. None of these will work against Israel. Israel's military victory has improved its security posture considerably but at the same time has made a final political settlement with the Arabs less likely than ever. The present Soviet policy is to probe

for weak spots in Western positions, and in this respect the Middle East is tempting. The Russians are aware, however, that a Great Power confrontation in that area could be disasterous. They should also be aware that the importance of the Middle East has been greatly exaggerated. Probably no American or Soviet initiative could break the Arab-Israeli deadlock or prevent another military clash, but a U.S.-Soviet agreement not to intervene would at least localize the conflict. American policy should be directed toward such an agreement and should be clearly advertised as such. Uncertainty or ambiguity of intentions in this case only increase the danger of a Soviet-U.S. confrontation.

1317

Lavan, Spencer. THE PATH TO HOSTILITY: THE SHAPING OF THE ARAB MIND. Register-leader, v. 150, Mar. 1968: 8-11.
BX9801.C7, v. 150

The American reaction to the Middle East crisis is a glaring example of the tendency to think only in terms of "friend" or "foe." There is ample justification for a wholehearted support of Israel. Yet the pro-Israeli feeling kindled by cultural and emotional commitment to the Jews and fanned by the mass media have at the same time produced an utterly unfavorable opinion of the Arabs as unreasonable, hysterical, and unbending. The Arab world is not a monolithic entity; its values must be viewed only after a careful analysis of Arab culture and history in specific areas and in specific eras. Then it will be easier to see why the Arab attitude toward the non-Arab elements has grown from "one of liberal openness to one of hardened hostility." Along the path of gradual Arab downfall Israel's emergence was the last straw; its birth happened at a time when the Arabs were concerned with establishing their identity apart from Western capitalist and Eastern Communist domination. Arab-American relations suffered their first major blow with U.S. recognition of Israel and its acceptance of the takeover of Arab land by the Jews. Their argument that Palestine was the home of Judaism is hardly acceptable to the Arabs who have dwelled in that area for 13 centuries. Yet even more upsetting than this is the "continual American support and encouragement of conservative, status quo Arab governments," while Arabs attempting social and economic improvements "through governments which often appeared to be more left-wing than their predecessors" were frowned upon. No wonder that the progressive Arab nations turn to Moscow for aid and arms. This is a good moment for restoring broken links. Americans should accept the Arabs "on their own terms and without reference to Israel as the overriding concern." Arguing the "very few rights and many wrongs" of the June war won't help: the path to peace calls for "thoughtful understanding rather than one-sided judgmental criticism."

1318

Masson, P., and J. Labayle Couhat. [SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN] La présence navale soviétique en Méditerranée. Revue de défense nationale, v. 24, May 1968: 858-872. illus.
D410.R45, v. 24

Traces Russia's attempt to control the Mediterranean area from Catherine the Great's time to Breznev and Kosygin's. The authors feel that the Soviet fleet has created a balance of power in the Near East and conclude that, despite the dangers inherent in a situation where two powers are competing for the same area, the American forces must remain there. The most menacing factor in the Soviet presence is its arms shipments to the littoral states of North Africa.

1319

Mayer, Horst F. [THE ARAB WORLD AND THE SOVIET UNION; THE NEAR EAST CONFLICT IN THE EAST BLOC PRESS] Der arabische Raum und die Sowjetunion; der Nahostkonflikt in der Presse des Ostblocks. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, Sept./Oct. 1967: 381-385. illus.
P&GP RR

Using extracts from major Soviet, Polish, Yugoslav, and Red Chinese publications, describes Soviet political designs with regard to the Near East and the Eastern bloc's attitudes toward the state of Israel. Before and during the conflict, Moscow attached great importance to radical leftwing movements in the Arab world.

1320

[THE MEDITERRANEAN--A LANDLOCKED SEA OF THE U.S.S.R.?] Das Mittelmeer--ein Binnenmeer der UdSSR? [editorial] Der klare Blick, v. 9, Jan. 10, 1968: 1, 9. P&GP RR

"The presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean has altered the balance of power there. The situation will change further (in favor of the U.S.S.R.)." This prophecy by Krasnaia zvezda may come true; the Mediterranean today is open to the Soviet Union and could perhaps be at its disposal tomorrow. The Russians have a Mediterranean fleet consisting of an estimated 50 ships, which call at Egyptian and Syrian harbors, and a naval base in Algeria near completion. This naval force counters the American 50-ship 6th Fleet, which is supported by the NATO allies. However, whether Turkey would dare close its straits during a Mediterranean crisis is not certain; Greece cannot be relied on and is actually a political handicap; and the Italian leftists are demanding the closing of Naples to the 6th Fleet. The Mediterranean, a possible mousetrap for the Soviet fleet a year ago, could become one for the 6th Fleet today. The Arab countries are by no means dependable Soviet allies; but the U.S.S.R., by resupplying, rearming, and retraining the Arabs, has extended its influence in several Arab countries and is planning to introduce "lex sovietica" in the Mediterranean area.

1321

Meyer-Ranke, Peter. [THE ARAB CARD GAME WITH USE OF NON-ARAB TRUMP CARDS] Arabisches Kartenspiel mit ausserarabischen Trümpfen. Aussenpolitik, v. 19, Mar. 1968: 173-183.
D839.A885, v. 19

Contrary to some belief, no direct Arab-Israeli peace talks, multilateral or bilateral, ever took place after the Arab defeat in June 1967. The Arab summit conference of August 1967 produced no viable offer for ending the Arab-Israeli dispute. Because of political discord between the Arab States, which was heightened by their disparate economic interests, another conference, planned for January 1968, never materialized. Meanwhile Soviet political and strategic interests in the area assert themselves and are likely to spread to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. This, combined with the planned withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf, reduces the chances for negotiated peaceful coexistence between Israel and the Arab States.

1322
Molchanov, Nikolai N. [EUROPE'S FEARS AND HOPES] Trevogi i nadezhdy Evropy. Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1967. 103 p.
D1058.M66

Partial contents. --Europe's past. --Europe today. The United States and Europe. West Germany and Europe. France and Europe. The U.S.S.R. and Europe. --Europe's future.

Compares contemporary Europe and its prospects for the future with the Europe of the past. Two factors now create a favorable climate for peace: the development of nuclear weapons, whose utilization in a future war would be tantamount to the destruction of Europe, and the tireless efforts of the Socialist states to maintain continental peace and security.

1323
Morris, Joe A. ARABIAN AFTERMATH: THE STRATEGY OF DAYDREAMS. Nation, v. 206, Jan. 22, 1968: 110-112.
AP2.N2, v. 206

The shock of the June defeat has worn off--and the Arab masses are left with a legacy of hopelessness and frustration. The Israelis hoped that the bitter truth of the war would evoke a violent reaction, but there were no major political upheavals in the Arab world. In fact, "all the shaky Arab governments are now in a stronger position than they were before June," and the political nihilism of the Arabs has assumed the form of "a widespread resistance to any compromise settlement." With respect to Israel the Arabs feel wronged and they intend to make the most of it, looking to their ancient history for analogies--the Crusaders held their land for 70 years and were driven out, and this will eventually happen to the Jews. Technology in modern warfare may, of course, mean as much as numbers, but the Arabs believe in numbers "like 100 million Arabs against a paltry 2 million Jews." The June trauma has had, however, "one significant if transitory effect on Arab politics"; it has halted the strife between progressive and conservative factions in favor of the latter, which are rallied behind Saudi Arabia's King Feisal. Thus, instead of sitting back and contemplating an arena full of fighting Arabs, "Israel faces greater Arab political harmony than it has seen for many years." Among the upsets the Arabs have suffered in this century the June war has certainly been the most painful, but it has not been bad enough to send them flying "to the bargaining table on Israel's terms." What fascinates them today is the question of Israel's chance of survival in its present bloated form. This gives them hope that not the Jews but the Arabs will be the ultimate winners in the waiting game. It may be a dim hope, "but at present it is all they have."

1324
Murarka, Dev. RUSSIA PLAYS IT COOL. Spectator, v. 220, Apr. 5, 1968: 434-435.
AP4.S7, v. 220

Recent Arab-Israeli skirmishes foreshadow a long period of guerrilla warfare and demonstrate that Russia is irrevocably committed to the Arab cause. Although Russia is unwilling to fight Israel for the Arabs it has taken advantage of the situation and brought about a change in the balance of power in the Middle East. The Soviet Union has a naval presence in the Mediterranean and has won the political support of the Arabs by becoming their major source of arms and military equipment. However, the political instability in the Middle East and Arab hostility and indifference have created problems for the Russians. In order to consolidate its power with the aid of more stable governments Russia is searching for better relations with the "northern tier" states--Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey. Russia and Iran are restraining Saudi Arabia from acquiring new oil wealth in the Persian Gulf, and Iran has vowed that Britain's withdrawal East of Suez will not lead to an American takeover. With its growing influence in Iran, Russia is likely to consolidate its power beyond the Indian Ocean. But now it waits for a political settlement in the Middle East and plays the diplomatic game without firing a shot.

1325
Petković, Ranko. TWO FLEETS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. Review of international affairs, v. 19, Mar. 5, 1968: 4-5.
D839.R4, v. 19

An appraisal of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. presence in the Mediterranean and its consequences. The author considers the U.S. Fleet a threat to the independence of the Mediterranean countries and world peace and the Soviet fleet an aid to preserving freedom in these countries. Although the simultaneous presence of the fleets has established a balance of forces in the area, the possibility of a confrontation is a cause of tension. The author concludes that the same formula should be applied that relates to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, once NATO has disbanded. In this case, upon the departure of the U.S. Fleet the Soviet fleet would also leave the Mediterranean.

1326
Richardson, James L. GERMANY AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE; THE INTERACTION OF STRATEGY AND POLITICS. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966. 403 p.
UA646.3.R48
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents. --pt. 1. West German policy in NATO: Germany's alignment with the West, 1949-1951. Western alliance versus neutralization, 1952-1955. Germany adapts to NATO's nuclear strategy, 1956-1960. German-Allied discord, 1961-1963. --pt. 2. The Soviet threat: The Soviet political challenge. Soviet military policy. --pt. 3. NATO strategy: Deterrence and war: a general analysis. Defense in Europe. Deterrence in Europe. Nuclear control. Arms control. --pt. 4. The Berlin crisis: Pressure and resistance. The Berlin crisis, 1958-1960. The crisis continues, 1961-1962. Soviet objectives and interests. Issues in Western policy. --pt. 5. German-Allied relations; problems of reunification and détente: German reunification: the interests of the powers. Toward a policy for German reunification--Germany and its allies.

Examines the political and strategic background of the German question. Richardson believes that the Berlin crises and arms control have been divisive issues in German-Allied relations although they may eventually strengthen the NATO alliance, thus "differentiating it from the alliances of the past."

1327
Sa'adah, Mounir R. THE ARAB EXPERIENCE. Christian century, v. 85, Apr. 3, 1968: 419-423.
BR1.C45, v. 85

Analyzes the cohesive power of history, language, and religion in the Arab world and the anomaly of

Israel in its midst. As a political entity Israel may be destroyed by its own inner contradictions, and the Arabs will seal it inside its borders "even if their seal must be an international police force supplied by the United Nations." When the Arabs were embarking on the road to recovery after centuries of subjugation, the West forced an alien element upon them. To make amends and help heal the wound the West should encourage the Arabs to unite so they may help to build a world without wars.

1328
Salisbury, Harrison E. RUSSIA VS. CHINA: GLOBAL CONFLICT? Antioch review, v. 27, winter 1967-68: 425-439. AP2.A562, v. 27

If the problems surrounding China remain unremedied, they could propel the world into a nuclear conflict. China fears destruction from both Russia and the United States and believes that only through forceful expansion will it be able to feed its growing population. The Chinese hostility toward Russia derives from the long history of border conflicts between the two nations and the long-standing dispute between Soviet and Chinese Communist Party leaders. Khrushchev's attempts at rapprochement with the Chinese fell through when Moscow refused to give them the weapons they wanted to carry out an attack on Formosa in 1958. China was willing to risk war with the United States over Formosa because it feels war is inevitable between the two countries. Since China visualizes America as a dangerous and powerful enemy, which is currently threatening the Chinese mainland via Vietnam, it may attempt to use the Vietnam situation to trigger a war between the United States and Russia. In view of China's provocative attitudes and its inadequate resources, the situation seems hopeless. However, the trend toward catastrophe can be reversed by a program that would bring "China into the community of nations" and would provide for its basic food needs. By cooperating in aiding the Chinese without subjecting them to political pressures, the nations of the world may be able to escape the dangers inherent in current Chinese policies.

1329
Strausz-Hupé, Robert. ON THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN CONFRONTATION. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, May 1968: 38-41. illus. UG633.A65, v. 51

"At stake in Southeast Asia is not only the security and welfare of the local population and the fortunes of American arms, but also the credibility of American strategic power." Contrary to the popular myth that the Vietnam War is solely a confrontation between two third-rate Asian powers, it is partly a contest between the Soviet Union and the United States for dominance of Southeast Asia. Operating behind their North Vietnamese proxies, the Russians are indirectly challenging American strategic superiority. Although defense policymakers have assured the American public that Soviet technological breakthroughs and massive weapons buildups have not destroyed the U.S. capability for containing Communist aggression, their confidence is not reflected in "the sluggish and unsure conduct of the Vietnamese War." American statesmen must stand up to the Communist challenge in Southeast Asia and abandon their quest for bilateral understanding with the Soviet Union. Since "nothing stands between international order and chaos, freedom and tyranny, but American resolution and power," the United States cannot afford to lose the confrontation in Vietnam despite the costs and risks of escalating the war.

1330
Tilford, R. B. GERMAN COALITION POLITICS. Political quarterly, v. 39, Apr./June, 1968: 169-180. JA8.P72, v. 39

The official justification for the formation of the Grand Coalition of Christian and Social Democrats has been that only a government with broad support can carry through quick solutions to the problems that press upon the Federal Republic--German reunification, relations with Eastern Europe, electoral reform, and an alleged financial crisis. The problems have proved refractory, however, and division within the Coalition has frustrated decisionmaking. The result is a growing gap between Coalition rhetoric and action. There are serious dangers in this situation. The greatest is that failure of the coalition will be construed as failure of the democratic system. In this respect, German reunification is the most crucial issue. The extreme right already has benefited from the growing disillusionment, but so far the left has been too disorganized to do so. Many consider the Grand Coalition a sign of instability and antipluralistic tendencies in German society. In the face of uncertainty the Germans have always sought security in utopian and repressive solutions to social conflict. Since World War II the only real German opposition to the Federal Government has come from the East German regime. Within West Germany, domestic opposition has been subverted by the international opposition of the two Germanys. This can be seen most clearly in the Social Democratic Party, from which nuclear disarmers and academics have been excluded in order that the Party might keep its moderate and therefore Western credentials.

1331
Tong, André. [CONSEQUENCES OF THE VIETNAM WAR IN LAOS] Les conséquences du conflit vietnamien sur le Laos. Est & Ouest, v. 20, Jan. 16, 1968: 24-28. D839.A822, v. 20

Laos cannot realize peace or internal security as long as the North Vietnamese need to use its territory for sending troops and supplies into South Vietnam. Laos must fight against infiltrators who seek to destroy it in the name of an ideology that is totally foreign to the Laotian people. If the North Vietnamese and their Chinese allies were "honest" the 1954 and 1962 Geneva accords would be viable international agreements. However, they continue to violate Laotian territory and are contributing to the already flammable situation in Southeast Asia. Although the Laotian Communists (Pathet Lao) have insisted that they favor a constitutional monarchy and want to maintain the neutrality of Laos they have but one real objective: to replace the political regime in Laos with a Communist government.

1332
Toole, Wycliffe D. SOVIET INTEREST IN ARABIA. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, May 1968: 91-97. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 48

Traces Russia's involvement in Arabia, which began during the Second World War when the Russians attempted to control the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits by subverting territories and establishing bases in the Near East. Toole concludes that Russia's political objectives in Arabia--the use of the area as a stepping stone to Africa and the control of a strategic area

with vital communications routes--are being realized in part because of Britain's withdrawal East of Suez.

1333
Trombetas, Thomas P. THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS: A FEDERATION? THE UTILITY OF STRUCTURAL SOLUTIONS. In The Cyprus dilemma; options for peace. [New York, Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, 1967] p. 7-34. DS54.8.C87

Evaluates the proposed federative solution to the Cyprus problem advocated by the Turks and opposed by Greek leaders and finds that neither federation nor partition would be feasible or desirable. Only majority-rule principles, operative within constitutional safeguards, could provide "a basis for genuine democratic rule." But the Turkish-Cypriot minority's fears and Greek-Cypriot majority's frustrations will not let this happen overnight.

1334
Tsioupras, Kiriakos. THE CYPRUS ELECTIONS. New times, no. 10, Mar. 13, 1968: 18. D839.N483, 1968

The reelection of President Makarios by an overwhelming majority testifies to the support for his policy proposals. Makarios has proposed to ease tension by granting the Turks certain privileges, which should normalize the relations between the Turkish and Greek communities and enable them to live peacefully side by side. He has also suggested the demilitarization of the Cyprus Republic, in contrast to his opponent, who intended to turn Cyprus into a NATO base. The new measures will make Cyprus an independent, united, sovereign, and demilitarized state and help to consolidate peace in the eastern Mediterranean.

1335
Ward, D. R. APPEASEMENT ILLUMINATED--MIDDLE EASTERN LIGHT ON AN OLD CONTROVERSY. Contemporary review, v. 212, Mar. 1968: 151-155. AP4.C7, v. 212

Egypt's reoccupation of Sharm El Sheikh and closing of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping is analogous to Germany's remilitarization of the Rhineland, and a study of the consequences of Israel's response to Egyptian moves may throw light on the appeasement policy of Great Britain and France in the earlier crisis. Israel's preemptive strike neither improved its strategic position nor weakened Nasser's hold on Egypt. An Anglo-French preemptive strike in the Rhineland would have had as little effect on Hitler's position, except perhaps to strengthen it. Even if Hitler himself had been overthrown, his policy had the support of the overwhelming majority of Germans and would have been continued by his successor. Just as the present situation in the Middle East seems unjust to the Arabs, so the Versailles settlement seemed fundamentally wrong to the Germans. The means of the Anglo-French appeasement policy were open to serious criticism, but the policy itself was a legitimate alternative to a cold war that would have required keeping Germany in permanent subjugation and maintaining force levels unacceptable to the British and French.

1336
Waterkamp, Rainer. [POLITICAL OPTIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN AND GERMAN QUESTION] Politische Optionen für Europa- und Deutschland-Frage. Aussenpolitik, v. 19, Jan. 1968: 24-28. D839.A885, v. 19

In the fifties West Germans hoped that through subordination of their foreign policy to the West's and through West European integration they would eventually be able to unite Germany. Yet the political unification of Western Europe never materialized. It became clear in the sixties that German reunification can only be achieved through reunification of Europe, that it is a long, tedious process, and that it will never occur on purely Western or Eastern terms. Hence newly suggested options have underlined either an all-European solution or Europeanization of the problem of German reunification. Of the all-European policy options, one seeks a solution in East-West accommodation in Europe that would exclude both the Soviet Union, as a non-European power, and the German Democratic Republic, as its true satellite. The other would exclude only the German Democratic Republic and still another only the Soviet Union. There is also one that includes all European states without exception. Of the Europeanization options, one emphasizes East-West détente in Europe, accommodation between the two German states, and the eventual reunification of Germany within the framework of a European security system. Another calls for stronger Western support of the process of change in East European countries, especially the latters' aspirations for greater independence from the Soviet Union. There are also options that would cease to make German reunification the prime goal of West German policy. One of these rejects the nation-state concept for Germany and seeks confederation of the United States of America with an eventually confederated Western Europe. As to the relationship between the two Germanies one option rejects de jure and de facto recognition of the German Democratic Republic by the Federal Republic and insists on sole representation of all German interests by Western Germany. Another considers the two states as each representing its present area of power. Still another aims at a confederated Germany in a confederated Europe, and another suggests intensification and broadening of contacts between the two Germanies without official recognition of the German Democratic Republic. This option is directed at gradual coalescence of both parts of the nation.

1337
Zenovich, Mikhail. NATO TAKES AIM AT AFRICA. Soviet military review, Jan. 1968: 54-55. P&GP RR

The imperialists and reactionaries are forming a united front against the national liberation movements. A part of their overall strategy is to strike against the African peoples as is illustrated by the attempt to reinstate Tshombe in the Congo, by provocations against independent Zambia and Tanzania, by retaliatory operations against the patriots in Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, and by the imperialist intelligence agencies' activities aimed at splitting African unity. The establishment of new NATO headquarters in Portugal in February 1967 indicates that NATO is concentrating on the Portuguese colonies. The United States, West Germany, Britain, Belgium, and Israel are providing Portugual with naval vessels, fighter and bomber aircraft, and automatic weapons; and Portugal has increased its appropriations for the African war from 33 to 42 percent of its budget. Western military and economic aid is increasingly flowing into the racist African states; West Germany is cooperating with South Africa in developing nuclear weapons; Britain is aiding in the construction of a large aircraft works in Johannesburg; U S. investments in Rhodesia and South Africa

are expanding. Only an armed struggle can eliminate the racist threat and liberate the Africans from colonialism.

1338
Zoller, Henri. ["AL FATAH" FIGHTING FOR PALESTINE] "Al Fatah" im Kampf um Palästina. Weltwoche, v. 36, Apr. 11, 1968: 9. illus.
AP32.W4, v. 36

The rearmed Egyptians and Syrians are a lesser menace to Israel today than the Al Fatah terrorists, who are the only Arabs actively resisting the Israelis. The ill-trained Al Fatah have not been successful in the political mobilization of the Arab population against the Israeli occupants or in their guerrilla warfare against Israel because of Israel's liberal policy in the occupied territories and the effectiveness of Israeli intelligence. Now, however, the guerrillas are being assisted politically, militarily, and financially by Damascus, Baghdad, and Kuwait; Al Fatah recruiting centers (as far flung as Paris and Frankfurt) are not hiring mercenaries but educated partisans who are being properly trained. Although the Israeli Karameh operation against the Al Fatah has curtailed their activities on Israeli soil, the guerrillas' influence in the Jordan Valley is increasing, and they claim to represent all Palestinian Arabs. Israel may have to discuss Palestine's future with the Al Fatah and not with the Arab States.

2. Disengagement, Neutralization, etc.

1339
Becker, Kurt. [POLITICAL AND MILITARY NEUTRALIZATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE?--A FRENCH STUDY; GERMAN CONFEDERATION A LA CARTE] Politische und militärische Neutralisierung Mitteleuropas?--eine französische Studie; deutscher Bund à la carte. Zeit, v. 23, Feb. 13, 1968: 8.
AP30.Z39, v. 23

In terms of the German national interest and security criticizes a recent study by France's Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère on a future political order for central Europe. According to the centre, solution of the German question is a prerequisite for European peace and security. The study develops three European security models: one for East-West détente, another for entente, and the third for cooperation between East and West European nations. Becker believes that the French study should prompt Bonn to reformulate its European policy, especially on the question of priorities between détente, national security, and German reunification.

1340
Brodin, Katarina. SCANDINAVIA AND NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES. Disarmament, no. 16, Dec. 1967: 21-25. illus.
JX1981.P7D5, 1967

There may be a general consensus among Nordic countries on the matter of nuclear weapons but there is a difference in their motivation. The self-imposed arms restraint of Norway and Denmark is a result of careful consideration of military versus foreign policy, with domestic public opinion supplying the final word. Sweden's official stand is largely determined by its "genuine concern with the proliferation of nuclear weapons." Technologically advanced Sweden does not have to look abroad for atomic weapons; yet its Government has refrained from any decision, despite the clamor for a clear stand from proponents and opponents of a Swedish nuclear arms industry. Finland, on the other hand, bound by the 1947 peace treaty, has no option in the matter. Thus President Kekkonen's proposal for a nuclear-free Scandinavia has failed to arouse enthusiasm. Some even read into his initiative an ill-concealed mandate from Moscow, where a weakened Northern flank of NATO at the expense of Scandinavian security would be welcomed. However, considering Finland's location at the crossroads between East and West, Kekkonen's proposal is easy to understand; denuclearization of Scandinavia would save his country "from becoming involved in a possible nuclear war between major powers." Nonetheless, the proposal has a basic flaw: it calls for specific commitments by Scandinavian countries without a well-balanced system of mutual obligations and responsibilities. They would indeed be shortsighted to sign unilateral declarations forsaking their nuclear options while the Russians continue to stockpile nuclear warheads. It is evident that the problems facing Scandinavian nations must be viewed in the context of European security as a whole. As long as there is no agreement on disarmament and arms control no country can be expected to give up its freedom of action and sign an agreement banning nuclear weapons from the area.

1341
DENUCLEARIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA. UN monthly chronicle, v. 5, Jan. 1968: 25-26.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 5

The General Assembly resolution welcoming the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America as a significant step toward preventing the worldwide proliferation of nuclear weapons. By a vote of 82 to none, with 23 abstentions, the Assembly called upon all states to cooperate with the provisions of the treaty. Nuclear-weapon powers were invited to sign Protocol 2 of the treaty, in which they would pledge not to use nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty. The resolution recommended that all states located within the limits of the geographical zone established by the treaty and all states responsible for territories within this zone become parties to the treaty as soon as possible.

1342
Druto, Jan. [THE DENUCLEARIZATION PROBLEM] Le problème de la dénucléarisation. Revue militaire générale, Feb. 1968: 193-202.
U2.R48, 1968

Text of an address before the International Academy of Diplomacy.

Poland is working diligently toward a solution to the security problem in Europe. The Rapacki plan proposed a nuclear-free zone in central Europe, to be achieved through a freeze on nuclear weapons and negotiations for the reduction of conventional armaments. The Gomułka plan asked for a pledge by nuclear powers not to turn over nuclear weapons to other countries and the elimination of any further nuclear production for military purposes. The greatest obstacle to the denuclearization of central Europe is the Federal Republic of Germany; it has failed to make any positive statements regarding the Oder-Neisse boundary problem and refuses to recognize East Germany while claiming to represent all of Germany. But Poland is not discouraged, despite West Germany's attitude toward these problems and the nuclear weapons question. It stands by its proposals for the relaxation of tension in central

Europe, which it believes are the key to peace and security for all of Europe.

1343
Khvostov, V. THE U.S.S.R. AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. International affairs (Moscow) Feb. 1968: 3-7.
D839.I465, 1968

The establishment of NATO and the Warsaw Pact have contributed to Europe's arms race and insecurity. Since 1954 the U.S.S.R. and other Socialist countries have formulated numerous plans and partial measures for Europe's security. The Bucharest Declaration of 1966, the Karlovy Vary statement of 1967 and other proposals call for the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw pact and their replacement by a collective security system, advocate creation of nuclear-free zones, and support the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The security system would be based on West Germany's recognition of the political and territorial status quo in Europe and of two equal German states and the denial to Bonn revanchists of access to nuclear weapons in any form. The U.S.S.R. has also recommended an all-European conference to promote European security.

1344
Mosely, Philip E. THE UNITED STATES AND EAST-WEST DETENTE: THE RANGE OF CHOICE. Journal of international affairs, v. 22, no. 1, 1968: 5-15.
JX1.C6, v. 22

To move from coexistence to détente is to go beyond a relationship based on the mere avoidance of nuclear war to one actively committed to resolving East-West tensions. The goal is a more stable international equilibrium, but the outcome could be just the contrary unless adjustments are based on "balanced, reciprocal, and mutually benefical concessions." The logical choice of partners for détente are the United States and the Soviet Union, but the Americans are hampered by West European fears of a new Yalta. Western Europe itself could be the West's negotiator, but political disunity and dependence on the U.S. nuclear deterrent make that choice unrealistic. The Soviet Union's ability to negotiate is restricted by its decision to treat Germany as a revanchist bugaboo in order to strengthen its hold on Eastern Europe. The German problem is point one on any agenda for détente but is insoluable at present, and there would seem to be few promising opportunities elsewhere for agreement. Prospects for progress in arms control are not promising since the détente atmosphere has already so weakened the Western military position that further concessions by the West are out of the question. To date, the effects of the developing détente have been quite onesided, with the Soviet Union receiving tangible advantages in exchange for psychological and symbolic concessions. In contrast, the United States has received no measurable benefits. Despite the difficulties, however, the spirit of détente has made some headway. The problem now is that détente "must be deepened and must reach inside the major powers to influence their thinking and feelings."

1345
N.A.T.O., WARSAW PACT AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. Pacifist, v. 7, Jan. 1968: 12.
P&GP RR

"Statement issued by the International Council of the War Resisters' International at its meeting . . . in July, 1967."

The War Resisters' International regards all military pacts as devices that increase the danger of war and lessen the chances for peace. It opposes the Warsaw Pact and NATO--the latter because it "includes the dictatorships of Greece and Portugal" and also the United States, which is involved in "one of the most brutal military adventures of the 20th century." Dissolution of these military pacts alone, however, would not strengthen Europe's security; it could lead to U.S. or Soviet bilateral military agreements with individual countries and Germany's acquisition of nuclear arms. Thus a disbanding of existing military pacts must include demilitarization of Europe to end its unnatural division into two spheres of influence. What is now needed is a European community that takes action instead of merely reacting to events. Europe should be free to act, its independence serving "to contain American power and aiding the necessary liberalisation of the nations of Eastern Europe." One nation leaving the alliance could stimulate action by others. The War Resisters' International invites the cooperation of other international peace organizations in rallying public opinion against the Warsaw Pact and NATO; it especially wants to hinder NATO from being retained in its present form after 1969.

D. OUTER SPACE

1346
Dembling, Paul G., and Daniel M. Arons. THE EVOLUTION OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY. Journal of air law and commerce, v. 33, summer 1967: 419-456.
LL

Reviews opinions and international agreements on the peaceful uses of outer space and the events preceding the summer 1966 session of the U.N. General Assembly's Committee on outer space. The author concentrates on the two draft treaties introduced at the session and elaborates on the discussions and modifications of these drafts adopted in final form toward the end of 1966. The treaty, approved by acclamation by the United Nations General Assembly, was signed on January 27, 1967, by 60 nations, including the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. It is evidence of an international consensus on utilization of outer space and celestial bodies for peaceful purposes only and for the benefit of all mankind and is a major step "toward assuring the peace essential for the longer journey."

1347
Finch, Edward R. OUTER SPACE FOR "PEACEFUL PURPOSES." American Bar Association journal, v. 54, Apr. 1968: 365-367.
LL

Examines article 4 of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, analyzing the semantics of the words "peaceful purposes." The author points out that the term used in the treaty means nonmilitary or nonaggressive but that it does not "preclude the use of military personnel for outer space exploration."

1348
NEW RUSSIAN BOOSTER COULD ALTER U.S. LEAD. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Apr. 22, 1968: 15.
UG630.M54, v. 21

The present U.S. lead in the race to the moon could be upset if the Saturn V booster problems continue and if the Russians succeed in launching their new booster in 1968. Considering recent Soviet space exploits, U.S. officials estimate that the U.S.S.R. could carry out a "manned flight around the Moon before this country has the option to do so." On the other hand, it takes two to four flights to man-rate the booster, and America still hopes to undertake a manned landing in 1969.

1349

United Nations. INTERNATIONAL SPACE BIBLIOGRAPHY. New York, 1966. 166 p. ([United Nations. Document] A/AC.105/33)
JX1977.A2 A/AC.105/33

Part of a space literature survey undertaken by the U.N. Secretariat "to assist the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space" in its effort to expand popular understanding of space activities. The bibliography contains mostly entries supplied by member states in reply to the Secretary General's inquiry. It covers all subject areas of interest to the nonspecialist, including space exploration and space science, general and historical; goals and tools of space research; manned space flight and space medicine; astronomy; and the economic, social, legal, and political implications of space activities and international cooperation in space.

1350

Van Osten, Richard. REVAMPING OF EUROPE SPACE PROGRAM ASKED. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Apr. 8, 1968: 20. UG630.M54, v. 21

A special study prepared by the Advisory Committee on Programs to the European Space Conference recommends replacement of Europe's three space agencies--the European Space Research Organization, the European Launcher Development Organization, and the European Council on Telecommunications by Satellite--by a new authority. The study, which deals with technical as well as economic aspects of the program, advocates greater centralization, optional program participation by member states, and an increased budget to carry out a four-phase development program within the next decade.

1351

Waldheim, Kurt. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE. UN monthly chronicle, v. 5, Feb. 1968: 59-62.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 5

Because of its long standing concern that the knowledge gained from space exploration be used to benefit all mankind, the United Nations has invited governments throughout the world to send representatives to a conference on the peaceful uses of outer space, to be convened in Vienna on August 14, 1968. Although countless international meetings have dealt with specific scientific and technical aspects of space research, the U.N. conference will provide the first opportunity for both space and nonspace powers to discuss universal applications of space exploration. In vigorously pursuing their space programs, many states have placed a low priority on the practical uses of scientific knowledge gained from the programs. Satellites, for instance, have already contributed to the general welfare in the fields of meteorology and communications and could be used to extensively improve social and economic conditions in all nations. In addition to discussing the beneficial applications of space exploration, delegates to the Vienna conference will explore the opportunities for dissemination of information derived from space activities to all countries, including nonspace nations.

1352

Wilks, Willard E. SPACE AND MISSILE SYSTEMS ORGANIZATION: RVS GETTING LOTS OF ATTENTION AT SAMSO. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Mar. 25, 1968: 36-38, 40. UG630.M54, v. 21

Describes new projects envisaged by the Space and Missile Systems Organization [SAMSO] for the next few years and trends in satellite development. Reentry systems hold top priority since the reentry vehicle is "the only operational entity of the missile force that engages the enemy" and so its technology "actually decides the battle." Ballistic missile development, however, will continue to absorb a large portion of appropriations. In response to the Russian fractional orbital bombardment system studies of defense against such a system have been started. A special space group is investigating the concept of a multipurpose reusable spacecraft, unmanned or manned. Underway are also a number of space escape system studies. In the field of satellite operations, development in the next decade points to satellite "constellations" at synchronous or near-synchronous altitudes. Solving the question of survivability in a hostile setting, natural or man-made, involves a wide range of tasks.

E. VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS AND RESPONSES

1. Violation, Inspection, Verification

1353

Allkofer, O.C., J. M. Fox, and H. Hauser. [ANALYSIS OF THE ALPHA-EMITTING RADIONUCLIDES FROM RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT BY ALPHA-SPECTROSCOPY] Spektrometrische Untersuchung der Alpha-Strahlen im radioaktiven Fallout. Atomkernenergie, v. 13, Jan. 1968: 39-44. illus.
QC770.A8, v. 13

Evaluates transuranium elements in stratospheric fallout and the values given by plutonium and transplutonium elements in the tests. The authors also deduced the average value of the integral neutron flux produced by 1961-62 nuclear tests in the megaton range.

1354

Bauer, Camille. [CAPACITIVE APPREHENSION OF MEASURED VALUES ACCORDING TO THE COMPENSATING PRINCIPLE] Kapazitive Messgrössenerfassung nach dem Kompensationsprinzip. Neue Technik; nouvelles techniques; new techniques, v. 10, Jan. 1968: 3-6. illus.
TJ212.N4, v. 19

The suitability of electrical data processing for remote control, recording, sampling, and other purposes has raised interest in devices able to transduce measured quantities into electrical values. Capacitive transducers offer certain advantages in that area. The article discusses problems of use of adequate sensors and explains the principle of compensating a capaci-

tively detected measuring quantity for impressed proportional of direct current. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1355

Borovkov, I. I. [AUTOMATIC STATION FOR THE REGISTRATION OF GAMMA BACKGROUND] Avtomaticheskaia stantsiia dlia registratsii γ-fona. Gigiena i sanitariia, v. 32, Dec. 1967: 54-57. illus.
RA421.G5, v. 32

Describes the mobile radiometric laboratory PRL-60-E at the Lipetsk Regional Medical and Epidemic Station. This equipment records the gamma background and the contamination of various objects in the external environment.

1356

Butz, J. S. NEW VISTAS IN RECONNAISSANCE FROM SPACE. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Mar. 1968: 46-48, 50-51, 53-56. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 51

Sometime in the 1970's all nations may have access to real-time reconnaissance information that would reveal preparations for war in any part of the world. A fleet of about 100 satellites would provide the needed coverage. While U.S. Government officials appear reluctant to authorize production of a real-time orbital reconnaissance system, the United States is technically capable of placing such a system into operation within the next 10 years. Current U.S. aerial observation techniques produce very high quality data and could be incorporated into a real-time model. The United States has the basic technology to build the multispectral sensor systems, complex computers, and intricate communications systems needed to equip the satellites for monitoring global activities. In its interest and in the interest of world peace, the United States should seriously consider revitalizing the "open skies" policy.

1357

Galtung, Johan. POPULAR INSPECTION OF DISARMAMENT PROCESSES. Cooperation and conflict, v. 2, no. 3/4, 1967: 121-138.
P&GP RR

Statistical analysis of the results of a Norwegian public opinion survey designed to test the hypothesis that the general public can be relied upon to detect and report violations of disarmament agreements. Results of this survey are compared with those of an earlier study of six other nations. The surveys test only the willingness of the population to report violations and not its ability to do so. The influence of structural elements on willingness to report is slight. Individual attitude profiles seem to be the most significant determinant. The Norwegian survey found overwhelming general support for popular inspection in Norway, but the earlier data showed citizens of the Great Powers to be significantly less receptive to the idea. Although no detailed evidence exists on attitudes toward this subject in Socialist countries, willingness to report probably is much lower there than in the West.

1358

Ingram, Leo, John Strange, and William Flathau. RESEARCHING BLAST EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. Army research and development, v. 9, Jan. 1968: 18-20. illus.
U393.A8, v. 9

Summary of research into the effects and use of nuclear weapons conducted at the U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Miss. The effects of underwater explosions, such as shock propagation, shock reflection, and explosion generated waves and other research in the areas of cratering, ground-shock effects, protective structures, and laboratory simulation are outlined. The ultimate aim of the various aspects of the research effort is to formulate "procedures for predicting blast or shock loading information at any given point resulting from a nuclear explosion near, on, or beneath the earth's surface."

1359

Johansen, Anatol. [ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE; SATELLITES IN SERVICE OF DEFENSE] Elektronische Spionage; Satelliten im Dienste der Abwehr. Zeit, v. 23, Feb. 13, 1968: 17. AP30.Z39, v. 23

Describes the usefulness of Kosmos and Samos satellites for military reconnaissance and early warning systems.

1360

Jordan, P. [NEW FINDINGS IN THE FIELD OF MEASUREMENT OF RADIOACTIVITY WITH LIQUID SCINTILLOMETERS] Neuere Ergebnisse auf dem Gebiet der Radioaktivitätsmessung mit flüssigen Szintillatoren. In Schweizerische Vereinigung für Atomenergie. Bulletin, no. 4, Feb. 1968, Suppl.: 1-2.
P&GP RR

Describes a new, simplified technique of radiation measurement. The method gives "greater transparency of measured relationships" than do all other techniques now in use.

1361

Patijn, S. EURATOM, THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL: THE FIVE AND THE FIVE PRINCIPLES. Common Market, v. 8, Feb. 1968: 40-43.
P&GP RR

In their separate but identical drafts for a nuclear nonproliferation treaty [NPT] submitted in January 1968 to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the United States and the Soviet Union finally agreed on the wording of "the famous article III"--inspection. This essential question was left open in the former NPT drafts proposed jointly by the two powers; e.g., in their August 1967 proposal article 3 was missing altogether. To prevent conflict of their duties as members of the European Atomic Energy Community [Euratom] with their possible obligations under the NPT, Euratom's five nonnuclear members (the Five) agreed in October with the European Commission on five principles that should be incorporated in the NPT provision on inspection before any of them signs the treaty. The new American and Soviet draft proposals have taken into account four of these principles, among them that "safeguards under the NPT must be applied to source and special fissionable material and not to facilities." Disregarded, however, is the principle that no deadline be set by the treaty for the conclusion of an agreement between Euratom members and the

International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] on verification by the IAEA of possible Euratom safeguards under the NPT. The Five and the European Commission have contended that such a time limit would prejudice Euratom's position in negotiations between any of the Five and the IAEA. But the proposed article 3 provides for a 2-year negotiating period, "ample time if both parties are really willing to reach agreement."

1362

Thirlaway, H. I. S. DIAGNOSING UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS AND EARTHQUAKES. Contemporary physics, v. 9, Jan. 1968: 17-31. illus.
QC1. C76, v. 9

Although the amplitude of the signal itself is an inverse function of distance, it is easier to discriminate between an underground explosion and an earthquake at a great distance from the source than closer at hand. Two types of elastic waves are used--the longitudinal P-waves (detected by a seismometer of about 1 sec period) and the surface Rayleigh R-waves (detected by a 20 sec seismometer). An account is given of the principles of short-period array systems and their diagnostic performance, and of the independent diagnosis afforded by observations of the R-waves. The relevance of the experimental facilities and of the analytical results to more general geophysical and geological problems is briefly mentioned. (Abstract supplied)

2. Enforcement

F. CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

1363

Atkinson, James D. NPT--A BLOW TO U.S. DEFENSIVE ALLIANCES? In American Security Council. Washington report, Apr. 1, 1968: 1-4.
P&GP RR

The nonproliferation treaty (NPT) may be detrimental to U.S. security by shortening the life expectancy of American defensive systems. Multilateral and bilateral defensive treaties concluded by the United States after World War II may be disrupted and the efforts and sacrifices of the Vietnam War nullified. The draft NPT now under debate in the U.N. General Assembly shows a number of deficiencies; the most serious of them is the exclusion and denial of the American option "to selectively proliferate purely defensive nuclear armaments to hard-pressed U.S. allies" when this may some day prove of vital importance to U.S. national security. If upon careful examination the NPT does not actually contribute to U.S. security it should be rejected.

1364

Gilmore, John S., John J. Ryan, and William S. Gould. DEFENSE SYSTEMS RESOURCES IN THE CIVIL SECTOR: AN EVOLVING APPROACH, AN UNCERTAIN MARKET. Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1967. 201 p. illus. (ACDA/E-103) HC110. D4G54
Bibliography: p. 165-190.

Studies the economic consequences of reductions in defense demand and examines the applicability of defense system resources to the civil sector.

1365

Gross-Talmon, Paul. [CONCENTRATION AT ZERO LEVEL] Konzentration am Nullpunkt [by] grt. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Jan. 10, 1968: 20-22.
U3. W38, v. 12

Discusses results of merger efforts ordered by the West German Government to improve the aerospace industry's economic and technological standards. Gross-Talmon considers the efforts a failure owing mostly to the inadequate size of each merged production line. The author cites the adverse effects the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty would have on West German industry and contends that such a treaty would be against the politicomilitary interests of the Federal Republic.

1366

Santholzer, William. NUCLEAR FALLOUT AT HRADEC KRALOVÉ SINCE THE TEST BAN. Scientific world, v. 11, no. 6, 1967: 13-16. illus.
Q1. S8415, v. 11

According to measurements of radioactive fallout taken at the Medical Physics Institute of the Medical Faculty of the Charles University in Hradec Králové, Czechoslovakia, the amount of radioactivity in the environment declined after the test ban treaty was signed in 1963. Once massive testing ceased, the daily and monthly fallout samples collected at the institute showed a yearly decrease in radioactivity with occasional upward fluctuations due to French and Chinese nuclear explosions. If large-scale testing had continued, the environment could have been seriously contaminated with such dangerous fission products as radioactive strontium, caseium, carbon, and iodine. The human body is accustomed to small doses of natural radioactivity, but it cannot safely absorb large amounts of artificial radioactivity.

1367

Weidenbaum, Murray L. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AN ARMS CUT: COMMENT. Review of economics and statistics, v. 49, Nov. 1967: 612-613.
HA1. R35, v. 49

Discussion of an article by Wassily Leontief and others, "The Economic Impact--Industrial and Regional--of an Arms Cut," abstracted as item 937 in v. 2 of this bibliography.

Leontief's input-output analysis of the regional impact of possible U.S. defense cutback suffers from faulty categorization of factors. Far more important for regional economies than military payrolls are defense contracts with private industry, which consume a much greater part of the U.S. military budget than the former. Civilian payrolls from the military budget are also significant. Each of these three factors has a different geographical distribution. Thus their correlation on a regional level bears heavily on the empirical results.

1368

Weidenbaum, Murray L. PROSPECTS FOR THE AMERICAN ECONOMY DURING THE POST-VIETNAM PERIOD. [St. Louis, Dept. of Economics, Washington University] 1967. 46 l. tables.
HC106. 6. W4

Analyzes the long-term prospects for the American economy following the termination of the Vietnam War. Utilizing a set of long-range economic projections prepared by the Department of Commerce, Weidenbaum discusses the types of economic problems that are likely to arise in the coming decade. He attempts "to set forth the nature of the adjustments that appear needed to achieve certain objectives and to suggest the implications for the economy if the adjustments are not forthcoming."

G. OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

1369

Fisher, Adrian S. U.S. GIVES VIEWS ON SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR CONVENTION ON "NONUSE" OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, Jan. 1, 1968: 26-30. JX232.A33, v. 58

Statement made before the U.N. Political and Security Committee, Nov. 20, 1967.

Although the United States earnestly desires to avoid a nuclear holocaust, it cannot support the Soviet draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In the U.S. view nuclear war cannot be outlawed by the simple expedient of an agreement not to use nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear weapons stockpiles exist, the risk of nuclear war can be minimized most effectively by the maintenance of mutual deterrence capabilities. The Soviet proposal would provide nations with a false sense of security while actually increasing the danger of nuclear war by destabilizing the deterrent. Although the Soviet Union and the United States agree that a nonuse agreement must be accompanied by the eventual destruction of nuclear weapons in conformity with controls imposed by a treaty on general and complete disarmament, the United States disagrees with the priority the Soviet draft convention assigns to the two tasks. In each of their draft treaty outlines for general and complete disarmament the superpowers recognize that nuclear deterrent forces must be maintained until verification measures are in effect. The maintenance of these forces undermines the credibility of any prior agreement that they would never be used, so the existence of an unsafeguarded convention would not only prove dangerously deceptive but would also "debase the currency of international treaty making."

1370

Hanning, Hugh. THE WELFARE OF WAR. Twentieth century, v. 175, 3d quarter 1967: 26-27. AP4.N7, v. 175

Since universal disarmament appears impossible at the present time, the world's best hope for keeping the peace "now seems to lie in a change in the nature and purpose of armed forces." Instead of fighting, the armed forces of the nuclear age could help keep peace through civic-action activities. This new military concept has already been embraced by the governments of several emerging countries; they have successfully fought or even prevented civil insurgency by using the military to improve the welfare of the populace. In addition to contributing to political stability, a military civic-action program can give the serviceman valuable training that will benefit both him and the economy of his country. Perhaps as more and more civil functions are incorporated into the serviceman's life, he will become less interested in violence and more concerned with its prevention. Thus, the armed services themselves could provide "a way of harnessing the aggressive impulses of nations to creative purposes."

1371

Jacobsen, Kurt. VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE NORDIC COUNTRIES IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. Cooperation and conflict, v. 2, no. 3/4, 1967: 139-157. P&GP RR

Statistical analysis of the rollcall voting behavior of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden in the General Assembly from 1946 to 1963. Jacobsen relates the voting patterns of these states to a "center-peripheral" division within the Nordic group, and to East-West and North-South axes of international conflict. The evidence indicates that the Nordic group is drawing closer together, adopting a more pronounced northern orientation on the North-South axis, and moving from "a rather extreme Western position to a more neutral one."

1372

Kalela, Jaakko. THE NORDIC GROUP IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. Cooperation and conflict, v. 2, no. 3/4, 1967: 158-170. P&GP RR

Statistical analysis of the rollcall voting behavior of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden in the General Assembly from 1956 to 1966. Kalela classifies each Assembly proposal or resolution according to whether it reflects a Great Power, supranational, or Southern crisis issue. Nordic cohesion is found to be lowest on Great Power issues and highest on supranationalism. On Great Power issues, Finland is the most Eastern, Iceland the most Western, state. On Southern crisis issues, Finland is the most Northern, Iceland the most Southern, state. In the overall pattern of voting, the Nordic states must be classified as moderates, with Finland in particular probably coming closer to a position of neutrality on both Great Power and Southern crisis issues than any other state in the Assembly.

1373

Leary, Frank. VEHICLES FOR DEEP SUBMERGENCE. Space/aeronautics, v. 49, Apr. 1968: 52-65. illus. TL501.A786, v. 49

Examines the programs managed by private industry and by the Navy's Deep Submergence Systems Project Office for developing vehicles for underwater rescue, salvage, search, and survey missions at depths ranging from about 200 to 3300 fathoms. A new deep submergence marine technology is slowly emerging as designers begin translating conventional marine technology into equipment required for deep sea operations.

1374

Lidström, Jan-Erik, and Claes Wiklund. THE NORDIC COUNTRIES IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND ITS TWO POLITICAL COMMITTEES. Cooperation and conflict, v. 2, no. 3/4, 1967: 171-187. P&GP RR

Statistical analysis of the rollcall voting behavior of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden in the General Assembly and its First and Special Political Committees from 1956 to 1965. The voting record reveals a high degree of cohesion within the Nordic

group itself. Cohesion of the group with the United States and with the majority in the General Assembly is also high but is low with the Soviet Union. Cohesion is low on questions relating to peacekeeping missions and disarmament, even though this is the area of the group's most active interest. Group cohesion, which adds considerably to the influence of the Nordic States in the United Nations, is fostered by a practice of frequent intragroup consultation; but despite the advantages of unity the practice has never been extended to a mandatory concert of policy, nor could it be.

1375

Pollack, Herman. NATIONAL INTEREST, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND THE MARINE SCIENCES. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, Feb. 12, 1968: 211-215.
JX232.A33, v. 58

Paper "presented before the Marine Science Panel on December 27 during the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science at New York."

U.S. policymakers are currently looking for guidelines for the use of the ocean floor that will be acceptable to all nations and still serve the national interests of the United States. The State Department has established an Interdepartmental Committee on International Policy in the Marine Sciences to help define overall U.S. objectives in relation to the problems and opportunities that are foreseen. Many of the issues relating to the exploration of the world's oceans and the exploitation of their resources were debated last fall in the U.N. General Assembly. Ambassador Pardo of Malta proposed that the Assembly consider the establishment of an international agency to ensure the peaceful uses of that part of the ocean floor which is located beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. He suggested that any financial benefits from such a program be allocated to developing countries. While the Assembly representatives could not reach a consensus as to the limits of national jurisdiction over coastal waters, they raised many of the economic, administrative, disarmament, and legal questions implicit in international control of the deep ocean floor. The deep seas offer "meaningful areas for international cooperation and bridgebuilding between East and West, North and South," but there must be more knowledge of the deep ocean environment and its effect on national interests before effective international arrangements can be made in this field. As global interest in the oceans intensifies, the need to solve problems involving their usage becomes increasingly urgent since oceanic exploitation must be peaceful and based upon international cooperation if it is to prove profitable.

1376

PROHIBITION OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. UN monthly chronicle, v. 5, Jan. 1968: 23-25.
JX1977.AIU564, v. 5

On December 8, 1967, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution by a vote of 77 to none, with 29 abstentions, urging nations to conclude an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. The resolution requested the Secretary General to transmit the Soviet draft convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons to member states and to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee. All states were urged to consider the Soviet draft along with other proposals relating to the same issue and to conclude an appropriate international convention either through direct negotiations between themselves or through an international forum provided by a special conference or the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee. In explaining their favorable votes, representatives from Pakistan and Malta praised the resolution as a step toward nuclear disarmament. However, the Cuban representative stated his Government had to abstain from the voting because it was unrealistic to expect effective agreements on nuclear disarmament as long as the imperialist powers continued to resist any significant steps in that direction.

1377

Rosi, Eugene J. ELITE POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: FIVE WASHINGTON COLUMNISTS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING, 1954-1958. Social research, v. 34, winter 1967: 703-727.
Al.S53, v. 34

How effective are Washington columnists in communicating to their readers a frame of reference or systematic way of thinking about foreign policy or in illuminating specific foreign policy issues? An analysis of the columns of Walter Lippman, Joseph and Stewart Alsop, James Reston, Arthur Krock, and David Lawrence during the 1954-58 debate over the cessation of nuclear weapons testing reveals that only James Reston offered his readers the kind of factual information and balanced analysis useful to a genuine understanding of the testing issue. While these columnists as a group undeniably made some contributions to public understanding, greater political sophistication and a stronger commitment to impartial analysis are needed.

1378

RESERVATION OF SEA-BED AND OCEAN FLOOR FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. UN monthly chronicle, v. 5, Jan. 1968: 28-34.
JX1977.AIU564, v. 5

By a unanimous vote the General Assembly adopted a resolution submitted by the First Committee establishing a 35-member ad hoc committee to study the question of peaceful exploitation of deep sea resources, survey existing activities of international agencies in this field, and suggest a means of promoting international cooperation in the use and exploration of the seabed and ocean floor. The need for a special authority over the seabed was introduced by the representative from Malta who argued before the First Committee that modern technology had altered the traditional concepts of the use of the seas. He stated that within the present legal framework there is a real danger that the major powers might appropriate seabeds for military purposes. While many delegations felt the Maltese proposal for an international agency was somewhat premature, they foresaw dangers in an uncontrolled marine environment and suggested a number of approaches to the problem. The Soviet representative pointed out the need for extensive preparatory work by the member states and the Secretary General prior to the establishment of a permanent committee as suggested by the United States. A number of delegations supported the creation of an ad hoc working group that would analyze the legal, economic, military, scientific, and technological aspects of the problem. Other delegates suggested that the terms of reference of the proposed committee be narrowed and its findings combined with a report compiled by the

Secretary General from data submitted by appropriate technical organizations. During the debate several delegates pointed out ambiguities concerning the legal status of the ocean beds that would have to be clarified before further steps regarding their management became possible. There is a good deal of confusion regarding the rights of states to their offshore resources, the legal boundaries of the continental shelf, and the meaning of the Geneva Conventions on the law of the seas. After lengthy consultations the First Committee approved the draft resolution creating an ad hoc study group.

1379

SHELF-BOTTOM WORK NEEDS MAN-IN-THE-SEA TECHNOLOGY. Space/aeronautics, v. 49, Apr. 1968: 30, 35-36, 39-40. TL501.A786, v. 49

Points out the technological challenges that must be met in order to explore and exploit the continental shelf. Since the short term payoff is likely to be greater from shelf-limited programs than deep-submergence efforts, the Federal Government has allocated more than $400 million of its $518 million FY 1969 budget for marine science and technology to devise means for man to maneuver in the shelf environment. The Navy's sealab program is devoted to solving problems likely to be encountered by divers working at great ocean depths. The Navy is also striving to devise undersea vehicles that can transport divers and their equipment along the ocean floor. Although there are many political and legal questions concerning ownership of the ocean floor, it is in the best interests of the United States to push the frontiers of its continental shelf outward as far as possible "since the ultimate legalisms may have to wrap themselves around accomplished fact."

1380

Sisco, Joseph J. RECENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE OCEAN AND OCEAN FLOOR. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, Jan. 1, 1968: 17-19. JX232.A33, v. 58

Speech by the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 29, 1968.

Points out that studies by various international organizations have revealed that innovations in undersea technology are pushing back the frontiers of deep sea exploration and exploitation. New legal arrangements may be needed to promote international cooperation in the development and use of the deep ocean floor and prevent conflicts among nations competing for deep sea resources. Many of the legal, economic, and security issues involved in developing international controls over the deep ocean floor were surfaced in the U.N. General Assembly discussion of a proposal submitted by Ambassador Pardo of Malta. Pardo suggested the establishment of an international agency to ensure the reservation of the deep ocean floor for peaceful purposes. However, the U.S. Government stresses the complexity of the problems regarding the exploitation of the deep ocean resources, and Sisco advised it would be unwise for either House to take any direct action until the Government has examined these problems more thoroughly.

1381

Sisco, Joseph J. UNITED STATES REVIEWS PROBLEMS OF CONTROL OF PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, Jan. 8, 1968: 63-65. JX232.A33, v. 58

Statement made in the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 5, 1967.

The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] has contributed substantially to the expanding use of the atom to improve man's environment and is striving to provide assurances that nuclear materials will not be diverted from the peaceful purposes for which they are intended. Since nuclear reactors are now being built in all parts of the world, safeguards are needed to avoid an acceleration of the arms race. In addition to its theoretical studies, the IAEA has worked out a number of practical techniques to oversee nuclear activities dedicated to peaceful purposes. It has successfully applied its safeguards to several U.S. nuclear facilities, including the Nuclear Fuel Services plant near Buffalo, N.Y., and to U.S. bilateral programs for the supply of nuclear fuel to Colombia, Korea, and Venezuela. As soon as an effective safeguards system is established under a nonproliferation treaty, the United States will allow the application of IAEA safeguards to all its nuclear activities not directly affecting national security interests. The United States is determined to see "that the power of the atom will be dedicated not to death but to life."

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